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The recent explosion of Large Language Models (LLMs) has provoked lively debate about "emergent" properties of the models, including intelligence, insight, creativity, and meaning. These debates are rocky for two main reasons: The emergent properties sought are not well-defined; and the grounds for their dismissal often rest on a fallacious appeal to extraneous factors, like the LLM training regime, or fallacious assumptions about processes within the model. The latter issue is a particular roadblock for LLMs because their internal processes are largely unknown - they are colossal black boxes. In this paper, I try to cut through these problems by, first, identifying one salient feature shared by systems we regard as intelligent/conscious/sentient/etc., namely, their responsiveness to environmental conditions that may not be near in space and time. They engage with subjective worlds ("s-worlds") which may or may not conform to the actual environment. Observers can infer s-worlds from behavior alone, enabling hypotheses about perception and cognition that do not require evidence from the internal operations of the systems in question. The reconstruction of s-worlds offers a framework for comparing cognition across species, affording new leverage on the possible sentience of LLMs. Here, we examine one prominent LLM, OpenAI's GPT-4. Inquiry into the emergence of a complex subjective world is facilitated with philosophical phenomenology and cognitive ethology, examining the pattern of errors made by GPT-4 and proposing their origin in the absence of an analogue of the human subjective awareness of time. This deficit suggests that GPT-4 ultimately lacks a capacity to construct a stable perceptual world; the temporal vacuum undermines any capacity for GPT-4 to construct a consistent, continuously updated, model of its environment. Accordingly, none of GPT-4's statements are epistemically secure. Because the anthropomorphic illusion is so strong, I conclude by suggesting that GPT-4 works with its users to construct improvised works of fiction.

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Biological theory assumes the organized appearance of life and the reliable recurrence of traits are due to inheritance. Natural selection acting on blind variations produces phenotypes with heritable traits, one of which may be natural learning. The aim of learning, then, is solving problems related to survival and reproduction. But what if these views confuse cause with effect? Perhaps a learning algorithm is required for any phenotype at all to arise. If so, evolution proceeds learning-first, with individuals pursuing another telos entirely. I argue that this aim may be epistemological, the drive to understand the world through an umwelt. By "understand" I mean neither association nor prediction but Karl Popper's concept of explanation through conjecture and refutation. I propose that if only genetic materials are truly heritable, not traits, then testing a successful physical theory of life will depend on building abiotic machines which can perform natural learning without the presence of any inherited materials or conditions. I name this process "epistolution," combining "epistemology" and "evolution," to distinguish it from other concepts. Epistolution is an integral consequence of any learning-first view of life, such as the Cellular Basis of Consciousness theory. This type of theory suggests that in all cells during the history of life full-blown agency, involving beliefs, intentions, and desires, generated all the phenotypes that have then been winnowed by natural selection. Unlike in other versions, I posit that the aim of agential living systems is the explanation of reality rather than inductive prediction or survival/reproduction.

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Research on human-animal chimeras have elicited alarms and prompted debates. Those involving the generation of chimeric brains, in which human brain cells become anatomically and functionally intertwined with their animal counterparts in varying ratios, either via xenografts or embryonic co-development, have been considered the most problematic. The moral issues stem from a potential for "humanization" of the animal brain, as well as speculative changes to the host animals' consciousness or sentience, with consequential alteration in the animal hosts' moral status. However, critical background knowledge appears to be missing to resolve these debates. Firstly, there is no consensus on animal sentience vis-à-vis that of humans, and no established methodology that would allow a wholesome and objective assessment of changes in animal sentience resulting from the introduction of human brain cells. Knowledge in interspecies comparative neuropsychology that could allow effective demarcation of a state of "humanization" is also lacking. Secondly, moral status as a philosophical construct has no scientific and objective points of reference. Either changes in sentience or humanization effects would remain unclear unless there are some neuroscientific research grounding. For a bioethical stance based on moral status of human-animal brain chimera to make meaningful contributions to regulatory policies, it might first need to be adequately informed by, and with its arguments constructed, in a manner that are factually in line with the science. In may be prudent for approved research projects involving the generation of human-animal brain chimera to have a mandatory component of assessing plausible changes in sentience.

