RESUMEN
ABSTRACTFollowing landmark legislation in 2013, Uruguay became the first country to regulate the legal production, distribution and sale of recreational cannabis. While broader debates anticipated the significance of the UN drug conventions, the extent to which Uruguay's drug treaty obligations shaped regulation is unclear and the relevance of finance norms has been neglected. Drawing on institutionalist and governance theories, this study explores how international drug and finance regulations limited Uruguay's policy space to implement cannabis regulation, and how this was perceived by policy actors. Policy documents and 43 semi-structured interviews were thematically analysed. The analysis demonstrates how Uruguay's drug treaty obligations were less directly constraining to policy space compared to international finance norms, including the US Patriot Act, anti-money laundering standards and financial inclusion practices. Such norms exerted powerful influence over Uruguay's ability to implement aspects of cannabis supply that interact with broader financial systems, allowing banks to terminate business relationships with clients deemed as high risks for money laundering. The Uruguayan case suggests that financial regulations at diverse levels are likely to constrain policy space in other contexts where the market-based policies of cannabis regulation raise tensions with a narrowly constructed risk management principle in approaches to financial supply.
Asunto(s)
Cannabis , Tráfico de Drogas , Humanos , Uruguay , Políticas , Cooperación InternacionalRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: In 2013, Uruguay became the first country to fully regulate the cannabis market, which now operates under state control. Cannabis can be legally acquired in three ways: growing it for personal use (self-cultivation), cannabis club membership, and from pharmacies (not yet implemented). Users must be entered into a confidential official registry to gain access. METHODS: This article presents findings of a Respondent Driven Sample survey of 294 high-frequency cannabis consumers in the Montevideo metropolitan area. RESULTS: Frequent consumers resort to more than one method for acquiring cannabis, with illegal means still predominating after 1 year of the new regulation law. Cannabis users overwhelmingly support the current regulation, but many of them are reluctant to register. CONCLUSIONS: Some of the attitudes and behaviors of the high-frequency consumers pose a challenge to the success of the cannabis law. Individuals relying on more than one method of access defy the single access clause, a prerequisite for legal use, while the maximum amount of cannabis individuals can access monthly seems too high even for most frequent consumers, which might promote the emergence of a grey market. Reluctance to register among a significant proportion of high-frequency consumers raises doubts about the law's ability to achieve its stated objectives.