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Introduction: The concept of affordance refers to the opportunities for action provided by the environment, often conveyed through visual information. It has been applied to explain visuomotor processing and movement planning. As emotion modulates both visual perception and the motor system, it is reasonable to ask whether emotion can influence affordance judgments. If present, this relationship can have important ontological implications for affordances. Thus, we investigated whether the emotional value of manipulable objects affected the judgment of the appropriate grasping that could be used to interact with them (i.e., their affordance). Methods: Volunteers were instructed to use a numerical scale to report their judgment on how an observed object should be grasped. We compared these judgments across emotional categories of objects (pleasant, unpleasant and neutral), while also considering the expected effect of object size. Results: We found that unpleasant objects were rated as more appropriately graspable by a precision grip than pleasant and neutral objects. Simultaneously, smaller object size also favored this judgment. This effect was seen in all emotional categories examined in equal magnitude. Discussion: Our findings suggest that the emotional value of objects modulates affordance judgments in a way that favors careful manipulation and minimal physical contact with aversive stimuli. Finally, we discuss how this affective aspect of our experience of objects overlaps with what affordances are conceptualized to be, calling for further reexamination of the relationship between affordances and emotions.

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BACKGROUND: The biomedical understanding of chronic musculoskeletal pain endorses a linear relationship between noxious stimuli and pain, and is often dualist or reductionist. Although the biopsychosocial approach is an important advancement, it has a limited theoretical foundation. As such, it tends to be misinterpreted in manners that lead to artificial boundaries between the biological, psychological, and social, with fragmented and polarized clinical applications. OBJECTIVE: We present an ecological-enactive approach to complement the biopsychosocial model. In this approach, the disabling aspect of chronic pain is characterized as an embodied, embedded, and enactive process of experiencing a closed-off field of affordances (i.e., shutting down of action possibilities). Pain is considered as a multi-dimensional, multicausal, and dynamic process, not locatable in any of the biopsychosocial component domains. Based on a person-centered reasoning approach and a dispositional view of causation, we present tools to reason about complex clinical problems in face of uncertainty and the absence of 'root causes' for pain. Interventions to open up the field of affordances include building ability and confidence, encouraging movement variability, carefully controlling contextual factors, and changing perceptions through action according to each patient's self-identified goals. A clinical case illustrates how reasoning based on an ecological-enactive approach leads to an expanded, multi-pronged, affordance-based intervention. CONCLUSIONS: The ecological-enactive perspective can provide an overarching conceptual and practical framework for clinical practice, guiding and constraining clinicians to choose, combine, and integrate tools that are consistent with each other and with a true biopsychosocial approach.

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Object affordance refers to possibilities to interact with the objects in our environment, such as grasping. Previous research shows that objects that afford an action activate the motor system and attract attention, for example they elicit an enhanced frontal negativity and posterior P1 in the event-related potential. An effect on posterior N1 is discussed. However, previous findings might have resulted from physical differences between affording and non-affording stimuli, rather than affordance per se. Here we replicated the frontal negativity and posterior P1 effects and further explored the posterior N1 in affordance processing under constant visual input. An ambiguous target was primed either with an affording (pencils) or non-affording (trees) context. Although physically always identical, the target elicited an enhanced frontal negativity and posterior P1 in the pencil prime condition. Posterior N1 was reduced and grip aperture in a grasping task was smaller in the affording context. Source localization revealed stronger activation in occipital and parietal regions for targets in pencil versus tree prime trials. Thus, we successfully show that an ambiguous object primed with an affording context is processed differently than when primed with a non-affording context. This could be related to the ambiguous object acquiring a potential for action through priming.

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The avoidance of a hole in the pathway while walking has been systematically investigated; however, depending on the dimensions of the hole, the option to avoid it is infeasible, and it is necessary to use the so-called accommodation strategy to step into the hole. We investigated the critical point between the avoidance and accommodation strategies when dealing with a hole in the ground during locomotion of young and older adults. Young and older adults performed two tasks: verbal estimation and walking. We used holes of different lengths and constant depth (12 cm). In the verbal estimation task, participants stood and looked at each hole and verbally respond if they would step into or avoid it. In the walking task, they walked and chose to either step or avoid the hole. Both age groups preferred to step into the hole when it was larger than 1.3 times their foot length in both tasks. The perception of affordances of young and older adults to step into a hole was similar, and it was unaffected by the investigated tasks. Thus, our participants preferred to have a safety margin that was large enough to guarantee that the whole foot would accommodate within the hole.

