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In order for patients to gain the benefit of innovation in cardiac CT, it is necessary for coding, coverage, and payment to adapt to the novelty of algorithm-based healthcare procedures and services (ABHS). Appendix S to the CPT Code Set, the "AI Taxonomy", enables creation of discrete and differentiable codes for reimbursement of ABHS which has been clinically validated and FDA-labeled. Payment policy in OPPS and PFS is evolving to take account of the unique opportunities and issues arising from the clinical adoption of ABHS.

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This paper addresses the increasing challenges faced by hospital clinicians in coordinating and recommending post-acute care for patients, focusing on issues related to access to the most common post-acute services: skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and home health agencies (HHAs). In coordinating discharges, hospital clinicians have minimal information on care delivery in these settings. This knowledge gap is exacerbated by the disrupted continuum of patient care between acute care hospitals, SNFs, and HHAs. To address these challenges, hospital clinicians must understand how recent federal policies have impacted SNF and HHA care provision. The paper provides an overview of recent Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) policies and programs affecting SNFs and HHAs, including (1) fee-for-service reimbursement reform (i.e., Patient Driven Payment Model [PDPM] and the Patient Driven Groupings Model [PDGM]), (2) bundled payment programs, (3) accountable care organizations, and (4) Medicare Advantage plans. Overall, this paper aims to help hospital clinicians stay informed about the evolving landscape of post-acute care delivery by providing relevant information on how recent policy changes have impacted patient care.

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Nearly all empirical studies that estimate the coefficients of a risk equalization formula present the value of the statistical measure R2. The R2-value is often (implicitly) interpreted as a measure of the extent to which the risk equalization payments remove the regulation-induced predictable profits and losses on the insured, with a higher R2-value indicating a better performance. In many cases, however, we do not know whether a model with R2 = 0.30 reduces the predictable profits and losses more than a model with R2 = 0.20. In this paper we argue that in the context of risk equalization R2 is hard to interpret as a measure of selection incentives, can lead to wrong and misleading conclusions when used as a measure of selection incentives, and is therefore not useful for measuring selection incentives. The same is true for related statistical measures such as the Mean Absolute Prediction Error (MAPE), Cumming's Prediction Measure (CPM) and the Payment System Fit (PSF). There are some exceptions where the R2 can be useful. Our recommendation is to either present the R2 with a clear, valid, and relevant interpretation or not to present the R2. The same holds for the related statistical measures MAPE, CPM and PSF.

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As reimbursement from the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) continues to decline, cuts to practice expense relative value units disproportionately impact office-based interventionalists and private practices that rely on high-cost equipment. For 195 codes, specialties such as radiation oncology, vascular surgery, and interventional radiology are paid at rates less than their direct costs calculated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services itself. While reimbursement in the office-based setting continues to decline, high-cost hospital settings receive more payment for the same services. This disparity aligns with trends in care moving to the hospital setting and practice consolidation, resulting in increased costs to the healthcare system and decreased access to care. The current PFS is outdated, and the removal of high-cost supplies and equipment from the PFS is a critical step to reform.

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The introduction of the Quality Payment Program (QPP) by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) played a critical role in the process of transitioning U.S. healthcare from a pay-for-service to a pay-for-performance system. Physicians can participate in the QPP through one of three reporting methods: the traditional merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS), MIPS Value Pathways (MVPs), or Advanced Alternative Payment Models (APMs). These reporting methods require physicians to submit data on quality measures, which are averaged to determine a total quality performance score, which is weighted along with other QPP measures related to self-performance to provide an aggregate final performance score. This final score is used to determine either a negative, neutral, or positive percentage modifier for the physician's Medicare reimbursement payments, which applies to the fiscal year two years following the year of reporting. Quality measures are either specialty-specific or cross-specialty, meaning that they are reportable by any physician specialty. No studies have compared performance across physician specialty categories on these measures. Critics argue that CMS has not ensured equitable reporting of cross-specialty quality measures due to the difference in emphasis on aspects of care of different physician specialties, potentially advantaging some. For example, family medicine physicians may score higher on the blood pressure control quality measure due to its relevance in their practice. Significant performance differences could highlight areas of improvement for certain physicians in certain specialties and guide balanced measure development. The QPP currently uses non-specialty-specific historical quality performance scores as benchmarks to determine current-year quality measure scores, likely leading to unfair comparisons. Establishing specialty-specific benchmarks for cross-specialty measures would promote equitable evaluation and fair competition among all participating physicians.

