RESUMEN

INTRODUCTION: The cochlear implant (CI) is crucial in developing hearing, speech, language, and communication skills in children with profound hearing loss (HL). The study aimed to assess how the age at which children receive a CI affects the development of pragmatic abilities between the ages of 5 and 8 for those who received a CI before or after the age of 3. METHODS: Forty children with CI were evaluated. The children between the ages of 5 and 8 were divided into two groups who received CIs before or after age 3. The Persian version of the Children's Communication Checklist (CCC) was used to assess pragmatic abilities with a parent rating scale. RESULTS: Children implanted under 3 got higher scores in social relationships, using context, conversational rapport, syntax, and speech. Also, their performance in inappropriate and stereotyped conversations was better than those over 3 years. They have a significant difference in the pragmatic composite than those who received CI over 3 except for coherence and interest (p < 0.05). CONCLUSION: According to the results, children with CI under 3 performed better in pragmatic composites, which means they have better pragmatic abilities. These findings suggest that early CI is important. Of course, other individual and environmental factors must also be considered.

RESUMEN

Negation-triggered inferences are universal across human languages. Hearing "This is not X" should logically lead to the inference that all elements other than X constitute possible alternatives. However, not all logically possible alternatives are equally accessible in the real world. To qualify as a plausible alternative, it must share with the negated element as many similarities as possible, and the most plausible one is often from the same taxonomic category as the negated element. The current article reports on two experiments that investigated the development of preschool children's ability to infer plausible alternatives triggered by negation. Experiment 1 showed that in a context where children were required to determine the most plausible alternative to the negated element, the 4- and 5-year-olds, but not the 3-year-olds, exhibited a robust preference for the taxonomic associates. Experiment 2 further demonstrated that the 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds considered all the complement set members as equally possible alternatives in a context where they were not explicitly required to evaluate the plausibility of different candidates. Taken together, our findings reveal interesting developmental continuity in preschool children's ability to make inferences about plausible alternatives triggered by negation. We discuss the potential semantic and pragmatic factors that contribute to children's emerging awareness of typical alternatives triggered by negative expressions.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

We often form beliefs about others based on narratives they tell about their own moral actions. When constructing such moral narratives, narrators balance multiple goals, such as conveying accurate information about what happened ('informational goals') and swaying audiences' impressions about their moral characters ('reputational goals'). Here, we ask to what extent audiences' detection of narrators' reputational goals guide or prevent them from making moral character judgments intended by narrators. Across two pre-registered experiments, audiences read narratives written by real narrators about their own moral actions. Each narrator was incentivized to write about the same action twice while trying to appear like a morally good or bad person (positive and negative reputational goals). Audiences detected narrators' reputational goals with high accuracy and made judgments about moral character that aligned with narrators' goals. However, audiences were more suspicious toward positive than negative reputational goals, requiring more evidence of high informational goals. These results demonstrate how audiences' inferences of reputational goals can both support and hinder narrators: accurate goal recognition increases the chance that audiences will make judgments intended by narrators, but inferred positive reputational goals can lead to doubts about accuracy. More generally, this provides a novel approach to studying how moral information about people is transmitted through naturalistic narratives.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Building on the cross-linguistic variability in the meaning of vague quantifiers, this study explores the potential for negative transfer in Italian-Slovenian bilinguals concerning the use of quantificational determiners, specifically the translational equivalents of the English "many", that is the Slovenian "precej" and "veliko". The aim is to identify relevant aspects of pragmatic knowledge for cross-linguistic influence. The study presents the results of a sentence-picture verification task in which Slovenian native speakers and Italian-Slovenian bilinguals evaluated sentences of the form "Quantifier X are Y" in relation to visual contexts. The results suggest that Italian learners of Slovenian, unlike Slovenian native speakers, fail to distinguish between "precej" and "veliko". This finding aligns with the negative transfer hypothesis. The study highlights the potential role of pragmatic knowledge in cross-linguistic transfer, particularly in the context of vague quantifiers.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Research in the field of figurative language processing in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) has demonstrated that autistic individuals experience systematic difficulties in the comprehension of different types of metaphors. However, there is scarce evidence regarding metaphor production skills in ASD. Importantly, the exact source of metaphor processing difficulties in ASD remains largely controversial. The debate has mainly focused on the mediating role of structural language skills (i.e., lexical knowledge) and cognitive abilities (i.e., Theory of Mind and executive functions) in ASD individuals' ability to comprehend and generate metaphors. The present study examines metaphor comprehension and production in 18 Greek-speaking verbally able children with ASD and 31 typically-developing (TD) controls. Participants completed two tasks, namely, a low-verbal multiple-choice sentence-picture matching task that tested their ability to comprehend conventional predicate metaphors, and a sentence continuation task that assessed their ability to generate metaphors. The study also included measures of fluid intelligence, expressive vocabulary, and working memory within the sample. The results show that the ASD group had significantly lower performance than the TD group in both metaphor comprehension and production. The findings also reveal that expressive vocabulary skills were a key factor in the metaphor comprehension and production performance of the children with ASD. Working memory capacity was also found to correlate significantly with metaphor comprehension performance in the ASD group. Conversely, no correlations were found in the TD group with neither of the above factors. Of note, children with ASD generated significantly more inappropriate responses and no-responses to the metaphor production task compared with the control group. The overall results reveal that children with ASD had difficulty with both comprehending and using metaphorical language. The findings also indicate that TD children may employ diverse cognitive strategies or rely on different underlying skills when processing metaphors compared with children with ASD.

