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People often coordinate actions with others, requiring an adjustable amount of self-other integration between actor's and co-actor's actions. Previous research suggests that such self-other integration (indexed by the joint Simon effect) is enhanced by agent similarity of the co-actor (e.g., high in intentionality). In this study, we aimed to extend this line of research by testing whether experiencing agency over a co-actor's actions (vicarious agency) and/or action prediction strengthens the joint Simon effect. For this purpose, we manipulated experienced agency by varying the experienced control over a co-actor's actions (Experiment 1), and action prediction regarding the co-actor's actions (Experiment 2). Vicarious agency could effectively be induced, but did not modulate the size of the joint Simon effect. The joint Simon effect was decreased when the co-actor's actions were unpredictable (vs. predictable) during joint task performance. These findings suggest social agency can be induced and effectively measured in joint action. Action prediction can act as an effective agency cue modulating the amount of self-other integration in joint action.

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The experience of causing our own actions and resulting outcomes (i.e., self-agency) is essential for the regulation of our actions during goal pursuit. In two experiments, participants indicated experienced self-agency over presented outcomes, which varied in distance to their goal in an agency-ambiguous task. In Study 1, progress was manipulated at trial level (i.e., stimuli moved randomly or sequentially towards the goal). In Study 2, progress was constant at trial level (sequential), but varied at task level (i.e., goal discrepancy of the outcomes was random or decreased over trials). Study 1 showed that self-agency gradually increased in the progress condition as unsuccessful outcomes were objectively closer to the goal, while self-agency increased exponentially upon full goal attainment in the absence of progress. The gradual pattern for the progress condition was replicated in Study 2. These studies indicate that explicit judgments of self-agency are more flexible when there is goal progress.

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Earlier findings suggest that positions of power decrease self-other integration and increase psychological distance to others. Until now, however, evidence for this relation rests exclusively on subjective measures. The current research instead employed a vertical joint Simon task to measure self-other integration. This task assesses the extent to which people represent their own actions in reference to their co-actor's, also referred to as the joint Simon effect. Building on cultural associations between power and vertical elevation, we manipulated whether participants were in an elevated (high-power) or lower (low-power) seating position. Experiments 1a and 1b reanalyzed existing datasets and found that elevated (vs. lower) seating position decreased the joint Simon effect, consistent with predictions. Experiment 2 provides a high-powered replication of this finding. Yet, further analyses revealed that feelings of power - measured as a manipulation check and indeed demonstrating that the manipulation was successful - did not mediate or moderate the effect of seating position on the joint Simon effect. Therefore, it is possible that the effect of seating elevation was driven through other aspects of that manipulation than feelings of power. We discuss these and suggest ways to test these alternative explanations.

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When striving for long-term goals (e.g., healthy eating, saving money, reducing energy consumption, or maintaining interpersonal relationships), people often get in conflict with their short-term goals (e.g., enjoying tempting snacks, purchasing must-haves, getting warm, or watching YouTube video's). Previous research suggests that people who are successful in controlling their behavior in line with their long-term goals rely on effortless strategies, such as good habits. In the present study, we aimed to track how self-control capacity affects the development of good habits in real life over a period of 90 days. Results indicated that habit formation increased substantially over the course of three months, especially for participants who consistently performed the desired behavior during this time. Contrary to our expectations, however, self-control capacity did not seem to affect the habit formation process. Directions for future research on self-control and other potential moderators in the formation of good habits are discussed.

