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PIP: The demographic situation in Germany is first described, with attention given to such aspects as below replacement fertility, negative rates of natural increase, and the beginning of an actual decline in the size of the total population despite the presence of over 7 million foreigners. The author then describes a decision taken at Karlsruhe on January 19, 1999, by the countrys judges on a constitutional issue which for the first time recognized the duty of the state to protect marriage and the family, and to provide financial incentives to promote both the institution of marriage and encourage fertility within marriage.^ieng

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PIP: This study examined perceptions of the impacts of the antinatalist (OPP) and pronatalist (NPP) policies in Singapore. Data were obtained from a sample of 209 men and 280 women under 45 years old who lived in Ang Mo Kio New Town in the center of the island. Findings indicate that 53.4% of women said that fertility decisions were joint ones. 50% of women and 65% of men said that family size was jointly determined. Over 70% were aware of the OPP "stop at 2" policy. Those who gave accurate, detailed knowledge were mostly over 35 years old. Knowledge of OPP did not vary by education, but did vary by awareness of incentives and disincentives. 45.4% of women believed that OPP was a necessary state policy; 25.4% did not. 36.4% thought that OPP was fair; 28.3% did not. 60.3% of women said that OPP did influence family size in society, but 63.8% said it did not influence their individual family size. Finances, education, and child care were explanatory factors in individual planning. OPP is viewed as a successful policy not because of ideology, but because of the value placed on improved socioeconomic standards. 58.2% of women and 55.5% of men knew the details about the NPP. 51.9% of women said the NPP would encourage larger family size, but 87.8% said it would not affect them personally. Findings suggest that personal freedoms and public ideology are not binary, public-private concepts in fertility decision making.^ieng

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PIP: Relying on time-series and cross-sectional data, this paper investigates the effect of economic forces and cultural norms on fertility variations across and within Arab countries. This is accomplished by reviewing cross-country fertility trends at the aggregate level using a random-effect model applied to panel data covering 11 Arab countries. Estimates of cross-country fertility determinants were derived from the data on these countries. Despite disparities existing across countries, fertility levels were high overall in the region. Government policy has a role in the heterogeneity of Arab countries. At an aggregate level, findings suggest that Arab countries with a higher per capita income tend to maintain a higher fertility rate. Micro unit data indicated that preference for male offspring and religious beliefs positively influenced the number of births. One finding that is consistent at both macro and micro levels of analysis was that high levels of female educational attainment and--among working women--high wages had a powerful negative impact on fertility. However, women's education produced externalities (e.g., improvements in children¿s health and longevity as well as scholastic achievement) and also influenced family size. This implies that incentive-based government policies that attempt to reduce family size will require large penalties in order to be effective and may even be regressive from a social welfare perspective.^ieng

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PIP: Fertility levels are currently very low in western Europe, accelerating the process of demographic aging. This aging process cannot be offset by any realistic degree of immigration. Most European couples are not limiting family size because they want to be childless or because they prefer 1-child families. Rather, most would prefer to have 2 children, but are hampered in achieving their reproductive goals by economic uncertainties and the difficulties women face combining paid work with the duties of motherhood. Western European efforts to increase fertility, if possible, to replacement level are described dating back to the 1930s. Policies in Sweden have reduced the levels of economic insecurity for families and made it easier for women to both participate in the labor force and have children. These policies have increased fertility in Sweden. In contrast, however, Italy has taken no such action, and average family size in that country has fallen to 1.2 children. Fertility in Australia is also noted.^ieng

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PIP: "This paper examines the effects of a [Japanese] Tokugawa-period [1603-1868] law known as Akago-yoiku-shihou, an administrative attempt to shape fertility behavior of the domestic population. Akago-yoiku-shihou refers to the law to increase fertility under which local authorities distributed money and clothing to fathers according to the number of children they had.... By observing the relationship between the law and demographic variables such as the fertility rate, the births of twins and the births of mothers working as gejo, or servant, this paper gauges the effects of the Akago-yoiku-shihou." (EXCERPT)^ieng