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Os estudos sobre o comportamento humano no trânsito são recorrentes no campo da psicologia. Dentre as abordagens que se dedicam ao tema encontrase a Psicologia Ambiental e a perspectiva ecológica de James Jerome Gibson sobre a percepção. O autor elaborou uma teoria que busca a compreensão da relação entre as pessoas e o ambiente de forma direta, a teoria das affordances. A partir do entendimento de affordances como informações disponíveis no ambiente para a ação, propõe-se esta teoria como um novo olhar sobre o comportamento dos condutores. Representa uma alternativa para a compreensão da relação entre o comportamento dos motoristas e o ambiente de trânsito. Assim, a partir do entendimento dos principais conceitos da teoria, a proposta deste ensaio é convidar o leitor a pensar a relação entre ambiente de trânsito e comportamento dos motoristas como intrinsicamente relacionados, buscando evidenciar a reciprocidade da relação entre o agente (motorista) e o ambiente (no caso, o de trânsito)

Studies on human behavior in traffic are recurrent in the field of psychology. Among the approaches that focus on this topic is Environmental Psychology and the ecological perspective of James Jerome Gibson on perception. The author has developed a theory that seeks to understand the relationship between people and environment in a direct way, the theory of affordances. From the understanding of affordances as available information in the environment for action, the theory is proposed as a new perspective on drivers' behavior. It represents an alternative for understanding the relationship between driver behavior and the traffic environment. Thus, from the understanding of the main concepts of the theory, this study invites the reader to think about the relation between the traffic environment and the behavior of the drivers as intrinsically related, seeking to show a reciprocity of the relation between the agent (driver) and the environment (in this case, traffic)

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In this paper we reject the nature-culture dichotomy by means of the idea of affordance or possibility for action, which has important implications for landscape theory. Our hypothesis is that, just as the idea of affordance can serve to overcome the subjective-objective dichotomy, the ideas of landscape and ecological niche, properly defined, would allow us to also transcend the nature-culture dichotomy. First, we introduce an overview of landscape theory, emphasizing processual landscape theory as the most suitable approach for satisfying both cultural and naturalist approaches. After that, we introduce the idea of affordance and we analyze a tension between sociocultural and transcultural affordances (affordances that depend on cultural conventions and affordances that depend on lawful information and bodily aspects of agents). This tension has various implications for landscape theory and ecological niches. Our proposal is that sociocultural and transcultural aspects of affordances could be systematically accommodated if we apply niche construction theory (the theory that explains the process by which organisms modify their selective environments) as a methodological framework for explaining the emergence of ecological niches. This approach will lead us to an integrative account of landscapes as the products of the interaction between human and environmental elements, making it a clear example of a concept that transcends the nature-culture dichotomy.

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In this paper we address a frontier topic in the humanities, namely how the cultural and natural construction that we call landscape affects well-being and health. Following an updated review of evidence-based literature in the fields of medicine, psychology, and architecture, we propose a new theoretical framework called "processual landscape," which is able to explain both the health-landscape and the medical agency-structure binomial pairs. We provide a twofold analysis of landscape, from both the cultural and naturalist points of view: in order to take into account its relationship with health, the definition of landscape as a cultural product needs to be broadened through naturalization, grounding it in the scientific domain. Landscape cannot be distinguished from the ecological environment. For this reason, we naturalize the idea of landscape through the notion of affordance and Gibson's ecological psychology. In doing so, we stress the role of agency in the theory of perception and the health-landscape relationship. Since it is the result of continuous and co-creational interaction between the cultural agent, the biological agent and the affordances offered to the landscape perceiver, the processual landscape is, in our opinion, the most comprehensive framework for explaining the health-landscape relationship. The consequences of our framework are not only theoretical, but ethical also: insofar as health is greatly affected by landscape, this construction represents something more than just part of our heritage or a place to be preserved for the aesthetic pleasure it provides. Rather, we can talk about the right to landscape as something intrinsically linked to the well-being of present and future generations.

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The visualization of tools and manipulable objects activates motor-related areas in the cortex, facilitating possible actions toward them. This pattern of activity may underlie the phenomenon of object affordance. Some cortical motor neurons are also covertly activated during the recognition of body parts such as hands. One hypothesis is that different subpopulations of motor neurons in the frontal cortex are activated in each motor program; for example, canonical neurons in the premotor cortex are responsible for the affordance of visual objects, while mirror neurons support motor imagery triggered during handedness recognition. However, the question remains whether these subpopulations work independently. This hypothesis can be tested with a manual reaction time (MRT) task with a priming paradigm to evaluate whether the view of a manipulable object interferes with the motor imagery of the subject's hand. The MRT provides a measure of the course of information processing in the brain and allows indirect evaluation of cognitive processes. Our results suggest that canonical and mirror neurons work together to create a motor plan involving hand movements to facilitate successful object manipulation.