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Ethical behaviour tends to lead to the welfare consideration of animals, but much less so for invertebrates. Indigenous tradition often valued all animals as having an important role in life on the planet, a practical application of modern ecology. The Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition postulated 'man' as having dominion over all of Earth, resulting in anthropocentrism and careless practices. In contrast, the Buddhist/Hindu belief in rebirth leads to ahisma, or doing no harm. In the face of capitalist systems, practice does not necessarily follow these beliefs, especially in the 'shepherding' of domestic animals. Only Jainist beliefs value the lives of all invertebrates. Philosophers are often divorced from the physiological reality of the animals they muse about, and science's traditions of objectivity and the simplest possible explanation of behaviour led to ignorance of invertebrates' abilities. Ninety-seven percent of animals on the planet are invertebrates. We have a long way to go to provide moral standing and welfare consideration, which is consistent with the new information about the sentience of some of these animals.

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The basis for computation in the brain is the quantum threshold of "soliton," which accompanies the ion changes of the action potential, and the refractory membrane at convergences. Here, we provide a logical explanation from the action potential to a neuronal model of the coding and computation of the retina. We also explain how the visual cortex operates through quantum-phase processing. In the small-world network, parallel frequencies collide into definable patterns of distinct objects. Elsewhere, we have shown how many sensory cells are meanly sampled from a single neuron and that convergences of neurons are common. We also demonstrate, using the threshold and refractory period of a quantum-phase pulse, that action potentials diffract across a neural network due to the annulment of parallel collisions in the phase ternary computation (PTC). Thus, PTC applied to neuron convergences results in a collective mean sampled frequency and is the only mathematical solution within the constraints of the brain neural networks (BNN). In the retina and other sensory areas, we discuss how this information is initially coded and then understood in terms of network abstracts within the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) and visual cortex. First, by defining neural patterning within a neural network, and then in terms of contextual networks, we demonstrate that the output of frequencies from the visual cortex contains information amounting to abstract representations of objects in increasing detail. We show that nerve tracts from the LGN provide time synchronization to the neocortex (defined as the location of the combination of connections of the visual cortex, motor cortex, auditory cortex, etc.). The full image is therefore combined in the neocortex with other sensory modalities so that it receives information about the object from the eye and all the abstracts that make up the object. Spatial patterns in the visual cortex are formed from individual patterns illuminating the retina, and memory is encoded by reverberatory loops of computational action potentials (CAPs). We demonstrate that a similar process of PTC may take place in the cochlea and associated ganglia, as well as ascending information from the spinal cord, and that this function should be considered universal where convergences of neurons occur.

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Our previous efforts to probe the complex, rich experiential lives of unicellular species have focused on the origins of consciousness (Reber, 2019) and the biomolecular processes that underlie sentience (Reber et al., 2023). Implied, but unexplored, was the assumption that these cognitive functions and associated unicellular organismal behaviors were linked with and often driven by affect, feelings, sensual experiences. In this essay we dig more deeply into these valenced (We're using the term valence here to cover the aspects of sensory experiences that have evaluative elements, are experienced as positive or negative ─ those where this affective, internal representation is an essential element in how the input is interpreted and responded to.) self-referencing features. In the first part, we examine the empirical evidence for various sensual experiences that have been identified. In the second part, we look at other features of prokaryote life that appear to also have affective, valenced elements but where the data to support the proposition aren't as strong. We engage in some informed speculation about these phenomena.

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A range of studies published in the last few decades promotes the cognitive aspects of life: all organisms, from bacteria to mammals, are capable of sensing/perception, decision-making, problem-solving, learning, and other cognitive functions, including sentience and consciousness. In this paper I present a scientific and philosophical synthesis of these studies, leading to an integrated view of cognitive biology. This view is expressed through the four principles applicable to all living systems: (1) sentience and consciousness, (2) autopoiesis, (3) free energy principle and relational biology, and (4) cognitive repertoire. The principles are circular, and they reinforce themselves. The circularity is not rigid, meaning that hierarchical and heterarchical shifts are widespread in the biosphere. The above principles emerged at the dawn of life, with the first cells, bacteria and archaea. All biogenic forms and functions that emerged since then can be traced to the first cells - indivisible units of biological agency. Following these principles, I developed the concept of biocivilisations to explain various forms of social intelligence in different kingdoms of life. The term biociviloisations draws on the human interpretation of the concept of civilisation, which searches for non-human equivalents of communication, engineering, science, medicine, art, and agriculture, in all kingdoms of life by applying the principles of cognitive biology. Potential avenues for testing the concept of biocivilisations are highlighted.