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PIP: This is a general review of the trend toward below-replacement fertility in developed countries and of the policy initiatives that have been developed in response to such trends.^ieng

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PIP: Myanmar's population is expected to increase from 44.7 million to 49 million during 1995-2000. Population may reach 67.9 million by 2020. Myanmar has a pronatalist population policy. Despite policy, fertility declined from a range of 3.4-5.2 children/woman in 1983 to 2.0-3.2 in 1991. The range in fertility accounts for differences between urban and rural areas. The dependent population under 15 years old is expected to decline from 33.6% to 30.1% (20.5 million) during 1995-2020. The elderly population is expected to increase from 7.1% to 10.4% (7.1 million) during 1990-2020. Yangon is the most populated city, with 3.5 million persons. 28.9% of the total population was urban in 1997. Life expectancy in 1997 was 64 years for women and 61 years for men. The mean age at marriage rose from 22.4 years to 26.4 years during 1983-97. Maternal mortality was an estimated 231/100,000 live births in 1994.^ieng

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PIP: There is no global population issue, because there is no global government. Overpopulation as the world's monolithic population problem is overly simplistic and may lead to extreme positions. Problems are also caused by slow population growth, as for the 25% of the world's population who live in countries with age structure imbalances. Nearly all of world population growth comes from less-developed countries. By the year 2000, inhabitants of poor countries are expected to number 5 billion, a 5-fold increase in this century. Europe's population may decline from 728 million today to 563 million by 2050. The implosion of population in developed countries and the population explosion in developing ones creates problems. Nations must address these problems. A pronatalist policy in Europe would allow women to have the 2 children they desire, rather than the 1.5 they now have. The increase in fertility would eventually alleviate the age imbalance. Trade and economic policies could encourage trade rather than aid. European countries should also shift to more generous immigration policies, such as those in the United States. This could also ease the age dependency burden and demands for labor. Crucial to all efforts, however, is increasing fertility in Europe. It is now true that countries where women have the highest status (such as Scandinavian countries) often have higher fertility rates. Policies should be based on mutual understanding and recognition of the socioeconomic realities.^ieng

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PIP: "This study...[explores] the changing determinants of attitudes toward projected population aging and possible acceptance of alternative population policies to slow it down in Japan." Differences in attitudes between 1990 and 1995 are analyzed, with a focus on support for immigration policy and pronatalist policy. Determinants considered include age, sex, marital status, education, occupation, and place of residence. (EXCERPT)^ieng

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PIP: French population policy developments since 1945 are reviewed and compared to events in other developed countries. The author notes that the original objectives of French policy were to ensure a certain standard of living to children in families, regardless of the size of the family. However, over the course of time, the right not to have more children than parents wanted became another policy objective. He also notes that the level of support for families has declined in real terms over time and that France has now been overtaken by other Western countries, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom.^ieng

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"Although this article does not attempt a full evaluation of the 'selectively pro-natalist' national population policy of Singapore, it does bring out some indicative findings useful for assessing the effects of the policy on fertility. It finds that, while the new policy has succeeded in increasing the annual number of births, the total fertility rate still remains under two children per woman."

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PIP: The author first notes that in France, as in most other countries that have completed the demographic transition, fertility has stabilized at a level below that necessary to replace the population. A consequence of this is a continuing process of demographic aging, leading to increasing allocations of the nation's resources to meet the needs of the elderly at the expense of the young, which in turn leads to even lower levels of fertility. The author argues for policies to redistribute wealth toward families with children, pointing out that the longer the initiation of such policies is delayed, the more unpopular they are likely to prove politically. He concludes that unless such policies are adopted, the population will not only age, but will begin an inexorable process of decline in total size.^ieng

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"In this paper we have considered two unfunded social security programs. Under the conventional system, benefits are related to aggregate fertility; under the hypothetical fertility-related system, benefits are directly linked to individual fertility. The effects on fertility and per capita growth rates of the two social security systems are examined in the context of endogenous growth." The relative merits of the two systems for developing and developed countries are considered. The authors conclude that "the conventional social security system existing in many developed nations may be desirable to...developing countries in reducing population and promoting economic growth. On the other hand, the hypothetical fertility-related system may be useful to developed countries as far as increasing fertility is concerned."

