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Cultural learning plays a crucial role in enabling children to fit into their social community by mastering culture-specific habits. Infants learn actions via imitation, and they seem to be sensitive to the context in which a model demonstrates these. They imitate rationally by copying unusual means to achieve a goal more when the model chooses this means voluntarily compared with when some constraints force the model to do so. We investigated the development of rational imitation. In a within-participants design, 18-, 24-, and 36-month-olds (N = 293) observed two unusual actions: Instead of using her hands, a model operated an apparatus by using her head or by sitting on the apparatus. The model did so once with her hands being occupied and once with her hands being free. Besides measuring participants' imitative responses, we analyzed the gaze behavior directed at the model during the response phase of the current study and of 14-month-olds (N = 82) from Gellén and Buttelmann's study (Child Development Research, Vol. 2017, art. 8080649 [2017]). Increasing age was accompanied by an increasing rate of overall imitation across conditions. None of the three older age groups selectively imitated the unusual actions significantly more often in the hands-free condition than in the hands-occupied condition. Thus, rational imitation seems to disappear during the second year of life. Furthermore, there was a significant increase between 14 and 24 months of age and beyond in children's tendency to gaze at the model after reenacting the observed action. Children's gaze behavior indicates that this pattern might be due to a growing underlying social component in early cultural learning.

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Imitation is a powerful and ubiquitous social learning strategy, fundamental for the development of individual skills and cultural traditions. Recent research on the cognitive foundations and development of imitation, though, presents a surprising picture: Although even infants imitate in selective, efficient, and rational ways, children and adults engage in overimitation. Rather than imitating selectively and efficiently, they sometimes faithfully reproduce causally irrelevant actions as much as relevant ones. In this article, we suggest a new perspective on this phenomenon by integrating established findings on children's more general capacities for rational action parsing with newer findings on overimitation. We suggest that overimitation is a consequence of children's growing capacities to understand causal and social constraints in relation to goals and that it rests on the human capacity to represent observed actions simultaneously on different levels of goal hierarchies.

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Gergely et al. (2002) reported that children imitated a novel action - illuminating a light-box by using the forehead - after a delay significantly more often if the hands of the experimenter had been visible in comparison with if they had been covered. In an attempt to explore these findings we conducted two studies with a total N of 63 children. Both studies investigated deferred imitation of the action in two conditions, with the hands of the experimenter visible or covered, but the settings differed. Study 1 (n = 30; mean age = 16.6 months) was carried out in an unfamiliar environment (a laboratory setting) while Study 2 (n = 33; mean age = 13.3 months) was conducted in familiar surroundings (at home or at day care). The results showed that 50% of the children in Study 1 and 42.4% in Study 2 evidenced deferred imitation as compared to only 4.9% (n = 2) in the baseline condition. However, in none of the studies did the children use inferential processes when imitating, we detected no significant differences between the two conditions, hands visible or hands covered. The findings add to the validity of the head touch procedure as a measure of declarative-like memory processes in the pre-verbal child. At the same time the findings question the robustness of the concept 'rational imitation,' it seems not as easy as expected to elicit a response based on rational inferential processes in this age group.

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Children's strong tendency to over-imitate - i.e., to reproduce causally irrelevant actions - presents a well-documented, yet puzzling, phenomenon. On first sight this instrumentally inefficient behavior seems maladaptive and different accounts have been put forward to explain it. Causal accounts claim that children are misled by an adult's demonstration, mistake the superfluous actions as causally necessary, and therefore imitate them. Other accounts emphasize cognitive-motivational aspects underlying over-imitation, e.g. social motivations to affiliate with the model, or to adhere to normative conventions. Since all accounts predict the occurrence of over-imitation under typical conditions, different parameters and circumstances have to be considered to distinguish between them. Thus, we investigated children's over-imitation and their spontaneous verbal reactions to a puppet's behavior, in contexts in which a causally irrelevant action either led to the destruction of a valuable object belonging to the experimenter, or not. In addition, children saw the full action sequence being demonstrated either with an instrumental or a conventional focus. Causal accounts predict no flexibility across these contexts, because over-imitation is said to occur automatically. Normative accounts claim that different normative considerations affect children's behavior and action parsing, and therefore predict different response patterns across conditions. We found that over-imitation was less frequent in costly and instrumental conditions. Children criticized the puppet for omitting irrelevant actions more often in the non-costly condition, but criticized her more often for performing irrelevant actions in the costly condition, often expressing their moral concern. The results support the rational normative action interpretation account of over-imitation.

