RESUMEN

The sense of agency, the feeling of controlling one's bodily actions and the world is altered in Depersonalisation (DP), a condition that makes people feel detached from one's self and body. To investigate the link between depersonalisation and both implicit and explicit sense of agency, an online study was conducted using the influential Intentional Binding paradigm in a sample of non-clinical DP participants. The results did not reveal significant differences between individuals with low and high occurrences of DP experiences on the implicit and explicit sense of agency. However, participants with high occurrences of DP experiences showed a more time-sensitive explicit sense of agency and greater temporal distortions for short intervals in the absence of self-initiated motion. These results suggest that there is a discrepancy between implicit and explicit sense of agency in people with high levels of depersonalisation. Altogether, these findings call for further investigations of the key role of time perception on altered sense of self and agency in both non-clinical and clinical populations, to disentangle the mechanisms associated with the explicit and implicit sense of agency.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The intentional binding effect refers to the phenomenon where the perceived temporal interval between a voluntary action and its sensory consequence is subjectively compressed. Prior research revealed the importance of tactile feedback from the keyboard on this effect. Here we examined the necessity of such tactile feedback by utilizing a touch-free key-press device without haptic feedback, and explored how initial/outcome sensory modalities (visual/auditory/tactile) and their consistency influence the intentional binding effect. Participants estimated three delay lengths (250, 550, or 850 ms) between the initial and outcome stimuli. Results showed that regardless of the combinations of sensory modalities between the initial and the outcome stimuli (i.e., modal consistency), the intentional binding effect was only observed in the 250 ms delay condition. This findings indicate a stable intentional binding effect both within and across sensory modalities, supporting the existence of a shared mechanism underlying the binding effect in touch-free voluntary actions.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The sense of agency is the experience of being the author of self-generated actions and their outcomes. Both clinical manifestations and experimental evidence suggest that the agency experience and the mechanisms underlying agency attribution may be dysfunctional in schizophrenia. Yet, studies investigating the sense of agency in these patients show seemingly conflicting results: some indicated under-attribution of self-agency (coherently with certain positive symptoms), while others suggested over-attribution of self-agency. In this review, we assess whether recent theoretical frameworks can reconcile these divergent results. We examine whether the identification of agency abnormalities in schizophrenia might depend on the measure of self-agency considered (depending on the specific task requirements) and the available agency-related cues. We conclude that all these aspects are relevant to predict and characterize the type of agency misattribution that schizophrenia patients might show. We argue that one particular model, based on the predictive coding theory, can reconcile the interpretation of the multifarious phenomenology of agency manifestations in schizophrenia, paving the way for testing agency disorders in novel ways.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Sense of ownership and agency are two important aspects of the minimal self, but how self-perception is affected by social conditions remains unclear. Here, we studied how social inclusion or exclusion of participants in the course of a virtual Cyberball game would affect explicit judgments and implicit measures of ownership and agency (proprioceptive drift, skin conductance responses, and intentional binding, respectively) in a virtual hand illusion paradigm, in which a virtual hand moved in or out of sync with the participants' own hand. Results show that synchrony affected all four measures. More importantly, this effect interacted with social inclusion/exclusion in the Cyberball game for both ownership and agency measure, showing that social exclusion reduces perceived agency and ownership.

RESUMEN

The sense of agency is the ability to recognize that we are the actors of our actions and their consequences. We explored whether and how spatial cues may modulate the agency experience by manipulating the ecological validity of the experimental setup (real-space or computer-based setup) and the distance of the action-outcome (near or far). We tested 58 healthy adults collecting explicit agency judgments and the perceived time interval between movements and outcomes (to quantify the intentional binding phenomenon, an implicit index of agency). Participants show greater implicit agency for voluntary actions when there is a temporal and spatial action-outcome contingency. Conversely, participants reported similar explicit agency for outcomes appearing in the near and far space. Notably, these effects were independent of the ecological validity of the setting. These results suggest that spatial proximity, realistic or illusory, is essential for feeling implicitly responsible for the consequences of our actions.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The sense of agency refers to the experience of control over voluntary actions and their effects. There is growing interest in the notion of we-agency, whereby individual sense of agency is supplanted by a collective agentic experience. The existence of this unique agentic state would have profound implications for human responsibility, and, as such, warrants further scrutiny. In this paper, we review the concept of we-agency and examine whether evidence supports it. We argue that this concept entails multiplying hypothetical agentic states associated with joint action, thus ending up with an entangled phenomenology that appears somewhat speculative when weighted against the available evidence. In light of this, we suggest that the concept of we-agency should be abandoned in favor of a more parsimonious framework for the sense of agency in joint action.

