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The concept of episodic memory (EM) faces significant challenges by two claims: EM might not be a distinct memory system, and EM might be an epiphenomenon of a more general capacity for mental time travel (MTT). Nevertheless, the observations leading to these arguments do not preclude the existence of a mechanically and functionally distinct EM system. First, modular systems, like cognition, can have distinct subsystems that may not be distinguishable in the system's final output. EM could be such a subsystem, even though its effects may be difficult to distinguish from those of other subsystems. Second, EM could have a distinct and consistent low-level function, which is used in diverse high-level functions such as MTT. This article introduces the scenario construction framework, proposing that EM crucially rests on memory traces containing the gist of an episodic experience. During retrieval, EM traces trigger the reconstruction of semantic representations, which were active during the remembered episode, and are further enriched with semantic information, to generate a scenario of the past experience. This conceptualization of EM is consistent with studies on the neural basis of EM and resolves the two challenges while retaining the key properties associated with EM. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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Children's episodic future-thinking is typically assessed using experimental tasks that measure whether children select an item with future utility. Although these tasks-inspired by Tulving's seminal 'spoon test' (Tulving E. 2005 Episodic memory and autonoesis: uniquely human? In The missing link in cognition: origins of self-reflective consciousness [eds HS Terrace, J Metcalfe], pp. 3-56. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195161564.001.0001])-are passed around age 4, they tell us little about the functional significance of children's episodic future-thinking in their day-to-day lives. We highlight how a naturalistic approach can shed light on this issue, and present a small study where we recruited mothers to report on their children's (N = 12, 3- and 4-year-olds and 6- and 7-year-olds) future-thinking over a 7-day period. We used a thematic analysis to understand why children express future thoughts and derived the following themes: (1) expressing future desires and/or intentions, (2) future-oriented information-seeking, (3) connecting present actions with future outcomes, and (4) predicting future mental/physiological states. We compare these themes with recent accounts of the functional significance of future-thinking in adults and conclude that children largely express their future-thinking verbally to request information or support from their parent-likely because they do not yet possess enough control/autonomy to independently act for their own future. Our findings both complement and extend an experimental approach and further elucidate the functional significance of mental time travel in children. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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Episodic memory involves the conscious recollection of personally experienced events and when absent, results in profound losses to the typical human conscious experience. Over the last 2.5 decades, the debate surrounding whether episodic memory is unique to humans has seen a lot of controversy and accordingly has received significant research attention. Various behavioural paradigms have been developed to test episodic-like memory; a term designed to reflect the behavioural characteristics of episodic memory in the absence of evidence for consciously experienced recall. In this review, we first outline the most influential paradigms that have been developed to assess episodic-like memory across a variety of non-human taxa (including mammals, birds and cephalopods), namely the what-where-when memory, incidental encoding and unexpected question, and source memory paradigms. Then, we examine whether various key features of human episodic memory are conceptually represented in episodic-like memory across phylogenetically and neurologically diverse taxa, identifying similarities, differences and gaps in the literature. We conclude that the evidence is mixed, and as episodic memory encompasses a variety of cognitive structures and processes, research on episodic-like memory in non-humans should follow this multifaceted approach and assess evidence across various behavioural paradigms that each target different aspects of human episodic memory.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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40 years ago, Endel Tulving published his hugely influential Elements of Episodic Memory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). For the first time, this discussed the details of episodic memory (i.e. the ability to remember personal past events), including a specific conscious experience. Ten years later, Tulving defined the ability to mentally project oneself in time to be the critical feature distinguishing episodic from semantic memory ('What is episodic memory?' Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 2, 67-70, doi:10.1111/1467-8721.ep10770899). In this conception, the conscious experience of episodic memory captures the experience of reliving a personal event as it was experienced in the past, while the same ability allows a potential symmetry between remembering the past, and our ability to project into an imagined future. With the recent passing of Endel Tulving, this theme issue offers an opportunity to question our understanding of mental time travel in full.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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While many aspects of cognition have been shown to be shared between humans and non-human animals, there remains controversy regarding whether the capacity to mentally time travel is a uniquely human one. In this paper, we argue that there are four ways of representing when some event happened: four kinds of temporal representation. Distinguishing these four kinds of temporal representation has five benefits. First, it puts us in a position to determine the particular benefits these distinct temporal representations afford an organism. Second, it provides the conceptual resources to foster a discussion about which of these representations is necessary for an organism to count as having the capacity to mentally time travel. Third, it enables us to distinguish stricter from more liberal views of mental time travel that differ regarding which kind(s) of temporal representation is taken to be necessary for mental time travel. Fourth, it allows us to determine the benefits of taking a stricter or more liberal view of mental time travel. Finally, it ensures that disagreement about whether some species can mentally time travel is not merely the product of unrecognized disagreement about which temporal representation is necessary for mental time travel. We argue for a more liberal view, on the grounds that it allows us to view mental time travel as an evolutionarily continuous phenomenon and to recognize that differences in the ways that organisms mentally time travel might reflect different temporal representations, or combinations thereof, that they employ. Our ultimate aim, however, is to create a conceptual framework for further discussion regarding what sorts of temporal representations are required for mental time travel.