RESUMEN
The scientific community is increasingly concerned with the proportion of published "discoveries" that are not replicated in subsequent studies. The field of rodent behavioral phenotyping was one of the first to raise this concern, and to relate it to other methodological issues: the complex interaction between genotype and environment; the definitions of behavioral constructs; and the use of laboratory mice and rats as model species for investigating human health and disease mechanisms. In January 2015, researchers from various disciplines gathered at Tel Aviv University to discuss these issues. The general consensus was that the issue is prevalent and of concern, and should be addressed at the statistical, methodological and policy levels, but is not so severe as to call into question the validity and the usefulness of model organisms as a whole. Well-organized community efforts, coupled with improved data and metadata sharing, have a key role in identifying specific problems and promoting effective solutions. Replicability is closely related to validity, may affect generalizability and translation of findings, and has important ethical implications.
Asunto(s)
Experimentación Animal/normas , Conducta Animal , Investigación/normas , Animales , Difusión de la Información , Modelos Animales , Fenotipo , Reproducibilidad de los Resultados , Proyectos de Investigación , RoedoresRESUMEN
The body-mind problem invites scientific study, since mental events are repeated and repeatable and invite testable explanations. They seemed troublesome because of the classical theory of substance that failed to solve its own central problems. These are soluble with the aid of the theory of the laws of nature, particularly in its emergentist version [Bunge, M., 1980. The Body-mind Problem, Pergamon, Oxford] that invites refutable explanations [Popper, K.R., 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London]. The view of mental properties as emergent is a modification of the two chief classical views, materialism and dualism. As this view invites testable explanations of events of the inner world, it is better than the quasi-behaviorist view of self-awareness as computer-style self-monitoring [Minsky, M., Laske, O., 1992. A conversation with Marvin Minsky. AI Magazine 13 (3), 31-45].