Assessing the commensurability of theories of consciousness: On the usefulness of common denominators in differentiating, integrating and testing hypotheses.
Conscious Cogn
; 119: 103668, 2024 03.
Article
en En
| MEDLINE
| ID: mdl-38417198
ABSTRACT
How deep is the current diversity in the panoply of theories to define consciousness, and to what extent do these theories share common denominators? Here we first examine to what extent different theories are commensurable (or comparable) along particular dimensions. We posit logical (and, when applicable, empirical) commensurability as a necessary condition for identifying common denominators among different theories. By consequence, dimensions for inclusion in a set of logically and empirically commensurable theories of consciousness can be proposed. Next, we compare a limited subset of neuroscience-based theories in terms of commensurability. This analysis does not yield a denominator that might serve to define a minimally unifying model of consciousness. Theories that seem to be akin by one denominator can be remote by another. We suggest a methodology of comparing different theories via multiple probing questions, allowing to discern overall (dis)similarities between theories. Despite very different background definitions of consciousness, we conclude that, if attention is paid to the search for a common methological approach to brain-consciousness relationships, it should be possible in principle to overcome the current Babylonian confusion of tongues and eventually integrate and merge different theories.
Palabras clave
Texto completo:
1
Colección:
01-internacional
Base de datos:
MEDLINE
Asunto principal:
Neurociencias
/
Estado de Conciencia
Límite:
Humans
Idioma:
En
Revista:
Conscious Cogn
Asunto de la revista:
PSICOFISIOLOGIA
/
PSICOLOGIA
Año:
2024
Tipo del documento:
Article
Pais de publicación:
Estados Unidos