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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Over the course of his research, Endel Tulving offered a number of somewhat different characterizations of episodic memory. Do they indicate that he changed his mind over time as to what episodic memory is, or did his core understanding of the nature of episodic memory stay the same? In this article, we offer some support for the latter claim, and in particular for thinking that, throughout his life, Tulving took as a defining feature of episodic memory the distinctive awareness of the self in time it involves. We argue that it is easier to see the continuities rather than the discontinuities in Tulving's writings once their historical context is taken into account, where this involves both the authors who influenced his thinking, as well as the intellectual climate at the different times he was writing. We also discuss two recent bodies of work on episodic memory that take aspects of Tulving's writings as their point of departure, but try to factor out into separate ingredients what he arguably saw as a unitary phenomenon. Considering aspects of the dialectic between them and Tulving's view might shed further light on some of the motivations behind the latter.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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Many recent artificial intelligence (AI) systems take inspiration from biological episodic memory. Here, we ask how these 'episodic-inspired' AI systems might inform our understanding of biological episodic memory. We discuss work showing that these systems implement some key features of episodic memory while differing in important respects and appear to enjoy behavioural advantages in the domains of strategic decision-making, fast learning, navigation, exploration and acting over temporal distance. We propose that these systems could be used to evaluate competing theories of episodic memory's operations and function. However, further work is needed to validate them as models of episodic memory and isolate the contributions of their memory systems to their behaviour. More immediately, we propose that these systems have a role to play in directing episodic memory research by highlighting novel or neglected hypotheses as pursuit-worthy. In this vein, we propose that the evidence reviewed here highlights two pursuit-worthy hypotheses about episodic memory's function: that it plays a role in planning that is independent of future-oriented simulation, and that it is adaptive in virtue of its contributions to fast learning in novel, sparse-reward environments. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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Mental time travel is often presented as a singular mechanism, but theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that it is composed of component processes. What are these components? Three hypotheses about the major components of mental time travel are commonly considered: (i) remembering and imagining might, respectively, rely on different processes, (ii) past- and future-directed forms of mental time travel might, respectively, rely on different processes, and (iii) the creation of episodic representations and the determination of their temporal orientation might, respectively, rely on different processes. Here, we flesh out the last of these proposals. First, we argue for 'representational continuism': the view that different forms of mental travel are continuous with regard to their core representational contents. Next, we propose an updated account of episodic recombination (the mechanism generating these episodic contents) and review evidence in its support. On this view, episodic recombination is a natural kind best viewed as a form of compositional computation. Finally, we argue that episodic recombination should be distinguished from mechanisms determining the temporal orientation of episodic representations. Thus, we suggest that mental travel is a singular capacity, while mental time travel has at least two major components: episodic representations and their temporal orientation. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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I outline the perspective that searching the contents of memory is a form of mental time travel (MTT) in non-humans that is relatively tractable because it focuses on the contents of memory. I propose that an animal model of MTT requires three elements: (i) the animal remembers multiple events using episodic memory, (ii) the order of events in time is included in the representation, and (iii) the sequence of events can be searched to find a target that occurred at a particular time. I review experiments suggesting that rats represent multiple items in episodic memory (element 1) in order of occurrence (element 2) and engage in memory replay to search representations in episodic memory in sequential order to find information at particular points in the sequence (element 3). The cognitive building blocks needed for MTT may be quite old in the evolutionary timescale.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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Tulving's introduction of episodic memory and the metaphor of mental time travel has immensely enriched our understanding of human cognition. However, his focus on human psychology, with limited consideration of evolutionary perspectives, led to the entrenched notion that mental time travel is uniquely human. We contend that adopting a phylogenetic perspective offers a deeper insight into cognition, revealing it as a continuous evolutionary process. Adherence to the uniqueness of pre-defined psychological concepts obstructs a more complete understanding. We offer a concise natural history to elucidate how events that occurred hundreds of millions of years ago have been pivotal for our ability to mentally time travel. We discuss how the human brain, utilizing parts with ancient origins in a networked manner, enables mental time travel. This underscores that episodic memories and mental time travel are not isolated mental constructs but integral to our perception and representation of the world. We conclude by examining recent evidence of neuroanatomical correlates found only in great apes, which show great variability, indicating the ongoing evolution of mental time travel in humans.This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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Mental time travel (MTT), a cornerstone of human cognition, enables individuals to mentally project themselves into their past or future. It was shown that this self-projection may extend beyond the temporal domain to the spatial and social domains. What about higher cognitive domains? Twenty-eight participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while self-projecting to different political, moral and temporal perspectives. For each domain, participants were asked to judge their relationship to various people (politicians, moral figures, personal acquaintances) from their actual or projected self-location. Findings showed slower, less accurate responses during self-projection across all domains. fMRI analysis revealed self-projection elicited brain activity at the precuneus, medial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction and anterior insula, bilaterally and right lateral temporal cortex. Notably, 23.5% of active voxels responded to all three domains and 27% to two domains, suggesting a shared brain system for self-projection. For ordinality judgement (self-reference), 52.5% of active voxels corresponded to the temporal domain specifically. Self-projection activity overlapped mostly with the frontoparietal control network, followed by the default mode network, while self-reference showed a reversed pattern, demonstrating MTT's implication in spontaneous brain activity. MTT may thus be regarded as a 'mental-experiential travel', with self-projection as a domain-general construct and self-reference related mostly to time. This article is part of the theme issue 'Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research'.