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Recent research has documented the robust tendency of children to "over-imitate," that is, to copy causally irrelevant action elements in goal-directed action sequences. Different explanations for over-imitation have been proposed. Causal accounts claim that children mistakenly perceive such action elements as causally relevant and, therefore, imitate them. Affiliation accounts claim that children over-imitate to affiliate with the model. Normative accounts claim that children conceive of causally irrelevant actions as essential parts of an overarching conventional activity. These different accounts generally hold the same predictions regarding children's imitative response. However, it is possible to distinguish between them when one considers additional parameters. The normative account predicts wide-ranging flexibility with regard to action interpretation and the occurrence of over-imitation. First, it predicts spontaneous protest against norm violators who omit the causally irrelevant actions. Second, children should perform the causally irrelevant actions less frequently, and criticize others less frequently for omitting them, when the actions take place in a different context from the one of the initial demonstration. Such flexibility is not predicted by causal accounts and is predicted for only a limited range of contexts by affiliation accounts. Study 1 investigated children's own imitative response and found less over-imitation when children acted in a different context from when they acted in the same context as the initial demonstration. In Study 2, children criticized a puppet less frequently for omitting irrelevant actions when the puppet acted in a different context. The results support the notion that over-imitation is not an automatic and inflexible phenomenon.

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It has been proposed that infants selectively imitate based on a rational evaluation of an observed action (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002). This rational-imitation account has been rejected based on findings which suggested that infant imitation depends on: (a) the similarity between the infant's and the model's body posture; and (b) the presence of action effects (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011). Despite this controversy, we show that both accounts have received empirical support from different fields of research. We propose that both accounts operate on different levels, and we present an integrative model, which combines the two seemingly competing accounts. Motor resonance is perceived as a mechanism that enables infants to imitate, and a rational evaluation of the model's action is conceived as a mechanism that guides infants' imitative behavior.

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Recent research has documented that children readily engage in overimitation, that is, the reproduction of causally irrelevant elements within a bigger action sequence. Different explanations have been put forward. Affiliation accounts claim that children overimitate to affiliate with the model. Causal confusion accounts claim that children mistakenly perceive causally irrelevant elements as causally relevant and, thus, imitate them. Normativity accounts claim that overimitation arises when children view causally irrelevant elements as an essential part of an overarching conventional activity. To test among these accounts, we had children watch a model produce some effect by performing a sequence of causally irrelevant and relevant acts, with the latter resulting in some effect. In two conditions, the model presented the action sequence as focused either more on the method or more on the goal, with the normativity account predicting that children should interpret the causally irrelevant element as essential more often in the method condition than in the goal condition. Three measures were used: (a) children's own overimitation, (b) their spontaneous responses to a puppet engaging in or refraining from overimitation, and (c) their explicit judgments about the puppet's behavior. Results revealed that overimitation was frequent in both conditions. In addition, however, children protested against the puppet only when she did not overimitate, they did so more in the method condition than in the goal condition, and they explicitly judged omission of the irrelevant actions to be a mistake in the method condition. These results are not readily compatible with affiliation and causal confusion accounts, and they speak in favor of normativity accounts.

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The principle of rationality has been invoked to explain that infants expect agents to perform the most efficient means action to attain a goal. It has also been demonstrated that infants take into account the efficiency of observed actions to achieve a goal outcome when deciding whether to reenact a specific behavior or not. It is puzzling, however, that they also tend to imitate an apparently suboptimal unfamiliar action even when they can bring about the same outcome more efficiently by applying a more rational action alternative available to them. We propose that this apparently paradoxical behavior is explained by infants' interpretation of action demonstrations as communicative manifestations of novel and culturally relevant means actions to be acquired, and we present empirical evidence supporting this proposal. In Experiment 1, we found that 14-month-olds reenacted novel arbitrary means actions only following a communicative demonstration. Experiment 2 showed that infants' inclination to reproduce communicatively manifested novel actions is restricted to behaviors they can construe as goal-directed instrumental acts. The study also provides evidence that infants' reenactment of the demonstrated novel actions reflects epistemic motives rather than purely social motives. We argue that ostensive communication enables infants to represent the teleological structure of novel actions even when the causal relations between means and end are cognitively opaque and apparently violate the efficiency expectation derived from the principle of rationality. This new account of imitative learning of novel means shows how the teleological stance and natural pedagogy--two separate cognitive adaptations to interpret instrumental versus communicative actions--are integrated as a system for learning socially constituted instrumental knowledge in humans.

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In the current study, we first investigated whether preschoolers imitate selectively across three imitation tasks. Second, we examined whether preschoolers' selective imitation is influenced by differences in the modeled actions and/or by the situational context. Finally, we investigated how verbal cues given by the model affect preschoolers' imitation. Participants (3- to 5-year-olds) watched an adult performing an unusual action in three imitation tasks (touch light, house, and obstacle). In two conditions, the model either was or was not restricted by situational constraints. In addition, the model verbalized either the goal that was to be achieved, the movement, or none of the action components. Preschoolers always acted on the objects without constraints. Results revealed differences in preschoolers' selective imitation across the tasks. In the house task, they showed the selective imitation pattern that has been interpreted as rational, imitating the unusual action more often in the no-constraint condition than in the constraint condition. In contrast, in the touch light task, preschoolers imitated the unusual head touch irrespective of the model's constraints or of the verbal cues that had been presented. Finally, in the obstacle task, children mostly emulated the observed goal irrespective of the presence of the constraint, but they increased their imitation of the unusual action when the movement had been emphasized. Overall, our data suggest that preschoolers adjust their imitative behavior to context-specific information about objects, actions, and their interpretations of the model's intention to teach something.

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