RESUMEN
Mechanism diagrams exhibit visually the organized parts and operations of a biological mechanism. A mechanism diagram can facilitate mechanistic research by providing a mechanistic explanation of the phenomenon of interest. Much research has been focusing on the mechanistic explanation and the explanatory mechanistic models. As a specific type of scientific diagram, a simple mechanism diagram can be explanatory by drawing on the rich explanatory resources of non-depicted background knowledge. The relationship between the visually depicted and the background knowledge is underexplored. It is unclear how the non-depicted background knowledge of a mechanism diagram contributes to providing a better-informed explanation of the phenomenon of interest in biological sciences. With the aim to explore this relationship, I articulate that a mechanism diagram provides a mechanistic explanation by a process called abstraction-by-aggregation. Through visual cues, the unified relevant background knowledge provides an epistemic access to a better-informed explanation.
Asunto(s)
Disciplinas de las Ciencias Biológicas , Conocimiento , Proyectos de Investigación , Investigación/instrumentación , Gráficos por Computador , Modelos BiológicosRESUMEN
It is a widespread assumption in philosophy of science that representations of data are not explanatory-that they are mere stepping stones towards an explanation, such as a representation of a mechanism. I draw on instances of representational and explanatory practice from mammalian chronobiology to suggest that this assumption is unsustainable. In many instances, biologists employ representations of data in explanatory ways that are not reducible to constraints on or evidence for representations of mechanisms. Data graphs are used to represent relationships between quantities across conditions, and often these representations are necessary for explaining particular aspects of the phenomena under study. The benefit of the analysis is two-fold. First, it provides a more accurate account of explanatory practice in broadly mechanistic investigation in biology. Second, it suggests that there is not an explanatorily "fundamental" type of representation in biology. Rather, the practice of explanation consists in the construction of different types of representations and their employment for distinct explanatory purposes.