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Background: Schizophrenia is a disorder of basic self-disturbance. Evidence suggests that people with schizophrenia may have aberrant experiences of body ownership: they may feel that they are not the subject of their own body experiences. However, little is known about the development of such disturbances. Methods: Using a rubber hand illusion paradigm, we assessed body ownership in patients with schizophrenia (n = 54), healthy controls (n = 56), children/adolescents at increased familial risk of developing schizophrenia (n = 24) or mood disorders (n = 33), and children/adolescents without this risk (n = 18). In this paradigm, a rubber hand (visible) and a participant's real hand (invisible) were stroked synchronously and asynchronously; we then measured subjective illusory experiences and proprioceptive drift. Results: All groups showed the expected effect of the rubber hand illusion: stronger proprioceptive drift and increased subjective illusory experiences after synchronous versus asynchronous stroking. The effect of synchronicity on subjective experiences was significantly weaker in patients with schizophrenia than in healthy controls, and subjective ratings were positively correlated with delusions in patients. We found no significant differences between children/adolescents with and without increased familial risk. Limitations: Large individual differences raised questions for future research. Conclusion: We found subtle disturbances in body-ownership experiences in patients with schizophrenia, which were associated with delusions. We found no evidence for impairments in children/adolescents at increased familial risk of developing schizophrenia or a mood disorder. Longitudinal data might reveal whether impairments in body ownership are predictive of psychosis onset.

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When interacting with others, people represent their own as well as their interaction partners' actions. Such joint action representation is essential for action coordination, but may also interfere with action control. We investigated how joint action representations affect experienced control over people's own actions and their interaction partners' actions. Participants performed a joint go/no-go task, which is commonly used to measure to what extent people represent their own actions in spatial reference to their interaction partner (e.g., as 'left' vs. 'right'). After each second trial, participants indicated experienced control over their own action, their interaction partner's action, or over action inhibition. Despite this frequent interruption of the go/no-go task, we found strong evidence for the spatial representation of joint actions. However, this joint action representation did not affect experiences of control. Possible explanations and implications of these findings are discussed.

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Experiencing self-agency over one's own action outcomes is essential for social functioning. Recent research revealed that patients with schizophrenia do not use implicitly available information about their action-outcomes (i.e., prime-based agency inference) to arrive at self-agency experiences. Here, we examined whether this is related to symptoms and/or familial risk to develop the disease. Fifty-four patients, 54 controls, and 19 unaffected (and unrelated) siblings performed an agency inference task, in which experienced agency was measured over action-outcomes that matched or mismatched outcome-primes that were presented before action performance. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) and Comprehensive Assessment of Symptoms and History (CASH) were administered to assess psychopathology. Impairments in prime-based inferences did not differ between patients with symptoms of over- and underattribution. However, patients with agency underattribution symptoms reported significantly lower overall self-agency experiences. Siblings displayed stronger prime-based agency inferences than patients, but weaker prime-based inferences than healthy controls. However, these differences were not statistically significant. Findings suggest that impairments in prime-based agency inferences may be a trait characteristic of schizophrenia. Moreover, this study may stimulate further research on the familial basis and the clinical relevance of impairments in implicit agency inferences.

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People generally experience themselves as the cause of outcomes following from their own actions. Such agency inferences occur fluently and are essential to social interaction. However, schizophrenia patients often experience difficulties in distinguishing their own actions from those of others. Building on recent research into the neural substrates underlying agency inferences in healthy individuals, the present study investigates how these inferences are represented on a neural level in patients with schizophrenia. Thirty-one schizophrenia patients and 31 healthy controls performed an agency inference task while functional magnetic resonance images were obtained. Participants were presented with a task wherein the relationship between their actions and the subsequent outcomes was ambiguous. They received instructions to cause specific outcomes to occur by pressing a key, but the task was designed to match or mismatch the color outcome with the participants' goal. Both groups experienced stronger agency when their goal matched (vs. mismatched) the outcome. However, region of interest analyses revealed that only controls showed the expected involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex and superior frontal gyrus, whereas in patients the agency experience was not related to brain activation. These findings are discussed in light of a hypofrontality model of schizophrenia.

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Successful social interaction requires the ability to integrate as well as distinguish own and others' actions. Normally, the integration and distinction of self and other are a well-balanced process, occurring without much effort or conscious attention. However, not everyone is blessed with the ability to balance self-other distinction and integration, resulting in personal distress in reaction to other people's emotions or even a loss of self [e.g., in (subclinical) psychosis]. Previous research has demonstrated that the integration and distinction of others' actions cause interference with one's own action performance (commonly assessed with a social Simon task). The present study had two goals. First, as previous studies on the social Simon effect employed relatively small samples (N < 50 per test), we aimed for a sample size that allowed us to test the robustness of the action interference effect. Second, we tested to what extent action interference reflects individual differences in traits related to self-other distinction (i.e., personal distress in reaction to other people's emotions and subclinical psychotic symptoms). Based on a questionnaire study among a large sample (N = 745), we selected a subsample (N = 130) of participants scoring low, average, or high on subclinical psychotic symptoms, or on personal distress. The selected participants performed a social Simon task. Results showed a robust social Simon effect, regardless of individual differences in personal distress or subclinical psychotic symptoms. However, exploratory analyses revealed that the sex composition of interaction pairs modulated social Simon effects. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.

