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Exposure to potentially morally injurious events (PMIEs) among combat veterans has been acknowledged as a significant stressful combat event that may lead to various mental health problems, including depression and moral injury (MI), outcomes of shame and guilt. Recent studies have examined both risk and protective factors that can contribute to PMIEs and their consequences. However, while the general level of one's moral judgment is a logical contributor to moral injuries, it has yet to be examined empirically. In the current study, we examined the unique impact of moral judgment levels on the experience of PMIEs among combat veterans. We also examined the moderating role of moral judgment in the relationship between PMIEs and MI outcomes and depressive symptoms. A volunteer sample of 70 male Israeli combat veterans completed self-report questionnaires and a moral judgment task in a cross-sectional design study. Our findings indicate that moral judgment contributed to higher levels of perceiving others' actions as transgressive (PMIE-Other), above and beyond combat exposure. Moreover, we found that moral judgment has a moderating role in the link between PMIEs and their negative outcomes: Among veterans with higher levels of moral judgment, the association between PMIEs and their expressions was stronger than for those with lower levels of moral judgment. Our finding highlights the unique contribution of moral judgment level to PMIEs and their mental health consequences. It can be cautiously suggested that moral judgment should be viewed as a pre-recruitment risk factor that can help identify those at greater risk for mental health problems following exposure to PMIEs.

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Theories of justice suggest that it serves two main purposes: punishment and restoration. Although punishment emerges early and has been well-documented, little is known about the contexts in which young children engage in restorative practices like compensation for victims. The current study investigated whether children's engagement in compensation and punishment (which often involve a redistribution of resources) was sensitive to characteristics of the perpetrator and victim known to shape distributive justice decisions (decisions about how resources should be distributed), such as social dominance, resource inequality, and moral character. A total of 54 children aged 3 to 7 years completed a series of moral judgment experiments. Each experiment featured interactions between a perpetrator and a victim, ending with the perpetrator stealing the victim's toy. In Experiment 1 (N = 44), social dominance did not affect punishment or compensation overall, but older children compensated the dominant victim (but not the subordinate victim) less than younger children. In Experiment 2 (N = 42), children compensated the poor victim more than the rich victim, but they did not punish the rich perpetrator more than the poor perpetrator. In Experiment 3 (N = 45), children compensated the victim with a good moral character more than the victim with a bad moral character, and the victim's moral character did not influence punishment. Altogether, these findings offer new insights into how children resort to compensation for victims as a complement to, rather than an alternative to, punishment.

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OBJECTIVES: The objective was to study the effect of serial night shifts on the cognitive, psychomotor, and moral performance of emergency medicine residents of an academic Emergency Medicine Department. METHODS: This prospective case-crossover study compared emergency medicine residents' sleep time, subjective sleepiness, cognitive function, moral judgment, and psychomotor skills after 5 consecutive days versus night shifts using sleep diaries, activity monitors, and multiple performance tests. Paired t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to analyze data based on normality. Correlation analysis was done using Spearman's correlation test. Subgroup analysis was also performed to find any difference based on gender and year of residency. RESULTS: Twenty-seven emergency medicine residents participated (13 males, 48.1%). The distribution across residency years was as follows: 44.4% in their first year, 25.9% in their second year, and 29.6% in their third year. Following five consecutive night shifts, total sleep duration decreased significantly from 338.1 ± 67.8 to 307.4 ± 71.0 min (p < 0.001), while subjective sleepiness scores increased from 9.6 ± 3.3 to 13.6 ± 4.6. Psychomotor performance and reaction times did not significantly differ between night and day shifts. However, working memory declined, assessed by self-paced three-back test scores (median [IQR] 517.1 [471.9-546.7] vs. 457.6 [334.4-508.8]; p = 0.034) and interference test scores (445.5 ± 59.9 vs. 407.2 ± 56.8; p < 0.001), along with moral judgment (median [IQR] 19 [18-28] vs. 15 [11-21]; p = 0.010) after serial night shifts. No correlations existed between performance measures nor differences based on gender or residency year. CONCLUSIONS: Residents sleep less following night versus day shifts, reporting the highest sleepiness levels after 5 consecutive nights. Despite this, psychomotor performance and reaction times did not significantly differ. However, considerable reductions occurred in moral judgment, working memory, and interference test performance after serial night shifts.