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This systematic review and meta-analysis aimed to evaluate the impact of prospective payment systems (PPSs) on cholecystectomy. A comprehensive literature review was conducted, examining studies published until December 2023. The review process focused on identifying research across major databases that reported critical outcomes such as length of stay (LOS), mortality, complications, admissions, readmissions, and costs following PPS for cholecystectomy. The studies were specifically selected for their relevance to the impact of PPS or the transition from fee-for-service (FFS) to PPS. The study analyzed six papers, with three eligible for meta-analysis, to assess the impact of the shift from FFS to PPS in laparoscopic and open cholecystectomy procedures. Our findings indicated no significant changes in LOS and mortality rates following the transition from FFS to PPS. Complication rates varied and were influenced by the diagnosis-related group categorization and surgeon cost profiles under episode-based payment. There was a slight increase in admissions and readmissions, and mixed effects on hospital costs and financial margins, suggesting varied responses to PPS for cholecystectomy procedures. The impact of PPS on cholecystectomy is nuanced and varies across different aspects of healthcare delivery. Our findings indicate a need for adaptable, patient-centered PPS models that balance economic efficiency with high-quality patient care. The study emphasizes the importance of considering specific surgical procedures and patient demographics in healthcare payment reforms.

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INTRODUCTION: The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services introduced an End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 2011 to increase the utilization of home dialysis modalities, including peritoneal dialysis (PD). Several studies have shown a significant increase in PD utilization after PPS implementation. However, its impact on patients with kidney allograft failure remains unknown. METHODS: We conducted an interrupted time series analysis using data from the US Renal Data System (USRDS) that include all adult kidney transplant recipients with allograft failure who started dialysis between 2005 and 2019. We compared the PD utilization in the pre-PPS period (2005-2010) to the fully implemented post-PPS period (2014-2019) for early (within 90 days) and late (91-365 days) PD experience. RESULTS: A total of 27,507 adult recipients with allograft failure started dialysis during the study period. There was no difference in early PD utilization between the pre-PPS and the post-PPS period in either immediate change (0.3% increase; 95% CI: -1.95%, 2.54%; p = 0.79) or rate of change over time (0.28% increase per year; 95% CI: -0.16%, 0.72%; p = 0.18). Subgroup analyses revealed a trend toward higher PD utilization post-PPS in for-profit and large-volume dialysis units. There was a significant increase in PD utilization in the post-PPS period in units with low PD experience in the pre-PPS period. Similar findings were seen for the late PD experience. CONCLUSION: PPS did not significantly increase the overall utilization of PD in patients initiating dialysis after allograft failure.

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Providers have intended and unintended responses to payment reforms, such as China's new case-based payment system, i.e. Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP) under global budget, that classified patients based on the combination of principal diagnosis and procedures. Our study explores the impact of DIP payment reform on hospital selection of patients undergoing total hip/knee arthroplasty (THA/TKA) or with arteriosclerotic heart disease (AHD) from July 2017 to June 2021 in a large city. We used a difference-in-differences approach to compare the changes in patient age, severity reflected by the Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI), and a measure of treatment intensity [relative weight (RW)] in hospitals that were and were not subject to DIP incentives before and after the DIP payment reform in July 2019. Compared with non-DIP pilot hospitals, trends in patient age after the DIP reform were similar for DIP and non-DIP hospitals for both conditions, while differences in patient severity grew because severity in DIP hospitals increased more for THA/TKA (P = 0.036) or dropped in non-DIP hospitals for AHD (P = 0.011) following DIP reform. Treatment intensity (measured via RWs) for AHD patients in DIP hospitals increased 5.5% (P = 0.015) more than in non-DIP hospitals after payment reform, but treatment intensity trends were similar for THA/TKA patients in DIP and non-DIP hospitals. When the DIP payment reform in China was introduced just prior to the pandemic, hospitals subject to this reform responded by admitting sicker patients and providing more treatment intensity to their AHD patients. Policymakers need to balance between cost containment and the unintended consequences of prospective payment systems, and the DIP payment could also be a new alternative payment system for other countries.

