RESUMO
PIP: Latin America has a population of 471 million, which grows at a rate of around 2% per year; if this does not change, the population will double in a period of 35 years. Life expectancy at birth was 68 years in the period 1990-1995, it will be 73 years in the period 2020-2025, while the global birth rate of 3.1 in 1990-1995 will be reduced to 2.2 in 2020-2025. In the year 2000 the area will have a population of 510.9 millions and in 2025 it will increase to 686.4 millions; 23.9% will be under the age of 15 years, 67% will be aged between 15 and 64 years, and 9% will be aged 65 years or over. These figures show the quick process of aging in the area's population as a result of the decrease in births. The region will face two fundamental demographic problems at the beginning of the third millennium: the aging of the population and the rapid increase of the working-age members of this population. (author's modified)^ieng
Assuntos
Coeficiente de Natalidade , Expectativa de Vida , Dinâmica Populacional , Crescimento Demográfico , Demografia , Países em Desenvolvimento , Fertilidade , América Latina , Longevidade , Mortalidade , PopulaçãoRESUMO
PIP: Demographic transition in Latin America began in 1930 with a decrease in mortality rates, followed in 1965 by a decrease in birth rates, parallel to an intense process of modernization in the subcontinent's societies and economies. This model of demographic transition follows A. Landry's classic theory, although it shows very different forms in the changes in marriage rates compared to European countries. In the 1980s, a significant decrease in birth rates can be observed in the poorer sectors and the most backward areas in Latin America. This process represents a new model of demographic transition, which could be considered as a "poverty Malthusianism", and can be applied to families who limit births, fearing the great deterioration of their living conditions. (author's)^ieng
Assuntos
Coeficiente de Natalidade , Casamento , Modelos Teóricos , Mortalidade , Dinâmica Populacional , Mudança Social , Demografia , Países em Desenvolvimento , Fertilidade , América Latina , População , Pesquisa , Ciências SociaisRESUMO
PIP: The author analyzes changes in the crude birth rate in Mexico between 1970 and 1987, with a focus on the impact of declining marital fertility, changes in the proportions of women in conjugal unions by age group, and changes in the age and sex distribution of the population. Data are from national fertility surveys conducted in Mexico in 1976, 1982, and 1987.^ieng
Assuntos
Distribuição por Idade , Fatores Etários , Coeficiente de Natalidade , Fertilidade , Estado Civil , Casamento , Distribuição por Sexo , América , Demografia , Países em Desenvolvimento , América Latina , México , América do Norte , População , Características da População , Dinâmica Populacional , Fatores SexuaisRESUMO
PIP: Trends in aging in Uruguay over the past 30 years are analyzed, with a focus on the impact of economic, social, and political factors. The extent to which declining birth rates and increased immigration have contributed to the extensive changes in age distribution is considered. Regional and sex differentials are noted, and possible means of supporting an increasingly aging population are suggested. Data are from the censuses of 1963, 1975, and 1985.^ieng
Assuntos
Distribuição por Idade , Idoso , Coeficiente de Natalidade , Demografia , Dependência Psicológica , Economia , Fertilidade , Geografia , Assistência a Idosos , Política , Dinâmica Populacional , Qualidade de Vida , Fatores Sexuais , Mudança Social , Fatores Socioeconômicos , Urbanização , Adulto , Fatores Etários , América , Países Desenvolvidos , Países em Desenvolvimento , América Latina , População , Características da População , Seguridade Social , América do Sul , População Urbana , UruguaiRESUMO
PIP: The demographic explosion after World War II was due to the sudden drop in mortality rates without an equivalent decrease of birth rates. Most countries in Asia, Latin American and Africa have had a natural growth rate of approximately 2%/year, causing the population to double every 35 years. Fertility rates remained high due to local customs, socioeconomic environment, and religion; the mortality rate decreased dramatically due to medical progress and control of epidemics. The population in these less developed areas increased from 1950 to 1975 from 1.7 to almost 3 billion, and is equivalent to 83% of the world's total. The world's population increased from 2.5 to 4 billion. The U.N. estimates that the worldwide population growth rate will go down to 0.9% by the year 2025, primarily due to a decrease of the 2% growth rate in the less developed countries to 1.1%. According to UN projections, the worldwide fertility rate has decreased from 38/1000 in the 1950s to 28.9 in 1975-80; it will reach 17.6/1000 by the year 2025. The birth rate decreased by 50% in East Asia but only by 2.5% in Africa, where it is expected to remain at the 40-50 births per 1000 level, notably in countries such as Nigeria and Kenya. There has been a significant overall decrease in the world's mortality rate, and life expectancy rates increased from 45.8 in 1950 to 57.3 in 1980. The difference in life expectancy between the more developed and less developed regions was about 24.1 years in the 1950s and is now 17.3 years. Africa has the highest mortality rate and the lowest life expectancy (less than 50 years) as do India, Indonesia and Bangladesh. China, however, has had a 21-year life expectancy rate increase from 46 in the 1950s to 67. Worldwide, the infant mortality rate appears to be the decisive factor in the population growth rate having decreased 130/1000 in 1950-1955 to 88 in 1975-1980. In a LDC, the life expectancy of a newborn is 17 years less than that of a child born in a developed country; at age 5, its life expectancy is 8 or 9 years less. For those with a high standard of living in the developing world there is little difference with the developed world. In Brazil, for instance the low income groups in the Northeast have a life expectancy of 45 years and the more affluent groups in the South have a life expectancy of 67 years.^ieng
Assuntos
