RESUMO
This study focusses on the risk of potential exposure to radiation for personnel driving a truck as well as illegal individuals being transported in cargo containers. Inspection facilities usually use a high energy linear accelerator (linac) in order to inspect the cargo. Since this type of equipment has associated health risks due to potential unwanted exposure, the occupational and public dose limits should be calculated in order to develop safer work conditions. This work used a computation model running the code MCNPX to simulate a typical cargo inspection facility which used a linac operating at 4.5 MeV. Two scenarios were considered: (1) exposure of the driver to the primary beam due to a potential failure of the safety sensors; and (2) dose received by an illegal individual being transported inside the cargo container. The results show a dose of 0.8514 mSv per scan for the driver exposed to the primary X-ray beam, and 0.1997 mSv per scan for an individual transported in the cargo box. In conclusion, both the individual and the driver received a dose below the acceptable limit considered safe for an individual (1 mSv/year). However, that was the value of one scan; in a case in which multiple scans would be performed, the dose limit can be quickly exceeded. In that case, the limit would be exceeded by the driver faster than by the individual in the cargo.
RESUMO
The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) Report No. 151 is an essential document for bunker design commonly applied for radiotherapy treatment rooms. This document is used as a reference by several countries, including Brazil. The objective of this study is to evaluate the shielding dimensioning methodology recommended by NCRP 151, and compare it with the one adopted by the Brazilian regulatory authority. Radiotherapy rooms and respective doors were designed to use linear accelerators operating at 6, 10, 15, and 18 MeV under two different ways: (a) applying exclusively the methodology recommended by the NCRP 151, and (b) taking into consideration the complementary recommendations from the Brazilian authorities. The results suggest that designers in Brazil can count on at least 4 and 11% safety margin for dimensioning primary barriers in controlled and free areas respectively. Also 8% for secondary barriers in controlled areas, 9.7% for secondary barriers adjacent to the primary belt of free areas, and 6.6% for the lead of the doors.
Assuntos
Aceleradores de Partículas , Proteção Radiológica , Brasil , Equipamentos de Proteção , Proteção Radiológica/métodosRESUMO
A radiological dispersal device (RDD) is a simple weapon capable of causing human harm, environmental contamination, disruption, area denial, and economic cost. It can affect small, large, or long areas depending on atmospheric stability. The risk of developing a radio-induced cancer depends on exposure, and an effective response depends upon available timely guidance. This article proposes and demonstrates a convergence of three different capabilities to assess risk and support rapid safe resource efficient response. The three capabilities that are integrated are Hotspot for dispersion, RERF for epidemiological risk, and RESRAD-RDD for response guidance. The combined methodology supports decisions on risk reduction and resource allocation through work schedules, the designation and composition of response teams, and siting for operations. In the illustrative RDD scenario, the contamination area for sheltering, evacuation, and long-term public concern was greatest for calm atmospheric conditions, whilst close-quarter responders faced highest dose rates for neutral atmospheric conditions. Generally, the risks to women responders were found to be significantly greater than for men, and the risks to 20-year-old responders were three times that of their 60-year-old counterparts for similar exposure.