RESUMO
We investigate the collective behavior of a system of social agents subject to the competition between two mass media influences considered as external fields. We study under what conditions either of two mass media with different intensities can impose its message to the majority. In addition to a collective state dominated by the stronger mass media and a disordered phase, we characterize two nontrivial effects as the parameters of the system are varied: (i) the appearance of a majority sharing the state of the weaker mass media, and (ii) the emergence of an alternative ordering in a state different from those of either media. We explore the dependence of both phenomena on the topology of the network of interactions. We show that the presence of long-range interactions rather than random connections is essential for the occurrence of both effects. The model can be extended to include multiple mass media and we illustrate it by considering three mass media fields acting on the system. Nontrivial collective behaviors persist for some ranges of parameters: the weakest mass media can convince the majority, and the system can spontaneously order against all applied fields.
RESUMO
We investigate an agent-based model for the emergence of corruption in public contracts. There are two types of agents: business people and public servants. Both business people and public servants can adopt two strategies: corrupt or honest behavior. Interactions between business people and public servants take place through defined payoff rules. Either type of agent can switch between corrupt or honest strategies by comparing their payoffs after interacting. We measure the level of corruption in the system by the fractions of corrupt and honest agents for asymptotic times. We study the effects of the group size of the interacting agents, the dispersion with respect to the average salary of the public servants, and a parameter representing the institutional control of corruption. We characterize the fractions of honest and corrupt agents as functions of these variables. We construct phase diagrams for the level of corruption in the system in terms of these variables, where three collective states can be distinguished: i) a phase where corruption dominates; ii) a phase where corruption remains in less than 50% of the agents; and iii) a phase where corruption disappears. Our results indicate that a combination of large group sizes of interacting servants and business people and small dispersion of the salaries of public servants, contributes to the decrease of systemic corruption in public contracts.
RESUMO
We investigate the collective behavior of a globalized society under the influence of endogenous mass media trends. The mass media trend is a global field corresponding to the statistical mode of the states of the agents in the system. The interaction dynamics is based on Axelrod's rules for the dissemination of culture. We find situations where the largest minority group, possessing a cultural state different from that of the predominant trend transmitted by the mass media, can grow to almost half of the size of the population. We show that this phenomenon occurs when a critical number of long-range connections are present in the underlying network of interactions. We have numerically characterized four phases on the space of parameters of the system: an ordered phase; a semi-ordered phase where almost half of the population consists of the largest minority in a state different from that of the mass media; a disordered phase; and a chimera-like phase where one large domain coexists with many very small domains.
Assuntos
Meios de Comunicação de Massa/tendências , Grupos Minoritários/psicologia , Simulação por Computador , Características Culturais , Humanos , Internacionalidade , Relações InterpessoaisRESUMO
We study the effect of mass media, modeled as an applied external field, on a social system based on Axelrod's model for the dissemination of culture. The numerical simulations show that the system undergoes a nonequilibrium phase transition between an ordered phase (homogeneous culture) specified by the mass media and a disordered (culturally fragmented) one. The critical boundary separating these phases is calculated on the parameter space of the system, given by the intensity of the mass media influence and the number of options per cultural attribute. Counterintuitively, mass media can induce cultural diversity when its intensity is above some threshold value. The nature of the phase transition changes from continuous to discontinuous at some critical value of the number of options.