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PIP: Singapore experienced an extraordinary demographic transition from a population growth of over 4% per year in the late 1950s to around 1.6% in the 1990s and below replacement fertility since 1986. In 1987 official government policy shifted to measures for increasing fertility. This paper explores whether Singapore's pronatalist policies can reverse the demographic transition. The present policies aim to selectively increase fertility among the well educated. By 1987 the slogan switched from "stop at two" to "have three, if you can afford it." The policy included tax relief for a third child and other measures to encourage a third child. The policies are expected to have a different influence on society according to one's education, income, and family size. The government target is to selectively increase population by 40% over 25 years. Singapore's transition may follow the theory that low fertility is attained in societies where kin relationships are less important than personal educational achievements. The three ethnic groups responded differently to educational and fertility policies. The Chinese acquired the best education and attained the lowest fertility. The Chinese, who comprised 76% of total population in 1986, continued to have low fertility, while increases occurred among the Malays and the Indians. Future trends are considered difficult to predict. A survey conducted in 1992 in Ang Mo Kio among 489 reproductive age respondents revealed that Malays had the earliest marriage and first births before the age of 25 years (75% of Malays and 50% of Indians). The Chinese had their first child at 25 years or older. Without controls for the age of the mother, a strong statistically significant association was found between ethnic group and age at marriage and age at first birth. The relationship was not supported for current fertility. A comparison of women married for 5 years or less and 5 years or more revealed that women in recent marriages showed a greater likelihood of postponing marriage and childbirth for all ethnic groups. Since 1987, third order births as a percentage of all births increased from 21.47% before 1987 to 23.11% during 1987-92, which only suggests the favorable impact of the pronatalist policy. Educational changes are likely to become more influential in affecting choice of family size.^ieng

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PIP: The author reviews demographic trends in the Czech Republic during the 1970s. The focus is on increased fertility during this period, and reasons for the increase. The impact of various social and pronatalist measures is analyzed. (ANNOTATION)^ieng

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PIP: "The demographic trend of decreasing numbers of children and the rising share of elderly prevailing in most industrialized countries is considered a problem by a large part of the Austrian population. Marriage and family continue to be of central importance.... These are results of the Austrian Population Policy Acceptance Survey (PPA) carried out in 1993. On the average, Austrians born between 1953 and 1972 want 1.99 children, which is clearly above the present (1995) total fertility rate of 1.40....[They] expect the government to assume the main responsibility for family and social matters. 40 percent of the Austrians consider the government fully responsible for helping women to manage child raising and jobs. Only one third of the population are fully content with family [policies], and some 40 percent consider social benefits for families not sufficiently generous.... The effects family [policy] measures have on the desire to have children and its realization, however, [are] disputed." (EXCERPT)^ieng