RESUMEN

Two views claim to account for the origins of great ape gestural forms. On the Leipzig view, gestural forms are ontogenetically ritualised from action sequences between pairs of individuals. On the St Andrews view, gestures are the product of natural selection for shared gestural forms. The Leipzig view predicts within- and between-group differences between gestural forms that arise as a product of learning in ontogeny. The St Andrews view predicts universal gestural forms comprehensible within and between species that arise because gestural forms were a target of natural selection. We reject both accounts and propose an alternative "recruitment view" of the origins of great ape gestures. According to the recruitment view, great ape gestures recruit features of their existing behavioural repertoire for communicative purposes. Their gestures inherit their communicative functions from visual (and sometimes tactile) presentations of familiar and easily recognisable action schemas and states and parts of the body. To the extent that great ape species possess similar bodies, this predicts mutual comprehensibility within and between species - but without supposing that gestural forms were themselves targets of natural selection. Additionally, we locate great ape gestural communication within a pragmatic framework that is continuous with human communication, and make testable predications for adjudicating between the three alternative views. We propose that the recruitment view best explains existing data, and does so within a mechanistic framework that emphasises continuity between human and non-human great ape communication.

RESUMEN

Linguistic communication is an intrinsically social activity that enables us to share thoughts across minds. Many complex social uses of language can be captured by domain-general representations of other minds (i.e., mentalistic representations) that externally modulate linguistic meaning through Gricean reasoning. However, here we show that representations of others' attention are embedded within language itself. Across ten languages, we show that demonstratives-basic grammatical words (e.g., "this"/"that") which are evolutionarily ancient, learned early in life, and documented in all known languages-are intrinsic attention tools. Beyond their spatial meanings, demonstratives encode both joint attention and the direction in which the listener must turn to establish it. Crucially, the frequency of the spatial and attentional uses of demonstratives varies across languages, suggesting that both spatial and mentalistic representations are part of their conventional meaning. Using computational modeling, we show that mentalistic representations of others' attention are internally encoded in demonstratives, with their effect further boosted by Gricean reasoning. Yet, speakers are largely unaware of this, incorrectly reporting that they primarily capture spatial representations. Our findings show that representations of other people's cognitive states (namely, their attention) are embedded in language and suggest that the most basic building blocks of the linguistic system crucially rely on social cognition.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