RESUMEN

Temporal binding has been understood as an illusion in timing judgment. When an action triggers an outcome (e.g. a sound) after a brief delay, the action is reported to occur later than if the outcome does not occur, and the outcome is reported to occur earlier than a similar outcome not caused by an action. We show here that an attention mechanism underlies the seeming illusion of timing judgment. In one method, participants watch a rotating clock hand and report event times by noting the clock hand position when the event occurs. We find that visual spatial attention is critically involved in shaping event time reports made in this way. This occurs because action and outcome events result in shifts of attention around the clock rim, thereby biasing the perceived location of the clock hand. Using a probe detection task to measure attention, we show a difference in the distribution of visual spatial attention between a single-event condition (sound only or action only) and a two-event agency condition (action plus sound). Participants accordingly report the timing of the same event (the sound or the action) differently in the two conditions: spatial attentional shifts masquerading as temporal binding. Furthermore, computational modeling based on the attention measure can reproduce the temporal binding effect. Studies that use time judgment as an implicit marker of voluntary agency should first discount the artefactual changes in event timing reports that actually reflect differences in spatial attention. The study also has important implications for related results in mental chronometry obtained with the clock-like method since Wundt, as attention may well be a critical confounding factor in the interpretation of these studies.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Intentional actions produce a temporal compression between the action and its outcome, known as intentional binding. However, Suzuki et al. (2019) recently showed that temporal compression can be observed without intentional actions. However, their results show a clear regression to the mean, which might have confounded the estimates of temporal intervals. To control these effects, we presented temporal intervals block-wise. Indeed, we found systematically greater compression for active than passive trials, in contrast to Suzuki et al. (2019). In our second experiment, our goal was to conceptually replicate the previous study. However, we were unable to reproduce their results and instead found more pronounced temporal compression in active trials compared to passive ones. In a subsequent attempt at a direct replication, we did not observe the same findings as the original study. Our findings reinforce the theory that intentions rather than causality cause temporal binding. During the preparation of this work, the authors used ChatGPT in order to improve the readability of the paper. After using this tool/service, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility for the content of the publication.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The sense of agency refers to the feeling of controlling one's actions and their effects on the external environment. Here, we tested how the physiological process of aging affects the agency experience by taking advantage of a validated ecological experimental paradigm and exploring the different dimensions of agency. We tested 60 young and older adults during active and passive movements, causing, after a variable time delay, an external sensorial event. We collected overt agency judgments (i.e., explicit agency dimension), and we measured the perceived compression of the time interval between the active/passive movements and outcomes (to quantify the intentional binding phenomenon, an implicit index of agency). Our results indicate that the sense of agency significantly changes across the adult life span, with older participants exhibiting a reduced sense of agency, both at the explicit and implicit level. Crucially, the temporal dimension of the action outcome did not affect their agency experience. We suggest that elderly adults are more reliant on internal predictions, making them less sensitive to cognitive biases and external manipulations. We discuss these results in the domain of neurocognitive models of motor control, with reference to how aging affects the weighting process of predictive and sensory signals for efficient sensorimotor integration.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Sense of agency (SoA) indicates a person's ability to perceive her/his own motor acts as actually being her/his and, through them, to exert control over the course of external events. Disruptions in SoA may profoundly affect the individual's functioning, as observed in several neuropsychiatric disorders. This is the first article to systematically review studies that investigated intentional binding (IB), a quantitative proxy for SoA measurement, in neurological and psychiatric patients. Eligible were studies of IB involving patients with neurological and/or psychiatric disorders. We included 15 studies involving 692 individuals. Risk of bias was low throughout studies. Abnormally increased action-outcome binding was found in schizophrenia and in patients with Parkinson's disease taking dopaminergic medications or reporting impulsive-compulsive behaviors. A decreased IB effect was observed in Tourette's disorder and functional movement disorders, whereas increased action-outcome binding was found in patients with the cortico-basal syndrome. The extent of IB deviation from healthy control values correlated with the severity of symptoms in several disorders. Inconsistent effects were found for autism spectrum disorders, anorexia nervosa, and borderline personality disorder. Findings pave the way for treatments specifically targeting SoA in neuropsychiatric disorders where IB is altered.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

