RESUMO
O artigo traça um breve histórico sobre a evolução dos problemas da mobilidade, dos cavalos aos carros, e mostra que hoje, tal como há cem anos, a priorização do transporte individual levou a problemas sociais, ambientais e de saúde pública. Em seguida, analisa a Política Nacional de Mobilidade Urbana, ressaltando suas inovações e os pontos de atenção que podem prejudicar sua efetividade. Por fim, destaca a necessidade de se melhorar o transporte coletivo e não motorizado e, concomitantemente, desestimular o uso do automóvel, como formas de se devolver aos cidadãos o direito à cidade e aos serviços essenciais que ela guarda.
The article starts by providing a brief history of the evolution of mobility problems, from horses to cars, and shows that nowadays, as it was 100 years ago, the prioritization of individual transportation facilities leads to social, environmental and health problems. Secondly, the National Urban Mobility Policy analysis highlights some innovations as well as points of attention that may impair its effectiveness. Lastly, the article advocates the necessity of collective and non-motorized transport and, simultaneously, discourages car use as a way of returning to the citizens the right of the city's space and its services.
Assuntos
Cidades , Planejamento de Cidades , Meio Ambiente , Veículos Automotores , Formulação de Políticas , Saúde Pública , Problemas Sociais , Meios de Transporte/históriaRESUMO
A new fee structure was introduced to the Advanced Training and Research in Fertility Management Unit in 1992. The study looked at the effect of the new fees on attendance and the choice of contraceptive methods through an examination of clinical records and a questionnaire survey. There was a decline in attendance of roughly 28 per cent between 1992 and 1993. The decline affected mainly new clients and those who accepted injectables. A reduction in the price of injectables is suggested since the fee for this short-term method is more in line with those charged for long-term and permanent methods.
PIP: In order to foster the self-sustainability of its family planning (FP) program, Jamaica has introduced user fees for previously free FP services. In 1992, donations were solicited for injectables and sterilization. By January 1993, a fee of J $200 was set for sterilization, and fees for other services were introduced. A study was undertaken to 1) examine the effect of the new fee structure on clinic attendance; 2) determine the extent to which the fees might have encouraged a shift to other methods; and 3) establish a range of affordable prices for current users. Data were collected from clinic attendance records for January-April of 1990-1992 and compared to the same period in 1993. A 20% sample of clients (n = 1002) attending in January of each year was followed for 4 months to allow comparisons of method changes. Finally a questionnaire was administered to a 25% sample of daily users (n = 200) over 4 weeks in February 1993 to determine affordable fees. It was found that there was a 28% decline in attendance in 1993 over 1992 despite a temporary halt in sterilizations in early 1992. The number of new clients in 1993 increased but failed to reach the 1990 level. The number of old clients attending in 1993 was the lowest for the 4 years. In early 1992, there was a shortage of injectable contraceptives. Despite this, injectables were used 7% more in 1992 than in 1993 when a fee of J $100 was established. Almost a third of the sample of new clients accepted sterilization in 1993, and all of the women kept their appointments unlike previous experience (perhaps out of fear of a higher fee in the future). 1993 also saw the highest percentage of drop-outs of any year studied. Current prices charged by the clinic for oral contraceptives, injectables, and sterilization were acceptable to 85, 23, and 13% of the women, respectively. The substantial drop in clientele over a single year affected mainly clients using injectables. A reduction in the price of this method seems justified not only by the loss of clients but also because the fee for this method is higher than that for longterm or permanent methods. Costs could also be subsidized by other strategies, such as allowing higher income couples to pay a fee to secure an appointment instead of having to wait. Future price increases should be gradual, since increases of 10% a few times a year are less likely to result in patient loss.
Assuntos
Serviços de Planejamento Familiar/economia , Serviços de Planejamento Familiar/estatística & dados numéricos , Honorários e Preços , Feminino , Humanos , JamaicaRESUMO
PIP: Even though fertility in the US is 2, the population grows each year by 2.5 million people due to natural increase and immigration. The US has never had a formal population policy to influence its birth rate. Yet the US government advises other nations, especially developing nations, how they should go about reducing their fertility. Instead the US can learn from population policies of direct disincentives, such as no income tax allowance for 3 children. In Indonesia, the president and Islamic religious leaders strongly support family planning. In Mexico, both the public and private sectors provide family planning services. The US does not have experience in influencing fertility declines, since fertility declined due to economic development over a period of time. Some scholars claim that there are 3 preconditions for a sustained decline in fertility, all of which have significance for setting population policies. The 1st is called rational choice in which conditions are such in a society that women can make their own decision. For example, the existence of legislation that guarantees women the right to act in their own interest, including the right to make their own reproductive decisions. The 2nd involves policies or conditions that motivate individuals and/or couples to limit family size. Incentives and disincentives can provide the needed motivation. For example, the government pays a woman for not having a child for a specific interval. The last precondition includes the necessity of having means available to limit family size. These means include knowledge of contraceptive methods and accessibility to them.^ieng
Assuntos
Etnicidade , Política de Planejamento Familiar , Acessibilidade aos Serviços de Saúde , Legislação como Assunto , Motivação , Dinâmica Populacional , Crescimento Demográfico , Pobreza , Educação Sexual , Direitos da Mulher , América , Ásia , Sudeste Asiático , Região do Caribe , China , Anticoncepção , Cuba , Cultura , Demografia , Países Desenvolvidos , Países em Desenvolvimento , Economia , Educação , Serviços de Planejamento Familiar , Ásia Oriental , Índia , Indonésia , Japão , América Latina , México , América do Norte , População , Características da População , Política Pública , Singapura , Fatores Socioeconômicos , Estados UnidosRESUMO
PIP: Although the government of the People's Republic of China manifested sporadic concern about the nation's rapid population growth beginning at the time of the 1953 national census, it was not until the 1970s that a small family with a maximum of 2 children began to be promoted through a national campaign of education and persuasion. With the subsequent advent of the 1-child policy in 1979, the family planning campaign became a campaign for population planning in which the government no longer limited itself to contraceptive education and distribution, but began to intervene in human reproduction to accomodate it to material production. China's population policy, despite setbacks and delays, has had notable results. No other predominantly peasant society has achieved such a significant fertility decline in such a short time, but the price has been high. The problems have included confrontation with ancient cultural traditions, interference of the government in the most intimate aspects of family life, the sacrifice of a natural desire for children, evasion of marriage and birth registration, and even female infanticide. The incentives and sanctions for the 1-child policy have been primarily economic in nature, but widespread coercion and abuse have been reported. Although China's fertility has declined steadily since 1971, the fall was considerably greater in the cities, where the expense of children and critical housing shortages have effectively discouraged childbearing. In the countryside the dismantling of the communes and substitution of a system of family responsibility for agricultural production have had a strong pronatalist effect, reinforcing the desire for children as a means of old age security. The costs of children in rural areas are insignificant compared to the cities, housing is less crowded, and fertility sanctions are harder to enforce. Rural discontent and resistence to government family planning policy nevertheless became so acute that it was probably a factor in the 1984 relaxation of the 1-child policy in certain rural areas. Despite considerable success, the Chinese government has not met its family planning goals. 32.3 million couples, or 18% of fertile-aged couples, have expressed willingness to have only 1 child. The 32.3 million include 36% of urban and 11% of rural couples. According to a July 1988 fertility survey, the crude birth rate dropped to 8.84/1000, but the rates of early marriage and adolescent pregnancy were increasing. A major problem in the next 5 years will be the arrival at marriageable age of the large cohorts born around the time of the Cultural Revolution.^ieng