BACKGROUND: The conceptualisation of autism as a disorder where Theory of Mind (ToM) and pragmatics are fundamentally impaired has prompted a wealth of research on autistic deficits, most of which is characterised by two main assumptions: first, that autistic people would display said deficits, if present, with any conversation partner and in any situation; second, that neurotypical people do not present these deficits, regardless of the conversation partner. However, this is not necessarily reflected in autistic accounts of the way they experience social cognition and pragmatics. AIMS: The present paper aims to investigate the autistic experience of communication with both autistic and neurotypical people, with a particular focus on their perception of the ability of autistic and neurotypical people to understand their communicative intentions. METHODS & PROCEDURES: Participants, 23 adult Italian autistic people without intellectual disability or language disorders, were recruited online. Two virtual focus groups of 2 hours each were conducted, transcribed and analysed through thematic analysis with a descriptive phenomenological approach by two independent researchers. OUTCOMES & RESULTS: Six themes were developed from the analysis, the most relevant being Autistic-Autistic communication and Autistic ToM. The results, in line with the Double Empathy theory, suggest there seem to be important differences between neurotypical and autistic people's ToM. These appear to make it easier for autistic people to communicate with one another, as well as to create difficulties for neurotypical people to understand autistic people, not just the other way around. CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS: These results seem to confirm that challenges in cross-neurotype communication are better interpreted as mutual miscomprehension and reciprocal differences in ToM rather than deficits on the autistic part. This calls for a reframing of ToM and/or the need for autistic ToM as a construct, of which neurotypical people seem to be lacking. Moreover, these insights should be taken into account for speech and language therapy and clinical practice in general, advocating for a neurodiversity-informed view of co-constructed communication as well as for a broader societal change in which therapists can play a crucial role, through participatory approaches or raising awareness in their daily practice. WHAT THIS PAPER ADDS: What is already known on the subject Autism is conceived as characterised by social cognition and communication difficulties, often linked to Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits. However, recent research suggested variations in ToM abilities within the autistic population and proposed alternative theories like the Double Empathy theory. Nevertheless, only a few studies examined how autistic individuals perceive communication across neurotypes. What this study adds Autistic individuals seem to find it easier to communicate with other autistic people, and they identify specific characteristics of neurotypical communication that hinder successful communication. Moreover, neurotypical people are perceived as having difficulties in autistic ToM, which seems to emerge as a relevant and needed construct in light of the Double Empathy problem. What are the clinical implications of this work? These findings can inform speech and language therapy and clinical practice about the potential gains of raising awareness on the Double Empathy problem and the higher communication ease inside the autistic community, alongside individualised support. Participatory approaches and closer collaboration with the autistic community also seem to be crucial for therapists to help improve communication experiences for autistic individuals.

RESUMEN

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is associated with pragmatic language impairments in children, but less is known about the communicative abilities of adults with ADHD, especially when using a second or third language. In this study, we developed a questionnaire to collect self-report measures of a set of pragmatic skills in a person's first, second and third language, comparing adults with and without an ADHD diagnosis. One hundred seventy-nine multilingual adults with (N = 91) and without ADHD (N = 88) completed the survey. As predicted, adults with ADHD reported more pragmatic difficulties than the control group. More specifically, people with ADHD showed pronounced impairments in regulating their behaviour in spoken interactions in the form of excessive talking, frequently interrupting others, and speaking without thinking first. Notably, these types of hyperactive and impulsive behaviours were significantly reduced when people with ADHD communicated in a second or third language. For pragmatic difficulties related to inattention such as concentrating on a conversation, both groups tended to be more inattentive in their third language compared to their first and second language. The understanding of non-literal language was only affected by ADHD in the first language and was generally more taxing in a language with lower proficiency levels. Our study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how ADHD affects different kinds of communicative abilities in multilingual adults. It also has implications for clinical practice, highlighting the importance of assessing symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity in a person's dominant language.