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Episodic-like memory in non-human animals represents the behavioral characteristics of human episodic memory-the ability to mentally travel backward in time to "re-live" past experiences. A focus on traditional model species of episodic-like memory may overlook taxa possessing this cognitive ability and consequently its evolution across species. Experiments conducted in the wild have the potential to broaden the scope of episodic-like memory research under the natural conditions in which they evolved. We combine two distinct yet complementary episodic-like memory tasks (the what-where-when memory and incidental encoding paradigms), each targeting a different aspect of human episodic memory, namely the content (what-where-when) and process (incidental encoding), to comprehensively test the memory abilities of wild, free-living, non-caching blue tits (Cyanistes caeruleus) and great tits (Parus major). Automated feeders with custom-built programs allowed for experimental manipulation of spatiotemporal experiences on an individual-level basis. In the what-where-when memory experiment, after learning individualized temporal feeder rules, the birds demonstrated their ability to recall the "what" (food type), "where" (feeder location), and "when" (time since their initial visit of the day) of previous foraging experiences. In the incidental encoding experiment, the birds showed that they were able to encode and recall incidental spatial information regarding previous foraging experiences ("where" test), and juveniles, but not adults, were also able to recall incidentally encoded visual information ("which" test). Consequently, this study presents multiple lines of converging evidence for episodic-like memory in a wild population of generalist foragers, suggesting that episodic-like memory may be more taxonomically widespread than previously assumed.