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The Quality Payment Program (QPP) is a Medicare value-based payment program with 2 tracks: -Advanced Alternative Payment Models (A-APMs), including two-sided risk Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), and Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). In 2020, A-APM eligible ACO clinicians received an additional 5% positive, and MIPS clinicians received up to 5% negative or 2% positive performance-based adjustments to their Medicare Part B medical services payments. It is unclear whether the different payment adjustments have differential impacts on total medical services payments for ACO and MIPS participants. We compare Medicare Part B medical services payments received by primary care clinicians participating in ACO and MIPS programs using Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Public Use Files from 2014 to 2018 using difference-in-differences regressions. We have 254 395 observations from 50 879 unique clinicians (ACO = 37.86%; MIPS = 62.14%). Regression results suggest that ACO clinicians have significantly higher Medicare Part B medical services payments ($1003.88; 95% CI: [579.08, 1428.69]) when compared to MIPS clinicians. Our findings suggest that ACO clinicians had a greater increase in medical services payments when compared to MIPS clinicians following QPP participation. Increased payments for Medicare Part B medical services among ACO clinicians may be driven partly by higher payment adjustment rates for ACO clinicians for Part B medical services. However, increased Part B medical services payments could also reflect clinicians switching to increased outpatient services to prevent potentially costly inpatient services. Policymakers should examine both aspects when evaluating QPP effectiveness.

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Purpose: The Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) or Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP) payment system, now introduced in China, intends to streamline healthcare billing practices. However, its implications for clinical pharmacists, pivotal stakeholders in the healthcare system, remain inadequately explored. This study sought to assess the perceptions, challenges, and roles of clinical pharmacists in China following the introduction of the DRG or DIP payment system. Methods: Qualitative interviews were conducted among a sample of clinical pharmacists. Ten semi-structured interviews were conducted, either online or face to face. Thematic analysis was employed to identify key insights and concerns related to their professional landscape under the DRG or DIP system. Results: Clinical pharmacists exhibited variable awareness levels about the DRG or DIP system. Their roles have undergone shifts, creating a balance between traditional responsibilities and new obligations dictated by the DRG or DIP system. Professional development, particularly concerning health economics and DRG-based or DIP-based patient care, was highlighted as a key need. There were calls for policy support at both healthcare and national levels and a revised, holistic performance assessment system. The demand for more resources, be it in training platforms or personnel, was a recurrent theme. Conclusion: The DRG or DIP system's introduction in China poses both opportunities and challenges for clinical pharmacists. Addressing awareness gaps, offering robust policy support, ensuring adequate resource allocation, and recognizing the evolving role of pharmacists are crucial for harmoniously integrating the DRG or DIP system into the Chinese healthcare paradigm.

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In 2018, Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) introduced a mobile money payment system for membership renewal and premium payments to enhance enrolment and retention rates. However, the adoption of such innovations depends on various factors, including personal traits and public perceptions. This study aims to explore the determinants of NHIS membership renewal and premium payment via the mobile renewal system. Conducted at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) in Kumasi, Ghana, the study used a survey design to gather data from 951 KNUST students. Employing logistic regression analysis, the study identified key factors influencing the use of the NHIS mobile renewal service. The findings revealed that individuals aged 19-21, 25-27 or above 27, without mobile money accounts, and those with no history of online purchases were less likely to adopt the mobile renewal system (P < .05). Conversely, those perceiving the system as useful and easy to use were more likely to utilise it for NHIS membership renewal (P < .05). In conclusion, policymakers should prioritise system quality, accessibility, perceived ease of use, and usefulness to facilitate the adoption and usage of the NHIS mobile payment system. These findings contribute valuable insights for enhancing the effectiveness of health insurance innovations.

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Diagnosis-related groups (DRG) based hospital payment systems are gradually becoming the main mechanism for reimbursement of acute inpatient care. We reviewed the existing literature to ascertain the global use of DRG-based hospital payment systems, compared the similarities and differences of original DRG versions in ten countries, and used ischemic stroke as an example to ascertain the design and implementation strategies for various DRG systems. The current challenges with and direction for the development of DRG-based hospital payment systems are also analyzed. We found that the DRG systems vary greatly in countries in terms of their purpose, grouping, coding, and payment mechanisms although based on the same classification concept and that they have tended to develop differently in countries with different income classifications. In high-income countries, DRG-based hospital payment systems have gradually begun to weaken as a mainstream payment method, while in middle-income countries DRG-based hospital payment systems have attracted increasing attention and increased use. The example of ischemic stroke provides suggestions for mutual promotion of DRG-based hospital payment systems and disease management. How to determine the level of DRG payment incentives and improve system flexibility, balance payment goals and disease management goals, and integrate development with other payment methods are areas for future research on DRG-based hospital payment systems.

