RESUMEN
The objective of explainable artificial intelligence systems designed for clinical decision support (XAI-CDSS) is to enhance physicians' diagnostic performance, confidence and trust through the implementation of interpretable methods, thus providing for a superior epistemic positioning, a robust foundation for critical reflection and trustworthiness in times of heightened technological dependence. However, recent studies have revealed shortcomings in achieving these goals, questioning the widespread endorsement of XAI by medical professionals, ethicists and policy-makers alike. Based on a surgical use case, this article challenges generalising calls for XAI-CDSS and emphasises the significance of time-sensitive clinical environments which frequently preclude adequate consideration of system explanations. Therefore, XAI-CDSS may not be able to meet expectations of augmenting clinical decision-making in specific circumstances where time is of the essence. This article, by employing a principled ethical balancing methodology, highlights several fallacies associated with XAI deployment in time-sensitive clinical situations and recommends XAI endorsement only where scientific evidence or stakeholder assessments do not contradict such deployment in specific target settings.
RESUMEN
Artificial placenta technologies (also termed 'artificial wombs') for use in place of conventional neonatal intensive care are increasingly closer to first-in-human use. There is growing ethical interest in partial ectogestation (the use of an artificial placenta to continue gestation of an underdeveloped human entity extra uterum), however, there has been little reflection on the ethical issues in the design of the technology. While some have noted the importance of such reflection, and others have noted that a 'value sensitive design' approach should be preferred, they have not elaborated on what this means. In this article, we consider what a value sensitive design approach to artificial placenta design might encompass. We believe that applying this framework to the topic at hand raises theoretical and substantive ethical questions that merit further elucidation. Highlighting that there is a careful need to separate preferences from values and that our intervention should be considered only a starting point, we explore some of the values that could be used to make ethical design choices about the artificial placenta: efficacy, compassion and accessibility.
RESUMEN
Some have challenged the validity of labelling suicidal thoughts and behaviours (STB) as pathological. In this paper, we argue that STB is indeed pathological, thereby, situating suicide prevention within the realm of medicine, complicating calls for the legalisation of medical assistance in dying for individuals whose sole condition is psychiatric (psychiatric medical assistance in dying (MAID)). Evidence shows STB predicts the risk of suicide; moreover, several mental illnesses are associated with STB, and 70%-90% of suicide deaths are linked to psychiatric illness. Treating psychiatric illnesses can prevent suicide. We contend that this clinical evidence not only warrants the classification of STB as pathological but also necessitates its treatment and prevention. This perspective poses a challenge to legislation that would legalise psychiatric MAID.
RESUMEN
PURPOSE: Medical assistance in dying (MAiD) in Canada places the medical provider at the centre of the process. The MAiD provider holds primary responsibility for determining eligibility and becomes acquainted with patients' inner desires and expressions of suffering. This is followed by the MAiD procedure of administering the lethal agent and being present at the death of eligible patients. We report participants' perceptions of the emotional and moral impacts of this role. METHODOLOGY: Two years after MAiD was legalised in Canada, 22 early-adopting physician providers were interviewed. Data were examined using both phenomenological analysis and a novel ChatGPT-enhanced analysis of an anonymised subset of interview excerpts. FINDINGS: Participants described MAiD as emotionally provocative with both challenges and rewards. Providers expressed a positive moral impact when helping to optimise a patient's autonomy and moral comfort with their role in relieving suffering. Providers experienced tensions around professional duty and balancing self with service to others. Personal choice and patient gratitude enhanced the provider experience, while uncertainty and conflict added difficulty. CONCLUSIONS: Participants described MAiD provision as strongly aligned with a patient-centred ethos of practice. This study suggests that, despite challenges, providing MAiD can be a meaningful and satisfying practice for physicians. Understanding the emotional and moral impact and factors that enhance or detract from the providers' experience allows future stakeholders to design and regulate assisted dying in ways congruent with the interests of patients, providers, families and society.
RESUMEN
In her recent paper, Emanuele Mangione proposes combining maternal spindle transfer (MST) and reciprocal effortless in vitro fertilisation (ReIVF) to enable both females to have genetic and gestational ties with the same child, which can particularly benefit lesbian couples. This response rejects Mangione's proposal for the reason that the additional biological ties created by MST+ReIVF, compared with the reception of oocytes from partner (ROPA), are unnecessary. ROPA is currently the most effective method for redistributing biological ties within lesbian couples, allowing one member to provide the egg and the other to carry the fetus. The additional biological ties created by MST+ReIVF are quantitatively too small to significantly enhance parental bonding or couple relationships, and their potential harms to both prospective parents and children outweigh any minor benefits. Furthermore, like ROPA, MST+ReIVF fails to address deeper feminist concerns. Therefore, I propose a new idea: combining in vitro gametogenesis with ectogenesis, which can offer far more reproductive choices and greater potential to address deeper feminist concerns than MST+ReIVF.
