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For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures.
Hannikainen, Ivar R; Machery, Edouard; Rose, David; Stich, Stephen; Olivola, Christopher Y; Sousa, Paulo; Cova, Florian; Buchtel, Emma E; Alai, Mario; Angelucci, Adriano; Berniûnas, Renatas; Chatterjee, Amita; Cheon, Hyundeuk; Cho, In-Rae; Cohnitz, Daniel; Dranseika, Vilius; Eraña Lagos, Ángeles; Ghadakpour, Laleh; Grinberg, Maurice; Hashimoto, Takaaki; Horowitz, Amir; Hristova, Evgeniya; Jraissati, Yasmina; Kadreva, Veselina; Karasawa, Kaori; Kim, Hackjin; Kim, Yeonjeong; Lee, Minwoo; Mauro, Carlos; Mizumoto, Masaharu; Moruzzi, Sebastiano; Ornelas, Jorge; Osimani, Barbara; Romero, Carlos; Rosas López, Alejandro; Sangoi, Massimo; Sereni, Andrea; Songhorian, Sarah; Struchiner, Noel; Tripodi, Vera; Usui, Naoki; Vázquez Del Mercado, Alejandro; Vosgerichian, Hrag A; Zhang, Xueyi; Zhu, Jing.
Afiliação
  • Hannikainen IR; Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
  • Machery E; Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.
  • Rose D; Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, United States.
  • Stich S; Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, United States.
  • Olivola CY; Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, United States.
  • Sousa P; Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University, Belfast, United Kingdom.
  • Cova F; Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland.
  • Buchtel EE; Department of Psychology, The Education University of Hong Kong, Tai Po, Hong Kong.
  • Alai M; Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy.
  • Angelucci A; Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy.
  • Berniûnas R; Institute of Psychology, Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania.
  • Chatterjee A; School of Cognitive Science, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India.
  • Cheon H; Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea.
  • Cho IR; Department of Philosophy, Seoul National University, Seoul, South Korea.
  • Cohnitz D; Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands.
  • Dranseika V; Institute of Philosophy, Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania.
  • Eraña Lagos Á; Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico.
  • Ghadakpour L; Independent Researcher, Tehran, Iran.
  • Grinberg M; Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria.
  • Hashimoto T; Department of Social Psychology, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.
  • Horowitz A; Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel.
  • Hristova E; Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria.
  • Jraissati Y; Department of Philosophy, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon.
  • Kadreva V; Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria.
  • Karasawa K; Department of Social Psychology, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan.
  • Kim H; Department of Psychology, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea.
  • Kim Y; Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, United States.
  • Lee M; Department of Psychology, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea.
  • Mauro C; CLOO Behavioral Insights Unit, Porto, Portugal.
  • Mizumoto M; School of Knowledge Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Ishikawa, Japan.
  • Moruzzi S; Department of Philosophy and Communication Studies, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy.
  • Ornelas J; Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí, Mexico.
  • Osimani B; Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, Munich, Germany.
  • Romero C; Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico.
  • Rosas López A; Department of Philosophy, National University of Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia.
  • Sangoi M; Department of Pure and Applied Sciences, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Urbino, Italy.
  • Sereni A; Faculty of Philosophy, Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS, Pavia, Italy.
  • Songhorian S; Faculty of Philosophy, Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy.
  • Struchiner N; Department of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
  • Tripodi V; Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Turin, Turin, Italy.
  • Usui N; Department of Humanities, Mie University, Tsu, Japan.
  • Vázquez Del Mercado A; Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico.
  • Vosgerichian HA; Department of History, Philosophy and Judaic Studies, Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel.
  • Zhang X; School of Humanities, Southeast University, Nanjing, China.
  • Zhu J; School of Information Management, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China.
Front Psychol ; 10: 2428, 2019.
Article em En | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31749739
Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one's actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one's actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.
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Texto completo: 1 Coleções: 01-internacional Base de dados: MEDLINE Idioma: En Revista: Front Psychol Ano de publicação: 2019 Tipo de documento: Article País de afiliação: Brasil País de publicação: Suíça
Texto completo
Adicionar na Minha BVS
Imprimir
XML
PubMed Links
Buscar no Google

Texto completo: 1 Coleções: 01-internacional Base de dados: MEDLINE Idioma: En Revista: Front Psychol Ano de publicação: 2019 Tipo de documento: Article País de afiliação: Brasil País de publicação: Suíça