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Background: Day admission surgery (DAS) is meant to provide a better in-hospital experience for patients and to save costs by reducing the length of stay. However, in a prospective payment system, it may also reduce the reimbursement amount, leading to unintended incentives for hospitals. Methods: Over a 4-month period in 2021 and based on predefined clinical and logistic criteria, patients from different surgical sub-specialties were identified to follow the institutional DAS program. Revenue-analysis was performed, considering the Swiss diagnosis-related group (SwissDRG) prospective payment policy. Revenue with DAS program was compared to revenue if patients were admitted the day prior surgery (No DAS) using nonparametric pooled bootstrap t-test. All other costs considered identical, an estimation of the average cost spared due to the avoidance of pre-operative hospitalization in the DAS setting was carried out using a micro-costing approach. Results: Overall, 105 inpatients underwent DAS over the study period, totaling a revenue of CHF 1 209 840. Among them, 25 patients (24%) were low outliers due to the day spared from the DAS program and triggering a mean (SD) financial discount of Swiss Francs (CHF) 4192 (2835), yielding a total amount of CHF 105 435. DAS revealed a mean revenue of CHF 7320 (656), compared to CHF 11 510 (1108) if patients were admitted the day before surgery (No DAS, P = .007). Conclusion: In a PPS, anticipation of financial penalties when implementing a DAS for all-comers is key to prevent an imbalance of the hospital equation if no financial criteria are used to select eligible patients. Promptly revising workflow to maintain constant fixed costs for a greater number of patients may be a valuable hedging strategy.

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CONTEXT: Across the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, policy makers are searching for new ways to pay hospitals for inpatient care to move from volume to value. This paper offers an overview of the latest reforms and their evidence to date. METHODS: We reviewed reforms to DRG payment systems in 10 high-income countries: Australia, Austria, Canada (Ontario), Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom (England), and the United States. FINDINGS: We identified four reform trends among the observed countries, them being (1) reductions in the overall share of inpatient payments based on DRGs, (2) add-on payments for rural hospitals or their exclusion from the DRG system, (3) episode-based payments, which use one joint price to pay providers for all services delivered along a patient pathway, and (4) financial incentives to shift the delivery of care to less costly settings. Some countries have combined some or all of these measures with financial adjustments for quality of care. These reforms demonstrate a shift away from activity and efficiency towards a diversified set of targets, and mirror efforts to slow the rise in health expenditures while improving quality of care. Where evaluations are available, the evidence indicates mixed success in improving quality of care and reducing costs and expenditures.

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Upcoding in Medicare has been a topic of interest to economists and policy makers for nearly 40 years. While upcoding is generally understood as "billing for services at higher level of complexity than the service actually pro- vided or documented," it has a wide range of definitions within the literature. This is largely because the financial incentives across programs and aspects under the coding control of billing specialists and providers are different, and have evolved substantially over time, as has the published literature. Arguably, the primary importance of analyzing upcoding in different parts of Medicare is to inform policy makers on the magnitude of the process and to suggest approaches to mitigate the level of upcoding. Financial estimates for upcoding in traditional Medicare (Medicare Parts A and B), are highly variable, in part reflecting differences in methodology for each of the services covered. To resolve this variability, we used summaries of audit data from the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing program for the period 2010-2019. This program uses the same methodology across all forms of service in Medicare Parts A and B, allowing direct comparisons of upcoding magnitude. On average, upcoding for hospitalization under Part A represents $656 million annually (or 0.53% of total Part A annual expenditures) during our sample period, while up- coding for physician services under Part B is $2.38 billion annually (or 2.43% of Part B annual expenditures). These numbers compare to the recent consistent estimates from multiple different entities putting upcoding in Medicare Part C at $10-15 billion annually (or approximately 2.8-4.2% of Part C annual expenditures). Upcoding for hospitalization under Medicare Part A is small, relative to overall upcoding expenditures.

