RESUMEN
Kind representations, concepts like table, triangle, dog, and planet, underlie generic language. Here, we investigate the formal structure of kind representations-the structure that distinguishes kind representations from other types of representations. The present studies confirm that participants distinguish generic-supporting properties of individuals (e.g., this watch is made of steel) and accidental properties (e.g., this watch is on the nightstand). Furthermore, work dating back to Aristotle establishes that only some generic-supporting properties bear a principled connection to the kind, that is, are true of an individual by virtue of its being a member of a specific kind (e.g., telling time for a watch). The present studies tested the hypothesis that principled connections are part of the formal structure of kind representations. Specifically, they tested whether they structure a newly learned kind representation. Experiment 1 found that introducing a property of a newly encountered novel kind in any one of four linguistic frames that provide evidence that a property has a principled connection to a kind (e.g., "It has fur because it is a blick") led participants to infer a different conceptual consequence of principled connections (i.e., "There is something wrong with this blick, which does not have fur") for which they had no direct evidence. Two introduction frames that provided no evidence for principled connections (e.g., "Almost all blicks have fur") did not generate the same consequence. Experiment 2 found that all of the targeted properties were generic licensing, irrespective of the introduction frame. That the distinction between properties that bear principled connections to their kinds, and merely generic-supporting properties structures novel kind representations, provides strong evidence that this distinction is part of the formal structure of kind representations.
Asunto(s)
Formación de Concepto , Lenguaje , Humanos , Aprendizaje , LingüísticaRESUMEN
Timing abilities help organizing the temporal structure of events but are known to change systematically with age. Yet, how the neuronal signature of temporal predictability changes across the age span remains unclear. Younger (n = 21; 23.1 years) and older adults (n = 21; 68.5 years) performed an auditory oddball task, consisting of isochronous and random sound sequences. Results confirm an altered P50 response in the older compared to younger participants. P50 amplitudes differed between the isochronous and random temporal structures in younger, and for P200 in the older group. These results suggest less efficient sensory gating in older adults in both isochronous and random auditory sequences. N100 amplitudes were more negative for deviant tones. P300 amplitudes were parietally enhanced in younger, but not in older adults. In younger participants, the P50 results confirm that this component marks temporal predictability, indicating sensitive gating of temporally regular sound sequences.
Asunto(s)
Electroencefalografía , Potenciales Evocados Auditivos , Estimulación Acústica , Anciano , Envejecimiento , Percepción Auditiva , Humanos , Tiempo de Reacción , Filtrado SensorialRESUMEN
Gallistel (2020) argues that current research on the physical basis of memory assumes an associationistic approach and thus fails to provide an account of quantitative facts because quantitative facts cannot be sensed and have no qualia. But are these approaches any better suited for investigating how we store concepts of concrete things such as dogs, tables and sand, which clearly have qualia? Seven examples of the abstract quantitative and non-quantitative formal structure found in the conceptual representation of concrete things are used to show that Gallistel's critique clearly extends to the conceptual representations stored in semantic memory. Gallistel (2020) presents compelling arguments that the physical basis for quantitative facts will not be the synapse or cell assemblies, but the information-bearing molecules inside the neuron. Given that quantitative facts are intrinsic to even our simplest conceptual representations, we should expect the same for conceptual representations.