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Neste trabalho, discutimos o papel do conceito de informação significativa no contexto da ação dos seres vivos. Argumentaremos que a proposta da causalidade mecânica não é capaz de explicar a complexidade das ações significativas dos organismos. Isto porque, em termos físicos, o melhor que se pode fazer é descrever a trajetória e troca de forças presente nos movimentos, mas não o significado das ações. Uma vez que as abordagens mecânicas da ação não englobam o aspecto significativo das ações, discutimos duas perspectivas informacionais que lidam com a relação informação/ação/significado, quais sejam: (i) a informacional-representacionista e (ii) a ecológico informacional. Por fim, discutimos as contribuições e limites de tais perspectivas para o estudo relação entre informação significativa e ação.

This paper aims to investigate the concept of meaningful action within the context of the action of living beings. We will argue that the proposal of mechanic causation is not enough to explain the complexity involved in organisms' actions; in physical terms, the best it can do is to describe the trajectory and the force exchange, but not the meaningful action. Since causal explanations do not encompass the meaningful aspect of actions, we will discuss two informational perspectives that deal with the relation between information/ action/meaning, such as: (i) the informationalrepresentationist and (ii) the informantionalecological. Finally, we will discuss the contributions and limits of both approaches to the understanding of the relation between meaningful information and action.

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Neste trabalho, discutimos o papel do conceito de informação significativa no contexto da ação dos seres vivos. Argumentaremos que a proposta da causalidade mecânica não é capaz de explicar a complexidade das ações significativas dos organismos. Isto porque, em termos físicos, o melhor que se pode fazer é descrever a trajetória e troca de forças presente nos movimentos, mas não o significado das ações. Uma vez que as abordagens mecânicas da ação não englobam o aspecto significativo das ações, discutimos duas perspectivas informacionais que lidam com a relação informação/ação/significado, quais sejam: (i) a informacional-representacionista e (ii) a ecológico informacional. Por fim, discutimos as contribuições e limites de tais perspectivas para o estudo relação entre informação significativa e ação.

This paper aims to investigate the concept of meaningful action within the context of the action of living beings. We will argue that the proposal of mechanic causation is not enough to explain the complexity involved in organisms’ actions; in physical terms, the best it can do is to describe the trajectory and the force exchange, but not the meaningful action. Since causal explanations do not encompass the meaningful aspect of actions, we will discuss two informational perspectives that deal with the relation between information/ action/meaning, such as: (i) the informationalrepresentationist and (ii) the informantionalecological. Finally, we will discuss the contributions and limits of both approaches to the understanding of the relation between meaningful information and action.

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Neste trabalho, discutimos o papel do conceito de informação significativa no contexto da ação dos seres vivos. Argumentaremos que a proposta da causalidade mecânica não é capaz de explicar a complexidade das ações significativas dos organismos. Isto porque, em termos físicos, o melhor que se pode fazer é descrever a trajetória e troca de forças presente nos movimentos, mas não o significado das ações. Uma vez que as abordagens mecânicas da ação não englobam o aspecto significativo das ações, discutimos duas perspectivas informacionais que lidam com a relação informação/ação/significado, quais sejam: (i) a informacional-representacionista e (ii) a ecológico informacional. Por fim, discutimos as contribuições e limites de tais perspectivas para o estudo relação entre informação significativa e ação.

This paper aims to investigate the concept of meaningful action within the context of the action of living beings. We will argue that the proposal of mechanic causation is not enough to explain the complexity involved in organisms’ actions; in physical terms, the best it can do is to describe the trajectory and the force exchange, but not the meaningful action. Since causal explanations do not encompass the meaningful aspect of actions, we will discuss two informational perspectives that deal with the relation between information/ action/meaning, such as: (i) the informationalrepresentationist and (ii) the informantionalecological. Finally, we will discuss the contributions and limits of both approaches to the understanding of the relation between meaningful information and action.

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O foco do artigo é a relação entre corporeidade e consciência para explicar como um ato que é pré-reflexivo e involuntário vem a se tornar reflexivo e voluntário, para se expressar posteriormente como pré-reflexivo e voluntário. Primeiro traça um paralelo entre psicólogos que recorreram à psicologia fenomenológica ou descritiva em experimentos sobre a consciência imediata dos sentidos. Segundo, ressalta o corpo como referencial ao movimento e à ação na constituição da autoconsciência, indicando divergências com teorias cognitivas e convergências com a fenomenologia existencial. Terceiro, toma-se o corpo situado interagindo com um mundo real para demonstrar que parte da apreensão fenomenal é concreta e situada. Por isto, se diz que a percepção é uma presentação e não necessariamente uma representação. Por fim, recorre-se a exemplos de estudos recentes em campos como a educação física, dança e ergonomia para sugerir aplicações fenomenológicas ainda pouco exploradas: como delineamento de layouts, planificação de ambientes e prevenção de acidentes...