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Difficulties in self-other processing lie at the core of schizophrenia and pose a problem for patients' daily social functioning. In the present selective review, we provide a framework for understanding self-other integration and distinction, and impairments herein in schizophrenia. For this purpose, we discuss classic motor prediction models in relation to mirror neuron functioning, theory of mind, mimicry, self-awareness, and self-agency phenomena. Importantly, we also discuss the role of more recent cognitive expectation models in these phenomena, and argue that these cognitive models form an essential contribution to our understanding of self-other integration and distinction. In doing so, we bring together different lines of research and connect findings from social psychology, affective neuropsychology, and psychiatry to further our understanding of when and how people integrate versus distinguish self and other, and how this goes wrong in schizophrenia patients.

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People usually experience agency over their actions and subsequent outcomes. These agency inferences over action-outcomes are essential to social interaction, and occur when an actual outcome corresponds with either a specific goal (goal-based), and matches with action-outcome information that is subtly pre-activated in the situation at hand (prime-based). Recent research showed that schizophrenia patients exhibit goal-based inferences, but not prime-based inferences. Intrigued by these findings, and underscoring their potential role in explaining poor social functioning, we replicate patients' deficit in prime-based agency inferences. Additionally, we exclude the account that patients are unable to visually process and attend to primed information.

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The sense of self-agency is a pervasive experience that people infer from their actions and the outcomes they produce. Recent research suggests that self-agency inferences arise from an explicit goal-directed process as well as an implicit outcome-priming process. Three experiments examined potential differences between these 2 processes. Participants had the goal to produce an outcome or were primed with the outcome. Next, they performed an action in an agency-ambiguous situation, followed by an outcome that matched or mismatched the goal or prime, and indicated experienced self-agency over the action-outcome. Results showed that goals reduce self-agency over mismatching outcomes. However, outcome-primes did not affect self-agency over mismatching outcomes but even enhanced self-agency over mismatching proximate outcomes. Goals and outcome-primes equally enhanced self-agency for matches. Our findings provide novel evidence that self-agency experiences result from 2 distinct inferential routes and that goals and primes differentially affect the perception of our own behavior.

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Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action-outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action-outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.

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The present research explored when observing gaze shifts of another person, involving both the observer and a specific object, enhances desirability of the gazed-at object. Specifically, we offer an initial attempt to test the idea that a three-step sequence consisting of direct gaze at the observer, followed by object-directed gaze and then by direct gaze at the observer, cues the desirability of an object to the observer and hence increases the perceived desirability of the gazed-at object. We examined this hypothesis in three experiments by manipulating eye-gaze shifts and including a no-gaze control condition. In line with our prediction, results showed that the dynamic sequence of gaze shifts indeed increases perceived object desirability. These findings provide new evidence that a sequence of gaze behavior involving the observer and an object plays an important role in influencing affective evaluation of objects.

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Recent research suggests that one can have the feeling of being the cause of an action's outcome, even in the absence of a prior intention to act. That is, experienced self-agency over behavior increases when outcome representations are primed outside of awareness, prior to executing the action and observing the resulting outcome. Based on the notion that behavior can be represented at different levels, we propose that priming outcome representations is more likely to augment self-agency experiences when the primed representation corresponds with a person's behavior representation level. Three experiments, using different priming and self-agency tasks, both measuring and manipulating the level of behavior representation, confirmed this idea. Priming high level outcome representations enhanced experienced self-agency over behavior more strongly when behavior was represented at a higher level, rather than a lower level. Thus, priming effects on self-agency experiences critically depend on behavior representation level.

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