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This article provides an updated overview and critique of clinical quality measures relevant to obstetrical care. The history of the quality movement in the United States and the proliferation of quality metrics over the past quarter-century are reviewed. Common uses of quality measures are summarized: payment programs, accreditation, public reporting, and quality improvement projects. We present listings of metrics that are reported by physicians or hospitals, either voluntarily or by mandate, to government agencies, payers, "watchdog" ratings organizations, and other entities. The costs and other burdens of extracting data and reporting metrics are summarized. The potential for unintended adverse consequences of the use of quality metrics is discussed along with approaches to mitigating adverse consequences. Finally, some recent attempts to develop simplified core measure sets are presented, with the promise that the complex and burdensome quality-metric enterprise may improve in the near future.

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As the comprehensive reform of public hospitals enters a more challenging phase,the conventional extensive operation management no longer fulfills the requirements of high-quality development.This article investigates the current challen-ges in hospital operation management under the DIP payment system,proposes an optimized pathway as well as an outline for practical implementation.The proposed pathway suggests implementing a closed-loop resource allocation strategy integrating budg-et and performance based on disease groups and scores,establishing a cost management mechanism for enhancing resource effi-ciency,and development of a performance distribution system for stimulating self-management motivation among personnel.Addi-tionally,the article suggests the establishment of a Management Information System,aiming to provide practical references for en-hancing operational management capabilities in public hospitals under the DIP payment mode.

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Objective It aims to analyze the grouping methods,payment standard calculation process,and cost settlement rules of ambulatory payment groups(APG)system in the United States.Additionally,it seeks to summarize the technical advantages and implementation key points of APG,providing reference for the ambulatory care payment reform in China.Methods Employing a literature research approach,this study dissects the payment technology and implementation process of APG.A preliminary comparison is made with the practices of APG pilot cities in China.Results The APG 3.18 version catalog comprises 13 types,61 categories,and 666 groups.One APG case can be classified into multiple APG groups,and by applying rules such as consolidation,packaging,and discounting,the final payment amount is calculated.Conclusion The APG payment technology aligns with the characteristics of outpatient health services,offering flexible payment methods and incentivizing healthcare institutions to provide efficient services.This holds significant reference value for the ambulatory care payment reform in China.The key points of APG implementation include improving the quality of outpatient data,localizing grouping and payment rules,establishing a regulatory assessment indicator system,and ensuring alignment with inpatient payments.

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From an economic perspective, large investments in medical equipment are justifiable only when many patients benefit. Although rural hospitals play a crucial role locally, the treatments they can offer are limited. In this study, I characterize investment level that maximizes the total surplus, encompassing patients' welfare and producer surplus, and subtracting treatment costs. Specifically, I account for economic externalities generated by the investment in the rural hospital and for different utility losses that patients suffer when they cannot be treated locally. I demonstrate that the optimal investment level can be implemented if the Health Authority has the power to set specific prices for each disease. Additionally, I explore a decentralized situation wherein the investment decision lies with the rural hospital manager, and the Health Authority can only make a discrete decision between two payment systems: Fee-for-service, which covers all treatment costs, or Diagnosis-Related-Groups, which reimburses a price per patient based on the overall average cost. I find that the Diagnosis-Related-Groups system outperforms the Fee-for-service in terms of total surplus when the treatment cost at the rural hospital is lower. However, when the rural hospital has higher costs and the Health Authority seeks to incentivize investment, the Fee-for-service system is superior.

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Antimicrobial resistance is a major global health threat, which is increased by the irrational use of antibiotics, for example, in the treatment of respiratory tract infections in community care. By using rapid point-of-care diagnostics, overuse can be avoided. However, the diagnostic tests are rarely used in most European countries. We mapped potential barriers and facilitators in health technology assessment (HTA), pricing, and funding policies related to the use of rapid diagnostics in patients with community-acquired acute respiratory tract infections. Expert interviews were conducted with representatives of public authorities from five European case study countries: Austria, Estonia, France, Poland, and Sweden. Barriers to the HTA process include the lack of evidence and limited transferability of methods established for medicines to diagnostics. There was no price regulation for the studied diagnostics in the case study countries, but prices were usually indirectly determined via procurement. The lack of price regulation and weak purchasing power due to regional procurement processes were mentioned as pricing-related barriers. Regarding funding, coverage (reimbursement) of the diagnostic tests and the optimized remuneration of physicians in their use were mentioned as facilitators. There is potential to strengthen peri-launch policies, as optimized policies may promote the uptake of POCT.