RESUMO
Freud's theorising about anxiety has traditionally been based on its nosographical categories (anxiety neurosis, anxiety hysteria) or on the relationship between anxiety and repression (first and second theories of anxiety). While these types of approach have made it possible to identify some milestones in the development of the concept of anxiety, they have also obscured the relevance that Freud attributed to the phylogenetic argument. This article reviews the historical and conceptual context of Freud's main evolutionary references (Lamarck, Darwin, Haeckel, Weismann), and then analyses their presence and function in Freud's work, especially in his conception of anxiety. The article shows that while some of the evolutionary references became obsolete towards the end of the 19th century, they played such an important role in Freud's work that he never ceased to defend them. With respect to anxiety, though Freud did not make fully public his metapsychological hypothesis about the phylogenetic rationale, this perspective permeates his writing and is fundamental to his development of the concepts of neurotic anxiety/realistic anxiety and automatic anxiety/signal anxiety.
Assuntos
Psicanálise , Ansiedade , Teoria Freudiana , História do Século XIX , História do Século XX , Humanos , Masculino , Filogenia , Psicanálise/história , RedaçãoRESUMO
Resumen El artículo tiene por objetivo realizar una historia crítica del auge de tres categorías diagnósticas: la neurastenia (fin del siglo XIX), la neurosis (primera mitad del siglo XX) y la depresión (segunda mitad del siglo XX hasta nuestros días). La hipótesis es que su amplia difusión se explicaría debido al vínculo que ellas han tenido con la metáfora energética del ser humano. Desde mediados del siglo XIX, la concepción energética se difundió por la cultura occidental, habilitando ciertas ficciones acerca de lo que somos - dimensión ontológica - y lo que podríamos llegar a ser - dimensión ética. El artículo muestra que estas patologías han codificado y tornado inteligible determinadas trayectorias vitales que no cumplían con los imperativos de tales ficciones onto-éticas.
Abstract This article aims to provide a historical critique of the rise of three diagnostic categories: neurasthenia (late nineteenth century), neurosis (first half of the twentieth century) and depression (mid-twentieth century to the present). The hypothesis is that their broad dissemination can be explained through their link to the energy metaphor for the human body. From the mid-nineteenth century on, the concept of energy spread through western culture, encouraging certain fictions about what we are - the ontological dimension - and what we could be - the ethical dimension. The article shows that these pathologies have codified and made intelligible a set of life trajectories that did not obey the imperatives of those onto-ethical fictions.