RESUMEN
Infertility patients and patient advocates have long argued for classifying infertility as a disease, in the hopes that this recognition would improve coverage for and access to fertility treatment. However, for many fertility patients, including older women, single women and same-sex couples, infertility does not represent a true disease state. Therefore, while calling infertility a 'disease' may seem politically advantageous, it might actually exclude patients with 'social' or 'relational' infertility from treatment. What is needed is a new conceptual framing of infertility that better reflects the profound significance of being infertile for many people and the importance of addressing infertility in order to improve their lives. In this paper, we argue that the capability approach provides this moral underpinning. The capability approach is concerned with what people are able to do, and whether they are able to act in a way that is in keeping with their own values and goals. The ability to procreate and build a family is a fundamental capacity and can be a major part of self-fulfilment, regardless of sexual orientation or family arrangement. Since the capability approach asks us to conceive of equality in terms of equal capabilities, it provides a strong ethical impetus for society to help those who cannot conceive on their own to do so with assisted reproduction.
RESUMEN
In his recent paper Hatherley discusses four reasons given to support mandatory disclosure of the use of machine learning technologies in healthcare, and provides counters to each of these reasons. While I agree with Hatherley's conclusion that such disclosures should not be mandatory (at least not in an upfront fashion), I raise some problems with his counters to the materiality argument. Finally, I raise another potential problem that exists in a democratic society: that even if Hatherley's (and other authors who share his conclusions) arguments are sound, in a democratic society the simple fact that most people might wish for such disclosures to be made might be an enough compelling reason to make such disclosures mandatory.
RESUMEN
In this paper, we report the results from an experimental reproductive ethics study exploring questions about reproduction and parenthood. The main finding in our study is that, while we may assume that everyone understands these concepts and their relationship in the same way, this assumption may be unwarranted. For example, we may assume that if 'x is y's father', it follows that 'y is x's child'. However, the participants in our study did not necessarily agree that it does follow. This means, at the very least, that we need to make sure all parties in a debate have the same relationships in mind when talking about reproduction and parenthood. Moreover, it gives us reason to explore more carefully the conditions which support or undermine the connections between these concepts. This cannot come from purely theoretical reasoning, nor from empirical research alone, but from the alliance between the two.
RESUMEN
In clinical ethics consultations, clinical ethicists bring moral reasoning to bear on concrete and complex clinical ethical problems by undertaking ethical deliberation in collaboration with others. The reasoning process involves identifying and clarifying ethical values which are at stake or contested, and guiding clinicians, and sometimes patients and families, to think through ethically justifiable and available courses of action in clinical situations. There is, however, ongoing discussion about the various methods ethicists use to do this ethical deliberation work. In this paper, we make visible and accessible seven steps of facilitation used in the critical dialogue method of ethics consultation.We describe how the facilitation techniques serve two overall purposes. First, to identify ethically justified responses to ethical questions. Second, to assist participants to gain greater moral clarity, understanding and confidence to respond to ethical challenges as independent moral agents.By describing in detail facilitation steps for clinical ethics consultation, we aim to advance the scholarship of 'clinical ethics facilitation methods' and to demystify the ethical deliberation work undertaken by clinical ethicists.
RESUMEN
We respond to David Wilkinson's arguments against our view of the ethicality of doctors' strikes and our claim that the 2023-2024 UK doctors' strikes are morally permissible and arguably supererogatory.Wilkinson proposes that in specialist outpatient settings, striking doctors should help arrange their own cover to prevent disproportionate harm to patients and to abide by the principles of non-maleficence and fiduciary duty. This hasn't happened during the 2023-2024 UK doctors' strikes; therefore, in his view, these strikes are morally impermissible. We reject Wilkinson's proposal on the grounds that the risk of disproportionate harm is adequately mitigated by existing arrangements and his interpretations of non-maleficence and fiduciary duty are overly demanding.We agree with Wilkinson that strikes put particularly high pressure on covering doctors in chronically under resourced specialisms. But this doesn't justify calling off or depowering doctors' strikes because, without effective strikes, under-resourcing is likely to continue and, ultimately, cause even more harm.Wilkinson argues that doctors cannot justifiably strike in the interests of public health because they don't have a broad duty to public health. We think they do have such a duty; however, we argue that doctors can justifiably strike in the interest of public health whether they have such a duty or not.Finally, we defend our claim that doctors' strikes can be supererogatory from Wilkinson's objections that there may be no such thing as supererogatory action and that our view absurdly entails that strikes can be supererogatory despite placing unfair demands on others.