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The welfare of invertebrates under human care is of growing concern, particularly with the increasing interest in insect farming as an environmentally sustainable means of producing food. Additionally, individual welfare monitoring systems can be time-consuming and impractical for larger groups, particularly when individual animals are difficult to identify. It is, therefore, imperative to develop a validated system for monitoring terrestrial invertebrate welfare at a group level. The Animal Welfare Assessment Grid (AWAG) is an objective welfare-monitoring tool that has been approved for use with a wide range of species. This study modified the AWAG for large group-level welfare assessments and successfully trialled it on a terrestrial invertebrate species, a group of captive male Gromphadorhina oblongonota. The modified template evaluated the group's welfare by scoring changes to 12 factors that could be tracked over time. The results highlight that the welfare of G. oblongonota is likely to be influenced by environmental and social factors, and inform practical improvements in G. oblongonota care that will result in improved welfare. The findings also demonstrate an efficient way to assess the welfare of invertebrates at the group level, and given the recent UK legislation (Animal Welfare (Sentience) Bill, 2022) plus the emerging interest in invertebrate farming, our findings hold timely significance.

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This paper explores the ethical considerations surrounding research on echinoderms, a group of invertebrates that has recently garnered attention in the scientific community. The importance of responsible animal handling and the need for an ethical framework that encompasses echinoderms are emphasized. The 3Rs principle, advocating for the replacement of conscious living vertebrates with non-sentient material in research, is discussed as a guiding tool in current animal research practices. As invertebrates are generally classified as non-sentient animals, the replacement dimension tends to favor them as prevalent models in experimental research. While it currently lacks the means to assess the mental states of invertebrates, there is undeniable evidence of social behavior in many species, suggesting that a lack of interactions with these organisms could potentially adversely affect their wellbeing. In the last few years, considerable progress has been made in developing an ethical framework that takes invertebrates into account, particularly cephalopods, crustaceans, and echinoderms. In this context, we discuss the development of a broader conceptual framework of 5Rs that includes responsibility and respect, which may guide practices ensuring welfare in echinoderms, even in the absence of any particular normative.

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Welfare metrics have been established for octopuses in the laboratory, but not for octopuses living in the wild. Wild octopuses are constantly exposed to potentially harmful situations, and the ability to assess the welfare status of wild octopuses could provide pertinent information about individuals' health and species' resilience to stressors. Here, we used underwater photos and videos to identify injuries and stress-related behaviors in wild Octopus insularis in a variety of contexts, including interacting with fishermen, interacting with other octopuses and fish, proximity to predators, in den, foraging, and in senescence. We adapted established metrics of octopus welfare from the laboratory to these wild octopuses. In addition to observing all of the stress measures, we also identified two previously unknown measures associated with decreased welfare: (1) a half white eye flash and (2) a half-and-half blotch body pattern. More than half of the individuals analyzed had arm loss, and almost half of the individuals had skin injuries. We also observed that irregular chromatophore expression and abnormal motor coordination were associated with interactions with fishermen. This is the first study to apply measures of welfare from the laboratory to wild octopuses. Our results may also aid in the identification of welfare measures for other wild invertebrates.

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There are, in the literature, distinct ways to approach animal welfare. The objective of this work was to study the value attributed to farm animals in the scientific papers published in animal welfare and animal production journals at three different points in time, separated by a decade each. The first ten papers mentioning "animal welfare" or "animal well-being" in their objectives or hypotheses from each journal and each focus year were selected. The 180 papers were blindly scored by five assessors between 1 and 10, according to the degree of intrinsic value attributed to animals. The overall mean score and standard deviation were 5.60 ± 2.49, with 6.46 ± 2.29 and 4.74 ± 2.40 for AW and AP journals, respectively, and 5.37 ± 2.44, 5.68 ± 2.52 and 5.75 ± 2.41 for the focus years of 2000, 2010 and 2020, respectively. There was an interaction between focus year and publication area: papers from AW journals scored better over time, in contrast with papers from AP journals, for which scores remained similar over decades. The inter-assessor agreement is moderate, which may reflect the subject complexity, as the language used in the papers studied was ambiguous in relation to why and for whom it is performed. The low overall mean score evidenced that the animal welfare scientific publications are, on average, not prioritizing the interests of the animals. Thus, our results evidenced the presence of animal welfarism in animal welfare science, a problem that seems not to be intrinsic to animal welfare science itself, but rather to the way research is frequently conceived, conducted, interpreted, summarized and applied. Therefore, it seems urgent to further study the motivation for animal welfare research. The statement of the main justification for animal welfare papers, with an explicit declaration of the motivational priorities that constitute each scientific animal welfare study, may be an interesting recommendation for the improvement of animal welfare science.

