RESUMEN

Ensuring food security while also protecting biodiversity requires a governance system that can address intra- and intersectoral complexity. In this paper, we sought to explore the governance challenges surrounding food security and biodiversity conservation through an empirical study in Jimma zone, southwestern Ethiopia. We used bottom-up snowball sampling to identify stakeholders and then held semi-structured interviews with 177 stakeholders across multiple levels of governance. We also conducted 24 focus group discussions with local people. Data were transcribed and thematically analyzed for its contents. Challenges in the structure of institutions and policy incoherence were the key challenges identified for the governance of food security and biodiversity conservation. The challenges around institutional structure included incompatibilities of the nature of governing institutions with the complexity inherent within and between the two sectors examined. Incoherences in policy goals, instruments, and contradictions of policy output relative to the actual problems of food security and biodiversity further hampered effective governance of food security and biodiversity conservation. Notably, many of the challenges that influenced an individual sector also posed a challenge for the integrated governance of food security and biodiversity conservation, often in a more pronounced way. Based on our findings, we argue that governance in our case study area requires a more integrated and collaborative approach that pays attention to institutional interplay in order to ensure institutional fit and consistency across policy goals.

Asunto(s)

Conservación de los Recursos Naturales , Seguridad Alimentaria , Biodiversidad , Etiopía , Humanos

RESUMEN

Veto player theory generates predictions about governments' capacity for policy change. Due to the difficulty of identifying significant laws needed to change the policy status quo, evidence about governments' ability to change policy has been mostly provided for a limited number of reforms and single-country studies. To evaluate the predictive power of veto player theory for policy making across time, policy areas and countries, a dataset was gathered that incorporates about 5,600 important government reform measures in the areas of social, labour, economic and taxation policy undertaken in 13 Western European countries from the mid-1980s until the mid-2000s. Veto player theory is applied in a combined model with other central theoretical expectations on policy change derived from political economy (crisis-driven policy change) and partisan theory (ideology-driven policy change). Robust support is found that governments introduce more reform measures when economic conditions are poor and when the government is positioned further away from the policy status quo. No empirical support is found for predictions of veto player theory in its pure form, where no differentiation between government types is made. However, the findings provide support for the veto player theory in the special case of minimal winning cabinets, where the support of all government parties is sufficient (in contrast to minority cabinets) and necessary (in contrast to oversized cabinets) for policy change. In particular, it is found that in minimal winning cabinets the ideological distance between the extreme government parties significantly decreases the government's ability to introduce reforms. These findings improve our understanding of reform making in parliamentary democracies and highlight important issues and open questions for future applications and tests of the veto player theory.