The focus of the paper is the relation between movement and consciousness to explain how a pre-reflexive and involuntary act becomes reflexive and voluntary, to further on express itself as pre-reflexive and voluntary. First, it traces a parallel among psychologists that used phenomenological or descriptive psychology on experiments about the immediate consciousness of the senses. Second, it emphasizes how descriptive phenomenology recognized the body as reference for movement and action in the constitution of self-consciousness, indicating convergences with existential phenomenology. Third, the situated body is taken in its interactions with the real world to show how phenomenal apprehension is concrete and situated. Thus, it understands perception as a presentation and not necessarily a representation. Finally, it resorts to examples of recent studies in fields such as physical education, dancing, and ergonomics, suggesting an applied field of phenomenology not much explored as designing layouts, planning environments and preventing accidents...

El enfoque del artigo es la relación entre movimiento y consciencia para explicar cómo es que un acto que es pre- reflexivo y involuntario se vuelve reflexivo y voluntario para expresarse, posteriormente como pre-reflexivo y voluntario. Primero traza un paralelo entre psicólogos que recurrieron a la psicología fenomenológica o descriptiva en experimentos sobre la consciencia inmediata de los sentidos. Segundo, resalta el cuerpo como referencial al movimiento y la acción en la constitución del auto consciencia, indicando convergencias con la fenomenología existencial. Tercero, tomase el cuerpo situado interactuando con un mundo real para demostrar que parte de la aprehensión fenomenal es concreta y ubicada. Por eso, se dice que la percepción es una presentación y no necesariamente una representación. Por fin, se recurre a ejemplos de estudios recientes en campos como la educación física, danza y ergonomía para sugerir aplicaciones fenomenológicas todavía poco exploradas, como el delineamiento de layouts, planeación de ambientes y prevención de accidentes...

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O foco do artigo é a relação entre corporeidade e consciência para explicar como um ato que é pré-reflexivo e involuntário vem a se tornar reflexivo e voluntário, para se expressar posteriormente como pré-reflexivo e voluntário. Primeiro traça um paralelo entre psicólogos que recorreram à psicologia fenomenológica ou descritiva em experimentos sobre a consciência imediata dos sentidos. Segundo, ressalta o corpo como referencial ao movimento e à ação na constituição da autoconsciência, indicando divergências com teorias cognitivas e convergências com a fenomenologia existencial. Terceiro, toma-se o corpo situado interagindo com um mundo real para demonstrar que parte da apreensão fenomenal é concreta e situada. Por isto, se diz que a percepção é uma presentação e não necessariamente uma representação. Por fim, recorre-se a exemplos de estudos recentes em campos como a educação física, dança e ergonomia para sugerir aplicações fenomenológicas ainda pouco exploradas: como delineamento de layouts, planificação de ambientes e prevenção de acidentes.(AU)

The focus of the paper is the relation between movement and consciousness to explain how a pre-reflexive and involuntary act becomes reflexive and voluntary, to further on express itself as pre-reflexive and voluntary. First, it traces a parallel among psychologists that used phenomenological or descriptive psychology on experiments about the immediate consciousness of the senses. Second, it emphasizes how descriptive phenomenology recognized the body as reference for movement and action in the constitution of self-consciousness, indicating convergences with existential phenomenology. Third, the situated body is taken in its interactions with the real world to show how phenomenal apprehension is concrete and situated. Thus, it understands perception as a presentation and not necessarily a representation. Finally, it resorts to examples of recent studies in fields such as physical education, dancing, and ergonomics, suggesting an applied field of phenomenology not much explored as designing layouts, planning environments and preventing accidents.(AU)

El enfoque del artigo es la relación entre movimiento y consciencia para explicar cómo es que un acto que es pre- reflexivo y involuntario se vuelve reflexivo y voluntario para expresarse, posteriormente como pre-reflexivo y voluntario. Primero traza un paralelo entre psicólogos que recurrieron a la psicología fenomenológica o descriptiva en experimentos sobre la consciencia inmediata de los sentidos. Segundo, resalta el cuerpo como referencial al movimiento y la acción en la constitución del auto consciencia, indicando convergencias con la fenomenología existencial. Tercero, tomase el cuerpo situado interactuando con un mundo real para demostrar que parte de la aprehensión fenomenal es concreta y ubicada. Por eso, se dice que la percepción es una presentación y no necesariamente una representación. Por fin, se recurre a ejemplos de estudios recientes en campos como la educación física, danza y ergonomía para sugerir aplicaciones fenomenológicas todavía poco exploradas, como el delineamiento de layouts, planeación de ambientes y prevención de accidentes.(AU)

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