RESUMEN

People are more likely to gesture when their speech is disfluent. Why? According to an influential proposal, speakers gesture when they are disfluent because gesturing helps them to produce speech. Here, we test an alternative proposal: People may gesture when their speech is disfluent because gestures serve as a pragmatic signal, telling the listener that the speaker is having problems with speaking. To distinguish between these proposals, we tested the relationship between gestures and speech disfluencies when listeners could see speakers' gestures and when they were prevented from seeing their gestures. If gesturing helps speakers to produce words, then the relationship between gesture and disfluency should persist regardless of whether gestures can be seen. Alternatively, if gestures during disfluent speech are pragmatically motivated, then the tendency to gesture more when speech is disfluent should disappear when the speaker's gestures are invisible to the listener. Results showed that speakers were more likely to gesture when their speech was disfluent, but only when the listener could see their gestures and not when the listener was prevented from seeing them, supporting a pragmatic account of the relationship between gestures and disfluencies. People tend to gesture more when speaking is difficult, not because gesturing facilitates speech production, but rather because gestures comment on the speaker's difficulty presenting an utterance to the listener.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The way we establish meaning has been a profound question not only in language research but in developmental science as well. The relation between linguistic form and content has been loosened up in recent pragmatic approaches to communication, showing that code-based models of language comprehension must be augmented by context-sensitive, pragmatic-inferential mechanisms to recover the speaker's intended meaning. Language acquisition has traditionally been thought to involve building a mental lexicon and extracting syntactic rules from noisy linguistic input, while communicative-pragmatic inferences have also been argued to be indispensable. Recent research findings exploring the electrophysiological indicator of semantic processing, the N400, have raised serious questions about the traditional separation between semantic decoding and pragmatic inferential processes. The N400 appears to be sensitive to mentalization-the ability to attribute beliefs to social partners-already from its developmental onset. This finding raises the possibility that mentalization may not simply contribute to pragmatic inferences that enrich linguistic decoding processes but that the semantic system may be functioning in a fundamentally mentalistic manner. The present review first summarizes the key contributions of pragmatic models of communication to language comprehension. Then, it provides an overview of how communicative intentions are interpreted in developmental theories of communication, with a special emphasis on mentalization. Next, it discusses the sensitivity of infants to the information-transmitting potential of language, their ability to pick up its code-like features, and their capacity to track language comprehension of social partners using mentalization. In conclusion, I argue that the recovery of meaning during linguistic communication is not adequately modeled as a process of code-based semantic retrieval complemented by pragmatic inferences. Instead, the semantic system may establish meaning, as intended, during language comprehension and acquisition through mentalistic attribution of content to communicative partners.

RESUMEN

Emoji symbols are widely used in online communication, particularly in instant messaging and on social media platforms. Existing research draws comparisons between the functions of emoji and those of gestures, with recent work extending a proposed typology of gestures to emoji, arguing that different emoji types can be distinguished by their placement within the modified text and by their semantic contribution (the linguistic inferences that they give rise to). In this paper, we present four experiments designed to test the predictions of this extended typology, the results of which suggest that emoji symbols indeed trigger the hypothesised linguistic inferences. The findings provide support for a semantic typology of emoji and contribute further evidence of the parallels between gesture and emoji.

RESUMEN

Two major trends on children's skills to comprehend metaphors have governed the literature on the subject: the literal stage hypothesis vs. the early birds hypothesis (Falkum, 2022). We aim to contribute to this debate by testing children's capability to comprehend novel metaphors ('X is a Y') in Spanish with a child-friendly, picture selection task, while also tracking their gaze. Further, given recent findings on the development of metonymy comprehension suggesting a U-shaped developmental curve for this phenomenon (Köder & Falkum, 2020), we aimed to determine the shape of the developmental trajectory of novel metaphor comprehension, and to explore how both types of data (picture selection and gaze behavior) relate to each other. Our results suggest a linear developmental trajectory with 6-year-olds significantly succeeding in picture selection and consistently looking at the metaphorical target even after question onset.

RESUMEN

How we reason about objectivity-whether an assertion has a ground truth-has implications for belief formation on wide-ranging topics. For example, if someone perceives climate change to be a matter of subjective opinion similar to the best movie genre, they may consider empirical claims about climate change as mere opinion and irrelevant to their beliefs. Here, we investigate whether the language employed by journalists might influence the perceived objectivity of news claims. Specifically, we ask whether factive verb framing (e.g., "Scientists know climate change is happening") increases perceived objectivity compared to nonfactive framing (e.g., "Scientists believe [...]"). Across eight studies (N = 2,785), participants read news headlines about unique, noncontroversial topics (studies 1a-b, 2a-b) or a familiar, controversial topic (climate change; studies 3a-b, 4a-b) and rated the truth and objectivity of the headlines' claims. Across all eight studies, when claims were presented as beliefs (e.g., "Tortoise breeders believe tortoises are becoming more popular pets"), people consistently judged those claims as more subjective than claims presented as knowledge (e.g., "Tortoise breeders know…"), as well as claims presented as unattributed generics (e.g., "Tortoises are becoming more popular pets"). Surprisingly, verb framing had relatively little, inconsistent influence over participants' judgments of the truth of claims. These results demonstrate how, apart from shaping whether we believe a claim is true or false, epistemic language in media can influence whether we believe a claim has an objective answer at all.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

