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Objective:To study the impact of financial compensation on the competitive strategy selection of public hospitals.Methods:Based on the quality and cost strategy selection framework of public hospitals,the evolutionary game model of strategy selection of secondary and tertiary public hospitals was established,and the influence of different financial compensation methods on the competitive strategy selection of public hospitals was analyzed by matlab simulation.Results:The more public hospitals choose the optimal strategy,the faster they reach the evolutionary stable state of the optimal strategy.The financial compensation of the same unit can change the competitive strategy choice tendency of the secondary hospitals.Regardless of the tertiary or secondary public hospitals,the impact of the compensation quality strategy is greater than the compensation cost policy,but the over-compensation quality strategy will cause the secondary hospitals to deviate from the optimal strategy.The impact of hospital competition costs on secondary public hospitals is much greater than that of tertiary public hospitals.Conclusion:To clarify the positioning and strategy of secondary and tertiary hospitals from the policy;financially increase the investment in the quality construction of tertiary public hospitals and increase the investment in the management level of secondary hospitals;strengthen supervision and management,guide the hospital reasonable competition.
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Radon is the second leading risk factor for lung cancer after smoking. As a public policy, radon mitigation not only involves radon control technology or its cost-benefit analysis, but also includes the decision-making process of local governments. In this study, the evolutionary game theory was used to analyse the interaction between local governments and residents based on the subsidy of the central government. Considering the practical data in China, factors influencing the behaviour of local governments and residents were discussed using numerical simulations. The results indicated that radon mitigation is a fully government-promoted action; thus, its implementation largely depends on the subsidy of the central government and the share of radon control costs borne by the local government. The financial burden for both local governments and residents is a more important determinant than long-term health effects. The relatively poor local economic situation could limit the implementation of radon control. There would be a public policy paradox wherein cities or regions with higher radon risk would have lower willingness for radon control, mainly due to the significantly higher costs of radon control. This work provides reference data for decision-making to implement radon control and is expected to offer some suggestions for local governments.
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Introduction: Public-private partnership (PPP) older adult care project is an effective means to solve the dilemma of the aging population in China's rural areas, but there are some problems in the operation process, such as a low participation rate and poor service quality, resulting in the needs of rural older adult groups not being met. Methods: To alleviate the pressure of the aging population in rural areas, this study establishes an evolutionary game model for the PPP older adult care project, then defines the interests of local government, the private sector, and rural older adult residents, based on which it discusses the strategic choices of the three parties in the evolutionary process, and finally analyzes the influencing factors of the strategic choices of the game parties through simulation. Results: The results suggest that whether the private sector chooses to actively participate in the project will be influenced by the willingness of local government and rural older adult residents to participate in the project. Local government could play the role of supervisor through reward and punishment mechanisms. Whether older rural residents choose to participate in the project depends on the number of benefits they would receive. Discussion: Based on these findings, local governments should clarify the responsibilities of relevant stakeholders, adopt a regulatory strategy combining subsidies and penalties, improve the participation efficiency of rural older adult residents, promote the effective operation of PPP older adult care projects, and improve the quality of rural older adult care services in the new era.