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The ChatGPT technology is increasingly becoming a part of our daily lives and is starting to be utilized in various decision-making contexts. The current study builds upon prior research, demonstrating that people's moral decision-making is influenced by ChatGPT across three perspectives, as evidenced by two studies (total n = 1925). The findings suggested that ChatGPT advice impacted decision-making similarly to expert advice, although not all decisions were susceptible to influence, particularly those based on negative emotions. Additionally, ChatGPT advice affected decisions beyond moral judgments, but no effect was observed when the advice recommended immediate low rewards. Moreover, individuals with a higher tendency for personal fear of invalidity were more likely to be influenced by both expert and AI advice, but this was not related to trust in AI.

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Rules help guide our behavior-particularly in complex social contexts. But rules sometimes give us the "wrong" answer. How do we know when it is okay to break the rules? In this paper, we argue that we sometimes use contractualist (agreement-based) mechanisms to determine when a rule can be broken. Our model draws on a theory of social interactions - "virtual bargaining" - that assumes that actors engage in a simulated bargaining process when navigating the social world. We present experimental data which suggests that rule-breaking decisions are sometimes driven by virtual bargaining and show that these data cannot be explained by more traditional rule-based or outcome-based approaches.

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Despite unresolved questions about replicability, a substantial number of studies find that disgust influences and arises from evaluations of immoral behavior and people. Departing from prior emphases, the current research examines a novel, related question: Are people who are viewed as disgusting (i.e., people whose habits seem disgusting) perceived as more immoral than typical or unusual people? Four experiments examined this, also exploring the downstream impacts of moral character judgments. Adults who seemed disgusting were regarded as more immoral for purity and non-purity violations (Experiment 1) and less praiseworthy for prosocial acts (Experiment 2). In Experiment 3, an 8-year-old with typical (but seemingly disgusting) habits was rated as "naughtier" and likelier to misbehave than an atypical child who loved vegetables and disliked sweets. Experiment 4 revealed how, when no behavioral information is available, beliefs about target disgust influence beliefs about future behavior, helping explain why seemingly disgusting targets are viewed as more immoral, but not always more punishable for their bad behavior.

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Children autonomously make sound moral judgments based on internal criteria, but they tend to make erroneous judgments in the presence of social influences, and the reasons for these errors are not well understood. Thus, the current research investigated how the presence of observers who can see and listen to 3-year-old children's judgments but who do not present their opinions influences children's conformity in moral judgment behavior. In Experiment 1, the children (N = 30) were presented with pictures depicting prosocial behaviors and asked whether the behaviors were acceptable. The children's tendency to change their answers after hearing the counterintuitive opinions of informants was then measured. The results showed that the children's moral judgments were more likely to conform to that of the group in the presence of observers. Experiment 2 aimed to determine the reason children were more likely to conform to a group when being watched by observers in Experiment 1. Children (N = 30) were randomly assigned to two conditions with different observer conditions as follows. Observers were either wearing headsets, indicating that they could not hear the children's responses, or had them hanging around their necks, indicating that they could. The results showed that children's conformity behavior depended on whether observers could hear what they were saying. The current findings are expected to help elucidate not only social factors that affect children's moral judgments but also the developmental mechanism of an observer effect.

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Human moral reactions to artificial intelligence (AI) agents' behavior constitute an important aspect of modern-day human-AI relationships. Although previous studies have mainly focused on autonomy ethics, this study investigates how individuals judge AI agents' violations of community ethics (including betrayals and subversions) compared with human violations. Participants' behavioral responses, event-related potentials (ERPs), and individual differences were assessed. Behavioral findings reveal that participants rated AI agents' community-violating actions less morally negative than human transgressions, possibly because AI agents are commonly perceived as having less agency than human adults. The ERP N1 component showed the same pattern with moral rating scores, indicating the modulation effect of human-AI differences on initial moral intuitions. Moreover, the level of social withdrawal correlated with a smaller N1 in the human condition but not in the AI condition. The N2 and P2 components were sensitive to the difference between the loyalty/betrayal and authority/subversion domains but not human/AI differences. Individual levels of moral sense and autistic traits also influenced behavioral data, especially on the loyalty/betrayal domain. In our opinion, these findings offer insights for predicting moral responses to AI agents and guiding ethical AI development aligned with human moral values.

