RESUMO
Health system reforms that introduce insurance principles into public health systems (such as national health insurance, internal markets, and separation of purchasers and providers) have been popular in the last two decades. Little is known, however, about the political complexities of transforming existing health services into health insurance systems in developing countries. Mexico's Seguro Popular (Popular Health Insurance) program, introduced in 2003, was an attempt to do exactly this: radically alter the country's existing health service and convert it into health insurance. Popular Health Insurance (PHI) has garnered international attention and has been held up as a model for other countries to follow. Yet little has been written about the political process that led to the reform or the difficulties of implementing it. This article fills that lacuna, offering an assessment of the reform context as well as of the process of formulating, adopting, and implementing it. It argues that, while the reform has improved Mexico's public health service, it has thus far failed to transform that health service into a true insurance system. Limited institutional reform has also left PHI severely underfinanced. The Mexican case is a cautionary tale for reformers who want to transform extant health services into health insurance systems.
Assuntos
Reforma dos Serviços de Saúde/organização & administração , Seguro Saúde/economia , Programas Nacionais de Saúde/organização & administração , Países em Desenvolvimento , Reforma dos Serviços de Saúde/economia , Implementação de Plano de Saúde , Humanos , México , Programas Nacionais de Saúde/economia , PolíticaRESUMO
BACKGROUND: We assessed aspects of Seguro Popular, a programme aimed to deliver health insurance, regular and preventive medical care, medicines, and health facilities to 50 million uninsured Mexicans. METHODS: We randomly assigned treatment within 74 matched pairs of health clusters-ie, health facility catchment areas-representing 118 569 households in seven Mexican states, and measured outcomes in a 2005 baseline survey (August, 2005, to September, 2005) and follow-up survey 10 months later (July, 2006, to August, 2006) in 50 pairs (n=32 515). The treatment consisted of encouragement to enrol in a health-insurance programme and upgraded medical facilities. Participant states also received funds to improve health facilities and to provide medications for services in treated clusters. We estimated intention to treat and complier average causal effects non-parametrically. FINDINGS: Intention-to-treat estimates indicated a 23% reduction from baseline in catastrophic expenditures (1.9% points; 95% CI 0.14-3.66). The effect in poor households was 3.0% points (0.46-5.54) and in experimental compliers was 6.5% points (1.65-11.28), 30% and 59% reductions, respectively. The intention-to-treat effect on health spending in poor households was 426 pesos (39-812), and the complier average causal effect was 915 pesos (147-1684). Contrary to expectations and previous observational research, we found no effects on medication spending, health outcomes, or utilisation. INTERPRETATION: Programme resources reached the poor. However, the programme did not show some other effects, possibly due to the short duration of treatment (10 months). Although Seguro Popular seems to be successful at this early stage, further experiments and follow-up studies, with longer assessment periods, are needed to ascertain the long-term effects of the programme.
Assuntos
Política de Saúde , Seguro Saúde , Programas Nacionais de Saúde , Cobertura Universal do Seguro de Saúde , Adulto , Criança , Pré-Escolar , Análise por Conglomerados , Feminino , Pesquisas sobre Atenção à Saúde , Gastos em Saúde/estatística & dados numéricos , Humanos , Lactente , Masculino , México , Avaliação de Programas e Projetos de Saúde , Fatores SocioeconômicosRESUMO
We develop an approach to conducting large-scale randomized public policy experiments intended to be more robust to the political interventions that have ruined some or all parts of many similar previous efforts. Our proposed design is insulated from selection bias in some circumstances even if we lose observations; our inferences can still be unbiased even if politics disrupts any two of the three steps in our analytical procedures; and other empirical checks are available to validate the overall design. We illustrate with a design and empirical validation of an evaluation of the Mexican Seguro Popular de Salud (Universal Health Insurance)program we are conducting. Seguro Popular, which is intended to grow to provide medical care, drugs, preventative services, and financial health protection to the 50 million Mexicans without health insurance, is one of the largest health reforms of any country in the last two decades. The evaluation is also large scale, constituting one of the largest policy experiments to date and what may be the largest randomized health policy experiment ever.