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Sentientism is the most influential position in animal ethics. It presents sentience as decisive for integrating animals in ethics. Nevertheless, its significance for animal ethical argumentation is not quite clear. Does it mean (a) that sentience is a valuable state, which awards sentient individuals the moral prize of something like 'intrinsic value'? (b) Or is sentience an empirical fact that informs how animal welfare can be adequately realised in samples of certain species? (c) Or does sentience explain psychologically why humans identify emotionally with singular animals? Additionally, the questions show how different animals are addressed, namely (a) as individual units of sentience (individuality), (b) as representatives of certain species (exemplarity), and (c) as unique relata in distinguished human-animal relationships (singularity). Every suggestion of the use of sentientism faces specific challenges: (a) Sentience used as a foundational value premise is philosophically confronted with the fact-value-fallacy. Taken as an absolute value, sentientism may even threaten the status of the sentient individual for the sake of the ideological status of a world without suffering. (b) Sentience in the animal ethical welfare application perspective asks for an evidence-based (neuro-)biopsychological terminology to operationalise the boundary of sentience in animal welfare research, and is confronted with the other-minds problem. For the sake of the individual animal, it has to refer to the specific characteristics of its species. (c) Human-animal relationships have to face the risk of emotional abuse and sentimental anthropomorphism. We must therefore carefully examine the question: For whose sake are not only companion animals regarded as unique - for the sake of the animal or for the sake of human emotional needs? - The range of challenges signals a loss of comprehensive value orientation in modern times. In view of a deeper understanding of the value crisis, the paper starts with a historical reconstruction of the philosophical implications of the transition from natural teleology to modern science. Initially, the ancient conceptual origin of sentientism - the anima sensitiva and its position in a natural philosophical teleological order - reveals sentientism as an isolated fragment from the broken Aristotelean scala naturae. Understanding Aristotle's highly influential natural teleological metaphysics and its destruction by the rise of modern science can explain how a common crypto-teleological language generates argumentation patterns that are problematic today. A consideration of Kant's epistemological critique of natural teleology, and his inclusion of animals as sentient beings in a self-reflective modern ethics, may help to clarify the roles of ethics, (bio)sciences, and teleology in enlightened animal ethical argumentations concerning sentience and animal welfare.

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Cells evolved some 4 billion years ago, and since then the integrity of the structural and functional continuity of cellular life has been maintained via highly conserved and ancient processes of cell reproduction and division. The plasma membrane as well as all the cytoplasmic structures are reproduced and inherited uninterruptedly by each of the two daughter cells resulting from every cell division. Although our understanding of the evolutionary emergence of the very first cells is obscured by the extremely long timeline since that revolutionary event, the generally accepted position is that the de novo formation of cells is not possible; all present cells are products of other prior cells. This essential biological principle was first discovered by Robert Remak and then effectively coined as Omnis Cellula e Cellula (every cell of the cell) by Rudolf Virchow: all currently living cells have direct structural and functional connections to the very first cells. Based on our previous theoretical analysis, all cells are endowed with individual sentient cognition that guides their individual agency, behaviour and evolution. There is a vital consequence of this new sentient and cognitive view of cells: when cells assemble as functional tissue ecologies and organs within multicellular organisms, including plants, animals and humans, these cellular aggregates display derivative versions of aggregate tissue- and organ-specific sentience and consciousness. This innovative view of the evolution and physiology of all currently living organisms supports a singular principle: all organismal physiology is based on cellular physiology that extends from unicellular roots.

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The Treaty of Lisbon states that animals are sentient beings. Fish species show physiological differences from terrestrial animals and are slaughtered and killed in a very different context. Many existing commercial killing methods expose fish to extensive suffering over a prolonged period of time, and some of the slaughtering practices they experience can cause pain and distress. This study highlights the limited feasibility of European Council Regulation 1099/09 requirements on welfare when killing cephalopods and crustaceans. Sentience is the animal's capacity to have positive (comfort, excitement) and negative (pain, anxiety, distress, or harm) feelings. Considerable evidence is now showing that the major commercial fish species, including cephalopods and crustaceans, possess complex neurological substrates supporting pain sensitivity and conscious experiences. In the legislation applied to scientific procedures, the concept of sentience in these species is important. Therefore, it would be appropriate to acknowledge current scientific evidence and establish reference criteria for fish welfare. For the welfare of fish species during slaughter, European Council Regulation 1099/09 applicability is limited. Fish welfare during slaughter is more than just an ethical problem. According to the One-Health approach, food safety should also include the concept of sentience for fish welfare. Pending studies that dispel all doubt, the precautionary principle of European Council Regulation 178/04 remains valid and should be applied to fish welfare.