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Negative gossip is a double-edged sword, which can harm group members but also protect them from harmful others. Current theory proposes that gossip receivers assess gossipers' selfish and prosocial intentions based on different social cues, to determine whether the negative gossip behavior is morally justifiable. However, assessing gossipers' moral intentions does not fully clarify when and how justifiability of negative gossip is assessed by receivers. Using goal framing theory, I propose a parsimonious way of understanding when gossip receivers will be interested in determining whether sharing the negative gossip was justifiable, and how they assess justifiability. In line with predictions, results of two scenario experiments showed that in a hedonic and gain goal frame gossip justifiability was similar to a baseline level, suggesting that receivers had no particular concerns regarding gossip justifiability. However, in a normative frame receivers assessed negative gossip to be less justifiable when social cues indicated that the gossiper was motivated to harm others for self-interest compared to when such cues were absent (Study 1). In Study 2, gossip was more justified when social cues indicated that that the target broke the salient social norm and signaled that the gossiper has low motivation to harm. Moreover, in a normative frame, participants were more interested in further establishing gossip truthfulness compared to participants in a gain, hedonic, or control condition in Study 1, and in a hedonic condition in Study 2. These results show that individuals' goal frame determine their interest in gossip justifiability and how they assess it. This may help solve the paradox of negative gossip by drawing from goal framing theory to understand individuals can be avid gossip consumers, while holding widely disapproving attitudes towards this behavior.

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Greene's influential dual-process model of moral cognition (mDPM) proposes that when people engage in Type 2 processing, they tend to make consequentialist moral judgments. One important source of empirical support for this claim comes from studies that ask participants to make moral judgments while experimentally manipulating Type 2 processing. This paper presents a meta-analysis of the published psychological literature on the effect of four standard cognitive-processing manipulations (cognitive load; ego depletion; induction; time restriction) on moral judgments about sacrificial moral dilemmas [n = 44; k = 68; total N = 14, 003; M(N) = 194.5]. The overall pooled effect was in the direction predicted by the mDPM, but did not reach statistical significance. Restricting the dataset to effect sizes from (high-conflict) personal sacrificial dilemmas (a type of sacrificial dilemma that is often argued to be best suited for tests of the mDPM) also did not yield a significant pooled effect. The same was true for a meta-analysis of the subset of studies that allowed for analysis using the process dissociation approach [n = 8; k = 12; total N = 2, 577; M(N) = 214.8]. I argue that these results undermine one important line of evidence for the mDPM and discuss a series of potential objections against this conclusion.

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New technologies regularly bring about profound changes in our daily lives. Romantic relationships are no exception to these transformations. Some philosophers expect the emergence in the near future of love drugs: a theoretically achievable biotechnological intervention that could be designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships. We investigated laypeople's resistance to the use of such technologies and its sources. Across two studies (Study 1, French and Peruvian university students, N after exclusion = 186; Study 2, Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, N after exclusion = 693, pre-registered), we found that the use of love drugs designed to strengthen and maintain love in romantic relationships are considered as more morally problematic than psychological therapy with the same aim. In Study 2, we show that this last effect is partially due to the fact that the love resulting from the use of love drugs is perceived as less authentic, intense, and durable. We discuss the specific role of authenticity in the relative moral disapproval of love drugs.

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Punishment of moral norm violators is instrumental for human cooperation. Yet, social and affective neuroscience research has primarily focused on second- and third-party norm enforcement, neglecting the neural architecture underlying observed (vicarious) punishment of moral wrongdoers. We used naturalistic television drama as a sampling space for observing outcomes of morally-relevant behaviors to assess how individuals cognitively process dynamically evolving moral actions and their consequences. Drawing on Affective Disposition Theory, we derived hypotheses linking character morality with viewers' neural processing of characters' rewards and punishments. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine neural responses of 28 female participants while free-viewing 15 short story summary video clips of episodes from a popular US television soap opera. Each summary included a complete narrative structure, fully crossing main character behaviors (moral/immoral) and the consequences (reward/punishment) characters faced for their actions. Narrative engagement was examined via intersubject correlation and representational similarity analysis. Highest cortical synchronization in 9 specifically selected regions previously implicated in processing moral information was observed when characters who act immorally are punished for their actions with participants' empathy as an important moderator. The results advance our understanding of the moral brain and the role of normative considerations and character outcomes in viewers' engagement with popular narratives.

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Countless policies are crafted with the intention of punishing all who do wrong or rewarding only those who do right. However, this requires accommodating certain mistakes: some who do not deserve to be punished might be, and some who deserve to be rewarded might not be. Six preregistered experiments (N = 3,484 U.S. adults) reveal that people are more willing to accept this trade-off in principle, before errors occur, than in practice, after errors occur. The result is an asymmetry such that for punishments, people believe it is more important to prevent false negatives (e.g., criminals escaping justice) than to fix them, and more important to fix false positives (e.g., wrongful convictions) than to prevent them. For rewards, people believe it is more important to prevent false positives (e.g., welfare fraud) than to fix them and more important to fix false negatives (e.g., improperly denied benefits) than to prevent them.

