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The enfacement illusion is a facial version of the rubber hand illusion, in which participants experience tactile stimulation of their own faces synchronously with the observation of the same stimulation applied to another's face. In previous studies, participants have reported experiencing an illusory embodiment of the other's face following synchronous compared to asynchronous stimulation. In a series of three experiments, we addressed the following three questions: (i) how does similarity between the self and the other, operationalized here as being of the same or different gender to the other, impact the experience of embodiment in the enfacement illusion; (ii) does the experience of embodiment result from alterations to the self-concept; and (iii) is susceptibility to the experience of embodiment associated with interoceptive processing, i.e. perception of the internal state of the body? Results indicate that embodiment is facilitated by the similarity between the self and the other and is mediated by the incorporation of the other into the self-concept, but sensitivity to one's own internal states does not impact upon embodiment within the enfacement illusion. This article is part of the theme issue 'Minds in movement: embodied cognition in the age of artificial intelligence'.

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The authors investigated children's automatic imitation in the context of observed shyness by adapting the widely used automatic imitation task (AIT). AIT performance in 6-year-old children (N = 38; 22 female; 71% White) and young adults (17-22 years; N = 122; 99 female; 32% White) was first examined as a proof of concept and to assess age-related differences in responses to the task (Experiment 1). Although error rate measures of automatic imitation were comparable between children and adults, children displayed less reaction time interference than adults. Children's shyness coded from direct behavioral observations was then examined in relation to AIT scores (Experiment 2). Observed shyness at 5 years old predicted higher automatic imitation one year later. We discuss the latter findings in the context of an adaptive strategy. We argue that shy children may possess a heightened sensitivity to others' motor cues and therefore are more likely to implicitly imitate social partners' actions. This tendency may serve as a strategy to signal appeasement and affiliation, allowing for shy children to blend in and feel less inhibited in a social environment.

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Social cognition relies on two main subsystems to construct the understanding of others, which are sustained by different social brain networks. One of these social networks is the default mode network (DMN) associated with the socio-cognitive subsystem (i.e., mentalizing), and the other is the salience network (SN) associated with the socio-affective route (i.e., empathy). The DMN and the SN are well-known resting state networks that seem to constitute a baseline for the performance of social tasks. We aimed to investigate both networks' functional connectivity (FC) pattern in the transition from resting state to social task performance. A sample of 38 participants involved in a monogamous romantic relationship completed a questionnaire of dyadic empathy and underwent an fMRI protocol that included a resting state acquisition followed by a task in which subjects watched emotional videos of their romantic partner and elaborated on their partner's (Other condition) or on their own experience (Self condition). Independent component and ROI-to-ROI correlation analysis were used to assess alterations in task-independent (Rest condition) and task-dependent (Self and Other conditions) FC. We found that the spatial FC maps of the DMN and SN evidenced the traditional regions associated with these networks in the three conditions. Anterior and posterior DMN regions exhibited increased FC during the social task performance compared to resting state. The Other condition revealed a more limited SN's connectivity in comparison to the Self and Rest conditions. The results revealed an interplay between the main nodes of the DMN and the core regions of the SN, particularly evident in the Self and Other conditions.

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Social interactions require the capacity to understand both our and other's internal states. These semi-independent skills, the ability to understand oneself and others, seem to rely on the same type of representations and recruit similar brain areas. In this study, we looked at the neural basis of self and other processing in the context of an interaction with a significant other. Fourty-two participants in a monogamous relationship completed an fMRI task in which they watched a set of video-vignettes of his/her romantic partner expressing emotional contents. Participants were asked to elaborate on his/her spouse´s experience (other condition) and on his/her own experience when watching the video-vignettes (self-condition). The results showed a significant overlap in the brain activation for both conditions (e.g. anterior insula, posterior cingulate/precuneus, inferior frontal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule). In addition, the self-condition recruited brain areas associated with interoceptive processing and affect sharing (e.g., posterior insula), whereas the other-condition engaged brain areas involved in the cognitive representation of another's internal states and self-other distinction (e.g., fusiform, supramarginal gyrus, angular gyrus and temporoparietal junction).

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The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is a key hub of the 'social brain', but little is known about specific processes supported by this region. Using focal high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) and a social cognitive battery with differing demands on self-other processing, we demonstrate specific involvement of the dmPFC in tasks placing high demands on self-other processing. Specifically, excitatory (anodal) HD-tDCS enhanced the integration of external information into the self for explicit higher-order socio-cognitive tasks across cognitive domains; i.e. visual perspective taking (VPT) and episodic memory. These effects were task specific, as no stimulation effects were found for attributing mental states from the eyes or implicit VPT. Inhibitory (cathodal) HD-tDCS had weaker effects in the opposite direction towards reduced integration of external information into the self. We thus demonstrate for the first time a specific and causal role of the dmPFC in integrating higher-order information from others/external source into that of the self across cognitive domains.

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