New insights into intractable industrial challenges can be revealed by framing them in terms of natural science. One intractable industrial challenge is that creative production can be much more financially expensive and time consuming than standardized production. Creative products include a wide range of goods that have one or more original characteristics. The scaling up of creative production is hindered by high financial production costs and long production durations. In this paper, creative production is framed in terms of interactions between entropy and complexity during progressions from emergent pragmatics to action semantics. An analysis of interactions between entropy and complexity is provided that relates established practice in creative production to organizational survival in changing environments. The analysis in this paper is related to assembly theory, which is a recent theoretical development in natural science that addresses how open-ended generation of complex physical objects can emerge from selection in biology. Parallels between assembly practice in industrial production and assembly theory in natural science are explained through constructs that are common to both, such as assembly index. Overall, analyses reported in the paper reveal that interactions between entropy and complexity underlie intractable challenges in creative production, from the production of individual products to the survival of companies.

RESUMEN

In their first three years, children begin to maintain topics and add new information in conversation. In turn, caregivers create opportunities for language learning. Compared to children with no family history of autism (typical likelihood, TL), the younger siblings of children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are at elevated likelihood (EL) for both ASD and language delays. This study asked: (1) Do profiles of spoken language and conversational skills differ across groups? (2) Does spoken language relate to conversational skills? and (3) How does parent speech relate to child spoken language and conversational skills? Child spoken language, conversational skills, and parent speech were examined during toy play at home with three-year-old TL (n = 16) and EL children with ASD (EL-ASD, n = 10), non-ASD language delay (EL-LD, n = 21), and no delays or diagnoses (EL-ND, n = 37). EL-ASD children produced fewer intelligible utterances, and EL-LD and EL-ASD children produced shorter utterances than TL and EL-ND children. When utterances were intelligible, all groups were highly contingent to the topic. EL-ASD children were less likely than all other groups to add new information, and adding new information was positively associated with utterance length. Parents of EL-ASD children had fewer opportunities to respond contingently. However, all parents were highly topic-contingent when child speech was intelligible, and parent speech complexity varied with child language and conversational skills. Findings highlight strengths in conversational skills for EL-ASD children during toy play with parents and show that children and caregivers together shape opportunities for developing language and conversation.

RESUMEN

Pragmatic impairment is diffused in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, but the literature still debates its neurocognitive underpinnings. This systematic review and meta-analysis aimed to investigate the neurocognitive correlates of pragmatic disorders in schizophrenia and determine the weight of social cognition and executive functioning on such disorders. Of the 2,668 records retrieved from the literature, 16 papers were included in the systematic review, mostly focused on non-literal meanings and discourse production in schizophrenia. Ten studies were included in the meta-analysis: pragmatics was moderately associated with both social cognition and executive functions (especially inhibition), but the link with social cognition was stronger. The mediation analysis showed that social cognition mediated the relationship between executive functions and pragmatics. Based on this, we proposed a hierarchical neurocognitive model where pragmatics stems from social cognition, while executive functions are the fertile ground supporting the other two domains, and we discuss its theoretical and clinical implications.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Existing proposals on the attenuating uses of indirect, negated expressions (e.g., not happy to mean sad) agree that speakers exploit indirectness for pragmatic purposes but differ on the underlying sources they attribute to these uses. Here, we synthesize existing proposals via adjective subjectivity, which operationalizes the notion of loopholes for plausible deniability. We present experimental evidence that the degree of subjectivity of an adjective predicts the degree to which participants strengthen the negated adjective's meaning, but only if the adjective under consideration has an evaluatively-positive meaning. This finding indicates that speakers may intentionally use negation to leave themselves the option to retract the implicated face-threatening meaning if openly challenged.

RESUMEN

In Metaphor Studies, metaphor is considered as a "form of understanding one thing in terms of something else." It is assumed that, despite their differences, metaphors share many properties and that a theory of metaphor should capture these essential properties. In short, it is assumed that metaphor is a natural kind. We call this view the Natural Kind Assumption. In this paper, we will challenge it and show that metaphor is not a natural kind. Finally, we will discuss the main philosophical consequences of this view.