If voluntary action is followed by an effect with a short time delay, the time interval between action and effect is often perceived to be shorter than it actually is. This perceptual time compression is termed intentional binding or temporal binding. We investigated age-related changes in adulthood considering temporal binding and its dependence on action body parts (i.e., hand vs. foot). This experiment included 17 young adults (mean age: 21.71 ± 3.14 years) and 27 older adults (mean age: 74.41 ± 3.38 years). Participants performed a button press task using their index fingers (hand condition) or toes (foot condition). The results showed that older participants exhibited a strong time compression comparable to young participants in the voluntary condition. Older participants also showed a strong time compression in involuntary action, which was induced by a mechanical device, differently from young participants. In line with previous research, the present age-related differences in time compression considering involuntary action suggest that causal belief significantly influences event perception rather than the associated intention of action or sensory afferents. The present results also suggest that the nature of action body parts has no significant influence on temporal binding, independent of age group.

RESUMEN

BACKGROUND: Self-bias effect is expressed as a preferential selection and accelerated perception of self-related sensory information. Intentional binding (IB) is a related phenomenon where the sensory outcome from a voluntary action and the voluntary action itself are perceived to be closer to each other in time in both predictive (voluntary action predicting sensory consequence) and retrospective (sensory consequence features triggering self-related inference) contexts. Recent evidence indicates that self-related visual stimuli can affect retrospective intentional binding (rIB). We aimed to 1) replicate rIB in the auditory context, and 2) investigate the potential role of left temporoparietal junction (l-TPJ), a crucial node for the self-monitoring process, in self-bias effect and intentional binding effect by manipulating l-TPJ activity with neuromodulation [using High-Definition Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (HD-tDCS)]. We anticipated self-bias and rIB effects to increase with anodal stimulation of l-TPJ in comparison to cathodal-stimulation of l-TPJ. METHODS: Fourteen, right-handed, healthy participants performed sound-label matching (matching tones to self-and-other labels) and rIB (estimating time interval between a button press and a self/other labelled tone) tasks. Each participant underwent both anodal and cathodal stimulation of l-TPJ in separate sessions (at least 72 h apart). Assignment of HD-tDCS type was random and counter-balanced across participants. Behavioural data was collected at three time points: once at baseline (no-stimulation), and twice after stimulation with HD-tDCS. RESULTS: Strong self-bias effect was observed across all experimental conditions. Neuromodulation of l-TPJ affected processing of other-labelled tone in the sound-label matching task. rIB was noted in baseline and anodal-HD-tDCS conditions where participants exhibited stronger binding for self-associated stimuli compared to other-associated stimuli. CONCLUSION: l-TPJ may potentially play a critical role in self-other distinction. This may have possible implications for disorders of self-disturbances like psychosis.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