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PIP: The decrease in Japan's total fertility rate (TFR) to a new low of 1.46 in 1993 may reinforce concern about the rapid aging of Japanese society and strengthen government and business pronatalist attitudes, says Yuriko Ashino, deputy executive director, Family Planning Federation of Japan. Ashino calls for fully paid child-care leave as well as a change in the value system that women should raise children. According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the TFR dropped 0.4 points from 1.50 in 1992 to reach the 1.46 mark, the second-lowest TFR in the industrialized world, after Italy's 1.26. The Ministry also reported that the number of babies born in Japan fell by 20,672 from 1992 to 1.18 million in 1993. At the peak in 1973, 2.9 million babies were born. The decline in fertility is attributed to the growing trend for women to marry later and bear children later. The average age at first marriage for women rose from 26 in 1992 to 26.1 years in 1993, while the average age at first birth rose to a record 27.2 years in 1993. However, advances in medical technologies allow women to bear children much later, boosting a woman's ability to have more than 1.46 children. Arguments from the government that the higher education of women in Japan is affecting the birthrate are incorrect, since women of all educational backgrounds are having fewer children. The government might like women to stay home not only to rear children, but to care for the increasing number of elderly. The government should place more emphasis on men's responsibility for contraception, child-rearing, and household work. The 1994 UN International Conference on Population and Development in September, should consider Japan's fertility issues in relation to other countries'. Japan is encouraging smaller, happier families in developing countries, but it is urging Japanese women to bear more children.^ieng

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PIP: The meeting of the health network of Latin American and Caribbean women was held in July 1993 and focused on strategies and issues of reproductive health and rights of women on the way to the Cairo conference in 1994. The complexity of the debate in the area of population politics was indicated by the pronatalist views expressed by the Vatican and Islam fundamentalism, the arguments and beliefs of the ecologists, the dichotomy of the North-South confrontation, and the tension between Western modernity and tradition. Several limitations also hamstrung feminists: with regard to fertility, the preoccupation with reproduction-sexuality-motherhood; advocation of the demographic transition in spite of pronatalist policies; and the absence of inefficiency of services. Tension within the feminist movement also surfaced with respect to tools used for exercising reproductive rights, reproductive decisions as permitted by technology, the radical division between masculine and feminine in feminist analysis, and false option between separatism and integration in political strategies. The limitations and paralyzing tension which frustrate the feminist debate about population can be transformed into fertile undertakings by articulating long-term projects; redefining the concepts of population and of population policies with regard to fertility and reproductive rights; by constructing the mechanisms of consensus within the movement (development of a common agenda); by defining the desirable alliances, possible alliances, and the necessary negotiations; and by following up the Cairo Conference with a Plan of Action and other meetings as the upcoming session on social development in Copenhagen in 1995 and the Conference on Women and Development in Beijing in 1995.^ieng

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PIP: Albania's entrance into the world community has exposed some of the consequences of a pronatalist policy of 40 years; high infant and maternal mortality, illegal clandestine abortions leading to morbidity and death, and high fertility at 3.3 children per woman in 1990. The crude birth rate was 25.2 per 1000. The communist dictator Enver Hohxa used extreme measures with his secret police to enforce repressive policies. Birth control was forbidden to be even discussed, and sex was absent from medical literature. The current population of Albania is 3.3 million, with 66% living in remote mountain villages. A national family planning program is currently underway. The goals are to reduce mortality, reduce premature births by 20%, and achieve contraceptive usage among 10% of the reproductive age populations. Medical personnel will be trained in family planning, and family planning will be introduced in the entire health education program. Reliance will be placed on the existing extensive system of primary health care (PHC) facilities. The outreach effort to the 700,000 women of reproductive age will involve all health care professionals. Information, education, and communication will be the main thrust of the program. A model family planning clinic will be established at the Maternity Hospital at Tirana, which already has a teaching capacity for training of medical students, midwives, and nurses. Although a PHC system is in place, buildings and equipment are out of data. The health personnel of the program are excited by the challenge of providing reproductive health care for an woman's entire reproductive life. A new family planning clinic has already been established in Elbasan, a remote village south of Tirana, but public response has been mixed. Another clinic north of tirana has a population that is enthusiastic about family planning, even with a clinic not as well equipped as in Elbasan. The educational outreach must include doctors as well, who have only read about family planning. Teenage pregnancy, as in many other cultures, is becoming a problem, which with greater access to information will hopefully be averted or reduced. The primary thrust of program is still in discovering ways to inform the population about birth control and contraceptives.^ieng

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