Coeficiente de Natalidade , Demografia , Mortalidade , Dinâmica Populacional , Crescimento Demográfico , População , Projetos de Pesquisa , África , América , Ásia , Países Desenvolvidos , Países em Desenvolvimento , Fertilidade , América Latina , Expectativa de Vida , Longevidade , PesquisaRESUMO
PIP: Cuba's post-revolution demographic trends, especially in regard to fertility and emigration, and the causes and consequences of these trends, were examined using available statistical data. The authors maintain that both fertility and emigration trends were highly infuenced by economic factors. The trends are described in the context of the social and economic changes instituted by the revolutionary government. Government policies were aimed at 1) eradicating inequalities in housing, income, education, and health; 2) improving the status of women; and 3) upgrading the living standards of the rural population. Government policies did alleviate many social problems and greatly improved the health and educational status of the population; however, these policies had a marked adverse effect on economic performance. The demographic transition began in Cuba earlier than in most other developing countries and it began long before the 1959 revolution. These earlier changes must be taken into account when assessing the impact of post-revolution policies on demographic trends. Cuba's birthrate declined from 26-14.8/1000 population between 1959-1979 and the total fertility rate declined from 3.7-1.9 between 1970-1978; however, during the 1960s there was a baby boom and the birth rate for 1963 exceeded 35/1000 population. The baby boom was largely a response to the temporary improvement in economic conditions which occurred shortly after the revolution. The decline in fertility during the 1970s was due in part to the increased availability of abortion and contraceptive services and to a decline in the marriage rate; however, Cuba's deteriorating economy was also a major contributing factor. The baby boom of the 1960s is negativley affecting the current economy of the country. Individuals born during the baby boom are entering adulthood and are contributing toward Cuba's current unemployment problems. Prior to the revolution, Cuba experienced a high rate of in-migration. Immediately after the revolution this pattern was reversed and between 1959-1980 more than 800,000 Cubans emigrated. Most of these emigrants went to the U.S. A large proportion of the earlier emigrants were members of the upper and middle socioeconomic classes. Recent emigrants were more evenly representative of all segments of Cuba's population. The socioeconomic characteristics of the emigrants are described and their adjustment in the U.S. is discussed. Tables provide statistical data on Cuba's demographic trends.^ieng
Assuntos
Coeficiente de Natalidade , Emigração e Imigração , Crescimento Demográfico , Política Pública , População Rural , Mudança Social , Fatores Socioeconômicos , Estatística como Assunto , População Urbana , Distribuição por Idade , América , Região do Caribe , Cuba , Demografia , Países em Desenvolvimento , Economia , Escolaridade , Emprego , Serviços de Planejamento Familiar , Fertilidade , Habitação , Renda , América Latina , Idade Materna , Mortalidade , América do Norte , Política , População , Características da População , Dinâmica Populacional , Pesquisa , Distribuição por Sexo , Razão de Masculinidade , Sociologia , Estados Unidos , Direitos da MulherRESUMO
PIP: Focus in this discussion is on demography and development in Costa Rica. In a 15-year period, during the 1960s and the 1st years of the 1970s, Costa Rica achieved the fastest and steepest fertility decline yet recorded in Latin America. The crude birthrate dropped from a high point in 1959 of 48.3/1000 to a low of 29.9/1000 in 1973. During the same period, the death rate declined from 9.2/1000 to 5.2/1000 by 1973. Because of this, the drop in the rate of natural increase, from 3.9% a year in 1959 to 2.47% in 1973, was not quite as pronounced in percentage terms. During those same years infant mortality dropped from 74/1000 to about 45/1000. The total fertility rate declined from 7.3 children in 1960 to 5.5 in 1968 and to just above 4 children in 1973. The major thrust of the decline originated primarily in popular perception of the imbalance between an unnecessarily high birthrate and changed socioeconomic conditions toward the end of the 1950s, of which improvements in health and general social care were among the most influential. It is not so much the economic performance of Costa Rica that distinguishes it from its neighbors as its social condition. What keeps Costa Rica from being a "banana republic" is its comparatively much higher level of social indicators: newspaper circulation per capita and the amount of newsprint consumption, the extraordinary number of bookstores in San Jose, the number of physicians and hospital beds per person, the number of teachers and students enrolled at all levels of education, and its extremely low mortality rate and very high longevity. The total fertility rate appears to have entered a period of stagnation or pause, with virtually no decline since 1974 and even a slight increase since 1976. In the 5-year period since 1973, the decline through 1978 amounted to only 5%. In the preceding 1968-73 period it wasmore than 26%. The number of births/1000 women in the 15-19 year old age group remains constant and is comparatively very high. The age specific statistics that are presented fail to give any indication as to why the recent stagnation has occurred, or whether it is a passing or a long term phenomenon. The following possible explanations, which are grouped into 3 categories, are reviewed: those relating to reproductive behavior itself, policy issues, and the role of socioeconomic influences. In the area of reproductive behavior, the evidence indicates that Costa Ricans still want a fairly large family. It needs to be clarified that the Costa Rican government has never had and does not now have a program designed primarily to reduce natality. With regard to development problems, the most marked feature in the Costa Rican panorama is its internal imbalance. The social aspects of development have been given more attention than the economic.^ieng