The sense of controlling one's actions and their consequences is a critical aspect of successful motor activity. While motor performance typically improves with learning, it is unclear whether, how, and why higher order aspects of motor cognition are also affected. Here, we used an implicit measure of sense of agency-the 'intentional binding' effect-as participants learned to make a skilled action involving precise control of thumb adduction. These actions were predictably followed by a tone (the outcome). At pre-test, we showed the perceived time of the tone was shifted towards the thumb action, compared to a control condition in which tones occurred without actions. Next, a relevant training group learned to refine the direction of the thumb movement, while an irrelevant training group was trained on another movement. Manipulation checks demonstrated that, as expected, the relevant training group improved performance of the trained movement, while the irrelevant training group did not. Critically, while both groups still showed binding of the tone towards the thumb action at post-test, the relevant training group showed less binding than the irrelevant training group. Given the link between intentional binding and volitional control of action, we suggest our result demonstrates subjective agency over the outcome of a skilled action decreases as practice makes the skilled action more fluent. We suggest that this reduction in sense of agency over movement outcomes is consistent with the decreasing cognitive engagement, or automatization, that occurs during skill learning.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Usually, the closer two events occur, the more likely people infer a causal relationship between them. Recent studies have shown that this relationship between time and causality is bidirectional. Participants also tend to judge events closer in time if they assume that they are causally related. We present six experiments showing causal binding, but unlike other experiments, participants do not emit any motor action, and no physical feedback is given. Rather, all stimuli and causal information are provided verbally. After reading a list of events, participants were asked to estimate the time elapsed between two of them. Those participants who were informed that there was a causal relationship between the two events estimated them as occurring closer to each other. These results support causality- and heuristic-based explanations of temporal binding, as opposed to other explanations such as sensory integration or intentionality of action.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Delusions of control in schizophrenia are characterized by the striking feeling that one's actions are controlled by external forces. We here tested qualitative predictions inspired by Bayesian causal inference models, which suggest that such misattributions of agency should lead to decreased intentional binding. Intentional binding refers to the phenomenon that subjects perceive a compression of time between their intentional actions and consequent sensory events. We demonstrate that patients with delusions of control perceived less self-agency in our intentional binding task. This effect was accompanied by significant reductions of intentional binding as compared to healthy controls and patients without delusions. Furthermore, the strength of delusions of control tightly correlated with decreases in intentional binding. Our study validated a critical prediction of Bayesian accounts of intentional binding, namely that a pathological reduction of the prior likelihood of a causal relation between one's actions and consequent sensory events-here captured by delusions of control-should lead to lesser intentional binding. Moreover, our study highlights the import of an intact perception of temporal contiguity between actions and their effects for the sense of agency.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Previous findings revealed that social ostracism reduces people's implicit sense of agency. Based on theoretical claims that observed behavior of others may be cognitively represented similarly to one's own behavior, we conducted two experiments to test whether people's own sense of agency can also be impaired by observed social exclusion of others. In Experiment 1, participants recalled episodes referring to vicarious ostracism or inclusion before completing a temporal interval estimation task to assess intentional binding effects (an established implicit measure of the sense of agency). In Experiment 2, participants immersed into a newly designed virtual Cyberball game, in which they witnessed a vicarious ostracism or inclusion scenario, before completing a Libet-style temporal estimation task and an agency questionnaire (an explicit measure of the sense of agency). The findings show, for the first time, that vicarious ostracism reduces both implicit and explicit measures of agency in observers.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Various "embodied perception" phenomena suggest that what people sense of their body shapes what they perceive of the environment and that what they perceive of the environment shapes what they perceive of their bodies. For example, an observer's own hand can be felt where a fake hand is seen, events produced by own body movements seem to occur earlier than they did, and feeling a heavy weight at an observer's back may prompt hills to look steeper. Here we argue that such and various other phenomena are instances of multisensory integration of interoceptive signals from the body and exteroceptive signals from the environment. This overarching view provides a mechanistic description of what embodiment in perception means and how it works. It suggests new research questions while questioning a special role of the body itself and various phenomenon-specific explanations in terms of ownership, agency, or action-related scaling of visual information.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

When a voluntary action is followed by an effect after a short delay, the time distance between the action and its effect is perceived to be shorter than the actual time distance. This phenomenon is known as intentional binding (IB). We investigated the influence of presentation of an additional effect on IB between the action and the target effect, and investigated the influence of the presentation timing of the additional effect. One sound (target sound) was constantly presented 250 ms after the button was pressed, and the other sound (additional sound) was presented simultaneously when the button was pressed (Experiment 1) or at one of various timings that included moments both before and after the target sound (Experiment 2). The results showed that IB between the action and target sound was significantly inhibited only when the additional sound was presented prior to the target sound. This suggests that the prior effect has a greater advantage in connecting to the action compared to the posterior sound.

Asunto(s)

RESUMEN

Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to the feeling of control over voluntary actions and the outcomes of those actions. Several brain disorders are characterized by an abnormal SoA. To date, there is no robust treatment for aberrant agency across disorders; this is, in large part, due to gaps in our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and neural correlates of the SoA. This apparent gap stems from a lack of synthesis in established findings. As such, the current review reconciles previously established findings into a novel neurocognitive framework for future investigations of the SoA in brain disorders, which we term the Agency in Brain Disorders Framework (ABDF). In doing so, we highlight key top-down and bottom-up cues that contribute to agency prospectively (i.e., prior to action execution) and retrospectively (i.e., after action execution). We then examine brain disorders, including schizophrenia, autism spectrum disorders (ASD), obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD), and cortico-basal syndrome (CBS), within the ABDF, to demonstrate its potential utility in investigating neurocognitive mechanisms underlying phenotypically variable presentations of the SoA in brain disorders.

Asunto(s)