RESUMO
This cross-cultural investigation explored children's reasoning about their mental capacities during the earliest period of human physical existence--the prenatal period. For comparison, children's reasoning about the observable period of infancy was also examined. A total of 283 5- to 12-year-olds from two distinct cultures (urban Ecuador and rural indigenous Shuar) participated. Across cultures, children distinguished the fetal period from infancy, attributing fewer capacities to fetuses. However, for both the infancy and fetal periods, children from both cultures privileged the functioning of emotions and desires over epistemic states (i.e., abilities for thought and memory). Children's justifications to questions about fetal mentality revealed that although epistemic states were generally regarded as requiring physical maturation to function, emotions and desires were seen as functioning as a de facto result of prenatal existence and in response to the prospect of future birth and being part of a social group. These results show that from early in development, children across cultures possess nuanced beliefs about the presence and functioning of mental capacities. Findings converge with recent results to suggest that there is an early arising bias to view emotions and desires as the essential inviolable core of human mentality. The current findings have implications for understanding the role that emerging cognitive biases play in shaping conceptions of human mentality across different cultures. They also speak to the cognitive foundations of moral beliefs about fetal rights.
Assuntos
Desenvolvimento Infantil/fisiologia , Comparação Transcultural , Emoções , Teoria da Mente/fisiologia , Pensamento/fisiologia , Criança , Pré-Escolar , Equador/etnologia , Etnologia , Feminino , Humanos , Masculino , Pessoalidade , População Rural , População UrbanaRESUMO
No presente artigo são investigadas as relações entre o Behaviorismo Radical e o Materialismo Eliminativo. A despeito de suas peculiaridades, esses dois programas têm em comum a crítica sistemática às explicações mentalistas da psicologia popular, reivindicando uma nova estrutura conceptual forjada em contexto científico rigoroso. Esse aspecto justifica a renúncia de ambos ao projeto reducionista da Teoria da Identidade, e por consistir no critério mais essencial ao Materialismo Eliminativo, permite que este prescinda do compromisso exclusivo com a neurociência como substituta da psicologia popular, abrindo espaço para que a ciência do comportamento de base behaviorista radical seja incluída ao projeto eliminativista.
The relations between Radical Behaviorism and Eliminative Materialism are investigated. Despite its peculiarities, these two programs have in common the systematic criticism to the mentalists explanations of folk psychology, claiming a new conceptual structure built in a rigorous scientific context. This aspect jus tifies the rejection of both to the reductionist project of the Identity Theory, and as this is the most essential criteria of Eliminative Materialism allows it to ignore the exclusive commitment with neurosciences as a substitute of folk psychology, opening space for a radical behaviorist based behavior science to be included in the eliminative project.
Assuntos
Behaviorismo , Psicologia , Terapia ComportamentalRESUMO
No presente artigo são investigadas as relações entre o Behaviorismo Radical e o Materialismo Eliminativo. A despeito de suas peculiaridades, esses dois programas têm em comum a crítica sistemática às explicações mentalistas da psicologia popular, reivindicando uma nova estrutura conceptual forjada em contexto científico rigoroso. Esse aspecto justifica a renúncia de ambos ao projeto reducionista da Teoria da Identidade, e por consistir no critério mais essencial ao Materialismo Eliminativo, permite que este prescinda do compromisso exclusivo com a neurociência como substituta da psicologia popular, abrindo espaço para que a ciência do comportamento de base behaviorista radical seja incluída ao projeto eliminativista.(AU)
The relations between Radical Behaviorism and Eliminative Materialism are investigated. Despite its peculiarities, these two programs have in common the systematic criticism to the mentalists explanations of folk psychology, claiming a new conceptual structure built in a rigorous scientific context. This aspect jus tifies the rejection of both to the reductionist project of the Identity Theory, and as this is the most essential criteria of Eliminative Materialism allows it to ignore the exclusive commitment with neurosciences as a substitute of folk psychology, opening space for a radical behaviorist based behavior science to be included in the eliminative project.(AU)