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Objective: To investigate the intervention effect of computerized cognitive remediation therapy (CCRT) on mental time travel (MTT) in patients with schizophrenia(SCZ). Methods: From August 2020 to July 2021, 60 patients with SCZ were randomly allocated to either the study or the control group. The control group was treated with conventional drugs alone. The study group received CCRT and medical therapy for 40 minutes three times a week for 4 weeks. The participants underwent the MTT test before and after the training. Results: A total of 28 patients in the study group and 26 patients in the control group were included in the analysis. Before training, there was no significant difference in the concretization ratio of recalling past and imagining future events between the study group and the control group (P > 0.05). After 4 weeks of training, the specific event ratio of the study group was higher than that of the control group (P < 0.01). In terms of the emotional titer of the events, the concreteness of the positive events in the study group was higher than that of the neutral events and negative events (P < 0.01). The concreteness of negative events was higher than that of neutral events (P < 0.01). Conclusion: CCRT can improve the MTT ability of SCZ patients, which is manifested by an increase in the concretiveness of recalling past and imagining future events.

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Mental Time Travel (MTT) allows us to remember past events and imagine future ones. According to previous literature, the Temporal Distance of events affects MTT: our ability to order events worsens for close, compared to far, events. However, those studies established distances a-priori, albeit the way we perceive events' temporal distance may subjectively differ from their objective distance. Thus, in the current study, we aimed to investigate the effects of Perceived Temporal Distance (PTD) on the MTT ability and the brain areas mediating this process. Thirty-three healthy volunteers took part in an fMRI MTT task. Participants were asked to project themselves into the past, present, or future, and to judge a series of events as relative-past or relative-future, in relation to the adopted time location. Outside the scanner, participants provided PTD estimates for each stimulus of the MTT task. Participants' performance and functional activity were analyzed as a function of these estimations. At the behavioural level, PTD predicts the modulation of the performance for relative-past and relative-future. Bilateral angular gyrus, retrosplenial cortex, temporo-parietal region and medial, middle and superior frontal gyri mediate the PTD effect. In addition to these areas, the closer the relative-future events are perceived, the higher the involvement of left parahippocampal and lingual gyri and right cerebellum. Thus, perceived proximity of events activates frontal and posterior parietal areas, which therefore might mediate the processing of PTD in the cognitive spatial representation of time. Future proximity also activates cerebellum and medial temporal areas, known to be involved in imaginative and constructive cognitive functions.

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This research experimentally examined the crossed influences between the emotional valence of collective memory and collective future thinking. As remembering the past and imagining the future are shaped by the present, we additionally test whether perceived anomie (i.e., perceiving present society as disintegrated and disregulated) would moderate these influences. Study 1 (N = 228 French participants) manipulated the valence of collective memory (positive vs. negative French past) to test its effect on the valence of collective future thinking. Results showed that the salience of a negative (vs. positive) French past lead to the projection of a more negative French future only among participants who perceived present society as highly disregulated. Study 2 (N = 215) focused on the influence of the valence of collective future thinking (positive vs. negative French future) on the valence associated with the French past. Results showed that the salience of a negative (vs. positive) French future lead left-wing participants to rate more positively events/figures of the French past that are usually valued by conservatives. Taken together, these studies provided evidence of conditional effects in the crossed influences between the emotional valence of collective memory and collective future thinking, thus contributing to the recent literature on collective mental time travel.

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ACADEMIC ABSTRACT: This article integrates and advances the scope of research on the role of mental time travel in bolstering the self. We propose that imagining the self in the future (prospection) or in the past (retrospection) highlights central and positive self-aspects. Thus, bringing to mind one's future or past broadens the perceived bases of self-integrity and offers a route to self-affirmation. In reviewing corresponding research programs on self-prospection and nostalgia, we illustrate that mental time travel serves to affirm the self in terms of self-esteem, coherence, and control. Mental time travel could be implemented as a source of self-affirmation for facilitating coping and behavior change in several domains such as relationships, health, education, and organizational contexts. PUBLIC ABSTRACT: People can mentally travel to their future or to their past. When people imagine what they will be like in the future, or what they were like in the past, they tend to think about themselves in terms of the important and positive attributes that they possess. Thinking about themselves in such an affirming way expands and consolidates their self-views. This broader image of themselves can increase self-esteem (the extent to which one likes who they are), coherence (the extent to which one perceives life as meaningful), and control (the extent to which one feels capable of initiating and pursuing goals or effecting desirable outcomes). Mental time travel, then, has favorable or affirming consequences for one's self-views. These consequences can be harnessed to modify one's behavior in such life domains as relationships, health, education, and work.