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The Animal Research Declaration is committed to establishing cohesive and rigorous ethical standards to safeguard the welfare of nonhuman primates (NHPs) engaged in neuroscience research (Petkov et al., 2022 this issue). As part of this mission, there is an expanding dialogue amongst neuroscientists, philosophers, and policymakers, that is centred on diverse aspects of animal welfare and scientific practice. This paper emphasises the necessity of integrating the assessment of animal sentience into the declaration. Animal sentience, in this context, refers to the recognized capacity that animals have for various kinds of subjective experience, with an associated positive or negative valence (Browning and Birch, 2022). Accordingly, NHP neuroscience researchers should work toward instituting a standardised approach for evaluating what can be termed "individual sentience profiles," representing the unique manner in which an individual NHP experiences specific events or environments. The adoption of this novel parameter would serve a triad of indispensable purposes: enhancing NHP welfare throughout research involvement, elevating the quality of life for NHPs in captivity, and refining the calibre of research outcomes.

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Working donkeys (Equus asinus) support human living standards globally. However, there is little information on the effect of human perceptions of emotion and pain on the welfare of working donkeys. We interviewed donkey owners (n = 332) in Pakistan to determine the relationship between human perspectives on donkey sentience: emotions and the ability to feel pain, and the routine working practices that could impact donkey welfare. The majority of donkey owners used padding under the saddle (n = 211; 63.6%; 95% CI (58.3%-68.9%)) and provided access to food (n = 213; 64.2%; 95% CI (58.9%-69.3%)) and water (n = 195; 58.7%; 95% CI (53.4%-64.1%)) during the working day. Owners reported that at some point in their donkey's life, 65.3% (95% CI (60.2%-70.5%)) had load-associated injuries, of which 27.7% (n = 92; 95% CI (22.8%-32.5%)) were wounds, 20.5% (n = 68; 95% CI (16.1%-24.8%)) were lameness and 7.2% (n = 24; 95% CI 4.4%-10.0%) were back pain. In total, 81.3% (95% CI 77.1%-85.5%; n = 270) of owners believed that their donkeys felt pain, and 70.2% (95% CI (65.2%-75.1%; n = 233) of owners believed that their donkeys had emotions. Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) was used to understand the relationship between owners' recognition of emotions and pain in donkeys and their working practices. The MCA factor map revealed two clusters, named positive and negative clusters. The positive cluster included owner's recognition of donkey pain and emotions, the availability of food and water, use of padding under the saddle, absence of injuries along with the willingness to follow loading guidelines. The negative cluster represented practices that did not benefit donkey welfare, such as using saddles without padding and a lack of food and water during work. The presence of injuries, owners not recognizing that donkeys feel pain and emotion along with an unwillingness to follow loading guidelines were also found in the negative cluster. We show that the owners who recognized sentience in their donkeys were more likely to use practices that are good for donkey welfare. The ability of owners to identify sentience in donkeys, along with their willingness to follow welfare guidelines, are important factors in improving the lives of working donkeys.

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The use of Latin in identifying an organism's genus and species is likely familiar to scientists and zoological professionals, but a traditional legal doctrine, known as habeas corpus (meaning "you have the body") may not have obvious applicability to nonhumans in the animal kingdom. In recent years, animal rights organizations have utilized the habeas corpus doctrine as a basis to bring legal challenges on behalf of nonhuman animals to expand "legal personhood" to them. These lawsuits, which have focused on species such as nonhuman primates and elephants, seek to challenge the "confinement" of animals in zoological institutions and by private owners, much like a prisoner or other detainee. The small but vocal animal legal personhood movement bases its argument on the fact that elephants and nonhuman primates are highly sentient and have complex cognitive characteristics. Proponents of legal personhood for animals have argued that the common law has progressed and expanded over the years as societal norms and conditions have changed and, much like the law has expanded to afford women and persons of color legal rights and protections, so should the law expand to treat animals the same as humans. Despite these efforts, to date, no court in the United States has accepted this invitation. This article summarizes key legal challenges and decisions to date in the United States, examines how science and societal conditions have influenced the law, and analyzes the reasons why legal personhood for animals so far has been viewed as a "bridge too far" in the American legal system.

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We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with "locked-in" syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we need meta-moral decision rules that allow us to either minimize the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choice-worthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the "risk asymmetry argument," which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favoring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this article argues that this is best understood as an ethical-epistemic challenge. The article argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help resolve disputes about the status of human-AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue); however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being skeptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take.