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Evaluating other people's moral character is a crucial social cognitive task. However, the cognitive processes by which people seek out, prioritize, and integrate multiple pieces of character-relevant information have not been studied empirically. The first aim of this research was to examine which character traits are considered most important when forming an impression of a person's overall moral character. The second aim was to understand how differing levels of trait expression affect overall character judgments. Four preregistered studies and one supplemental study (total N = 720), using five different measures of importance and sampling undergraduates, online workers, and community members, found that our participants placed the most importance on the traits honest, helpful, compassionate, loyal, and responsible. Also, when integrating the information that they have learned, our participants seemed to engage in a simple averaging process in which all available, relevant information is combined in a linear fashion to form an overall evaluation of moral character. This research provides new insights into the cognitive processes by which evaluations of moral character are formed.

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PUBLIC ABSTRACT: How do people make judgments about actions that violate moral norms yet maximize the greater good (e.g., sacrificing the well-being of a small number of people for the well-being of a larger number of people)? Research on this question has been criticized for relying on highly artificial scenarios and for conflating multiple distinct factors underlying responses in moral dilemmas. The current article reviews research that used a computational modeling approach to disentangle the roles of multiple distinct factors in responses to plausible moral dilemmas based on real-world events. By disentangling sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to moral norms, and general preference for inaction versus action in responses to realistic dilemmas, the reviewed work provides a more nuanced understanding of how people make judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas.

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Previous research has shown that moral choice depends on language, a phenomenon known as the moral foreign language effect (mFLE). The current study examines the influence of social distance on the mFLE. In Experiment 1, 200 participants were randomly assigned to either close or distant social distance in English or Chinese. In Experiment 2, 188 participants were randomly assigned to either English or Chinese and were presented with eight moral dilemmas, each with five different levels of social distance. After reading the dilemma, participants made a choice on a binary scale (Yes/No) in both Experiments 1 and 2 or on a more sensitive 100-point scale in Experiment 2. The results showed that the mFLE was present in distant social distance but absent in close social distance. Finally, a meta-analysis of the results from both studies confirmed the effect of social distance on the mFLE. These findings demonstrate that social distance might play an important role in moderating the mFLE in moral judgment.

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People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision-making, and folk metaethics.

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BACKGROUND: In the past, comparative cultural neurological studies of moral judgments have mainly focused on Eastern and Western groups. We initially examined Japanese and Chinese groups, both East Asian cultures. We utilized a recently proposed polynomial model known as the "consequences, norms, and generalized inaction" (CNI) model to investigate the variations in the overall prefrontal cortex activity between these two groups during moral judgment. METHODS: We employed functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to analyze the prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity within a CNI model of moral judgment among 23 healthy Japanese and 26 healthy Chinese adults. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: Our study revealed significant differences in the PFC activation between Japanese and Chinese individuals in the CNI moral judgment task context. Specifically, during the CNI task, Chinese men exhibited higher right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (R-DLPFC) activity than Chinese women. In contrast, Japanese women showed greater left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (L-DLPFC) activity than Japanese men. In an international comparison, R-DLPFC activity was higher in Chinese men than in Japanese men. Conversely, the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex activity was higher in Japanese men compared to Chinese men. Additionally, among women, the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex activity was higher in Japanese women than in Chinese women. In conclusion, our findings support the perspective of cultural psychology and identify cultural and sex differences in PFC activity between Japanese and Chinese individuals.

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When people are asked to recommend individuals they care about, they often grapple with conflicts regarding the level of honesty they should maintain when being truthful could potentially hinder those individuals' chances of receiving beneficial opportunities. In the current study, we examined how adolescents evaluate people based on how they respond to such dilemmas, with a focus on how it affects judgments of interpersonal and epistemic trustworthiness. We tested a sample of high school students in the southwestern United States (N = 78; Mage = 16.45 years), who were asked about a moral dilemma in which a story character needed to decide whether to recommend an unqualified friend. We experimentally manipulated whether the friend was very close to the standard (requiring a small exaggeration) or was far from the standard (requiring a large exaggeration) between participants. Across both exaggeration conditions, we observed a dissociation in judgments of epistemic and interpersonal trustworthiness: Lie-tellers were judged to be more interpersonally trustworthy than epistemically trustworthy, whereas truth-tellers were judged to be more epistemically trustworthy than interpersonally trustworthy. These results show that adolescents are capable of using information about an individual's lie-telling versus truth-telling decisions to make highly nuanced social inferences.

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