RESUMEN

If voluntary action is followed by an effect with a short time delay, the time interval between action and effect is often perceived to be shorter than it actually is. This perceptual time compression is termed intentional binding or temporal binding. We investigated age-related changes in adulthood considering temporal binding and its dependence on action body parts (i.e., hand vs. foot). This experiment included 17 young adults (mean age: 21.71 ± 3.14 years) and 27 older adults (mean age: 74.41 ± 3.38 years). Participants performed a button press task using their index fingers (hand condition) or toes (foot condition). The results showed that older participants exhibited a strong time compression comparable to young participants in the voluntary condition. Older participants also showed a strong time compression in involuntary action, which was induced by a mechanical device, differently from young participants. In line with previous research, the present age-related differences in time compression considering involuntary action suggest that causal belief significantly influences event perception rather than the associated intention of action or sensory afferents. The present results also suggest that the nature of action body parts has no significant influence on temporal binding, independent of age group.

RESUMEN

Usually, the closer two events occur, the more likely people infer a causal relationship between them. Recent studies have shown that this relationship between time and causality is bidirectional. Participants also tend to judge events closer in time if they assume that they are causally related. We present six experiments showing causal binding, but unlike other experiments, participants do not emit any motor action, and no physical feedback is given. Rather, all stimuli and causal information are provided verbally. After reading a list of events, participants were asked to estimate the time elapsed between two of them. Those participants who were informed that there was a causal relationship between the two events estimated them as occurring closer to each other. These results support causality- and heuristic-based explanations of temporal binding, as opposed to other explanations such as sensory integration or intentionality of action.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Three experiments investigated whether the nature of the temporal referent affects timing behaviour in rats. We used a peak procedure and assessed timing of food well activity as a function of whether the referent was an instrumental response (a lever press that resulted in the withdrawal of the lever) or a conditioned stimulus (CS) that was 2 s in Experiment 1, 500 ms in Experiment 2, and 800 ms in Experiment 3. In all experiments, the interval between the offset of the temporal referent and food was 5 s. The curve fits for each experiment revealed no differences in peak time, but magazine responding immediately following the CS was higher than following a lever press. This pattern of results was interpreted as reflecting a combination of (a) ambiguity in which component of the 500 ms-2-s auditory stimulus was serving as the referent and (b) response competition between lever pressing and magazine activity. Critically, these results suggest that peak timing in rats is unaffected by whether a lever press or CS serves as the referent. This conclusion is consistent with theoretical models of timing behaviour, but not with evidence from humans showing that the subjective perception of time is affected by whether the cause of an outcome was self-generated or not.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Temporal binding refers to a phenomenon whereby the time interval between a cause and its effect is perceived as shorter than the same interval separating two unrelated events. We examined the developmental profile of this phenomenon by comparing the performance of groups of children (aged 6-7, 7-8, and 9-10 years) and adults on a novel interval estimation task. In Experiment 1, participants made judgements about the time interval between (a) their button press and a rocket launch, and (b) a non-causal predictive signal and rocket launch. In Experiment 2, an additional causal condition was included in which participants made judgements about the interval between an experimenter's button press and the launch of a rocket. Temporal binding was demonstrated consistently and did not change in magnitude with age: estimates of delay were shorter in causal contexts for both adults and children. In addition, the magnitude of the binding effect was greater when participants themselves were the cause of an outcome compared with when they were mere spectators. This suggests that although causality underlies the binding effect, intentional action may modulate its magnitude. Again, this was true of both adults and children. Taken together, these results are the first to suggest that the binding effect is present and developmentally constant from childhood into adulthood.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Causality affects our perception of time; events that appear as causally related are perceived as closer together in time than unrelated events. This effect is known as temporal binding. One potential explanation of this effect is that causality slows an "internal clock" that is used in interval estimation. To explore this hypothesis, we first examined participants' perceived duration of a range of intervals between a causal action and an effect, or between two unrelated events. If (apparent) causality slows the internal clock, then plotting perceived duration against actual duration should reveal a shallower slope in the causality condition (a relative compression of perceived time). This pattern was found. We then examined an interesting corollary: that a slower rate during causal sequences would result in reduced temporal acuity. This is what we found: Duration discrimination thresholds were higher for causal compared to non-causal sequences. These results are compatible with a clock-slowing account of temporal binding. Implications for sensory recalibration accounts of binding are discussed.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

It is well established that the temporal proximity of two events is a fundamental cue to causality. Recent research with adults has shown that this relation is bidirectional: events that are believed to be causally related are perceived as occurring closer together in time-the so-called temporal binding effect. Here, we examined the developmental origins of temporal binding. Participants predicted when an event that was either caused by a button press, or preceded by a non-causal signal, would occur. We demonstrate for the first time that children as young as 4 years are susceptible to temporal binding. Binding occurred both when the button press was executed via intentional action, and when a machine caused it. These results suggest binding is a fundamental, early developing property of perception and grounded in causal knowledge. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQC_MqjxZQQ.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Research shows that people infer the time of their actions and decisions from their consequences. We asked how people know how much time to subtract from consequences in order to infer their actions and decisions. They could either subtract a fixed, default, time from consequences, or learn from experience how much time to subtract in each situation. In two experiments, participants' actions were followed by a tone, which was presented either immediately or after a delay. In Experiment 1, participants estimated the time of their actions; in Experiment 2, the time of their decisions to act. Both actions and decisions were judged to occur sooner or later as a function of whether consequences were immediate or delayed. Estimations tended to be shifted toward their consequences, but in some cases they were shifted away from them. Most importantly, in all cases participants learned progressively to adjust their estimations with experience.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

We investigate conditions in which more accurate metacognition may lead to greater susceptibility to illusion and thus conditions under which mindfulness meditation may lead to less accurate perceptions. Specifically, greater awareness of intentions may lead to an illusory compression of time between a voluntary action and its outcome ("intentional binding"). Here, we report that experienced Buddhist mindfulness meditators rather than non-meditators display a greater illusory shift of the timing of an outcome toward an intentional action. Mindfulness meditation involves awareness of causal connections between different mental states, including intentions. We argue that this supports improvements in metacognition targeted at motor intentions. Changes in metacognitive ability may result in an earlier and less veridical experience of the timing of action outcomes either through increased access to sensorimotor pre-representations of an action outcome or by affording greater precision to action timing judgements. Furthermore, as intentional binding is an implicit measure of the sense of agency; these results also provide evidence that mindfulness meditators experience a stronger sense of agency.