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In this paper, I tentatively answer 50 questions sampled from a pool of over 10,000 weekly questions formulated by students in a course entitled "The Self". The questions pertain to various key topics related to self-processes, such as self-awareness, self-knowledge, self-regulation, self-talk, self-esteem, and self-regulation. The students' weekly questions and their answers highlight what is currently known about the self. Answers to the student questions also allow for the identification of some recurrent lessons about the self. Some of these lessons include: all self-processes are interconnected (e.g., prospection depends on autobiography), self-terms must be properly defined (e.g., self-rumination and worry are not the same), inner speech plays an important role in self-processes, controversies are numerous (are animals self-aware?), measurement issues abound (e.g., self-recognition as an operationalization of self-awareness), deficits in some self-processes can have devastating effects (e.g., self-regulatory deficits may lead to financial problems), and there are lots of unknowns about the self (e.g., gender differences in Theory-of-Mind).

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Much developmental (and comparative) research has used Tulving's Spoon test (i.e., whether an individual will select an item needed to solve a future problem) as the basis for designing tasks to measure episodic future thinking, defined as the capacity to mentally pre-experience the future. There is, however, intense debate about whether these tasks successfully do so. Most notably, it has been argued that children may pass (i.e., select an item with future utility) by drawing on non-episodic, associative processes, rather than on the capacity to represent the future, per se. Although subsequent developmental tasks have sought to address this limitation, we highlight what we argue is a more fundamental shortcoming of Spoon tasks: they prompt future-directed action making it impossible to determine whether children have used their episodic future thinking to guide their behavior. Accordingly, we know little about children's thought about the future that is independently generated (i.e., without prompting), or autocued, and is subsequently reflected (and measurable) by children's actions. We argue that this capacity is a critical, and heretofore overlooked, transition in future-oriented cognition that may not occur until middle childhood. We further hypothesize that it is reliant on children developing richer and more detailed future event representations, along with the necessary cognitive control to transform these representations into actions that serve to benefit their future selves. The time is ripe for researchers to explore this aspect of cognitive development and we suggest several novel approaches to do so. This article is categorized under: Cognitive Biology > Cognitive Development.

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This paper focuses on the idea that pantomime is a privileged lens for investigating the origin of language in a naturalistic framework. Two reasons support this claim. The first one concerns the motivated and iconic character of pantomime compared to the arbitrary and abstract features of linguistic signs emphasized by the conventionalist thesis. The second reason is that a pantomimic account of language origin paves the way for a rethinking of the traditional hypothesis on the relationship between thought and language. Specifically, it leads to a revision of the thesis of the unidirectional influence of language on thought in favor of a bidirectional influence. Indeed, looking at the relationship between thought and language in its nascent stage means investigating the role of thought in shaping language rather than the role of language in shaping thought. A bidirectional perspective of this type hinges on the twofold idea that thought has primarily a narrative foundation and that pantomime represents an ideal expressive means for bootstrapping the evolutionary foundations of language origins in a naturalistic framework.

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Remembering and mentally reliving yesterday's lunch is a typical example of episodic autobiographical memory retrieval. In the present review, we reappraised the complex cascade of cognitive processes involved in memory retrieval, by highlighting one particular phase that has received little interest so far: attentional switch to memory (ASM). As attention cannot be simultaneously directed toward external stimuli and internal memories, there has to be an attentional switch from the external to the internal world in order to initiate memory retrieval. We formulated hypotheses and developed hypothetical models of both the cognitive and brain processes that accompany ASM. We suggest that gaze aversion could serve as an objective temporal marker of the point at which people switch their attention to memory, and highlight several fields (neuropsychology, neuroscience, social cognition, comparative psychology) in which ASM markers could be essential. Our review thus provides a new framework for understanding the early stages of autobiographical memory retrieval.

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