RESUMEN
Several countries have attempted to change human fertility through economic incentives. This paper presents simple mathematical models of the participation of couples in a locally funded program of economic incentives. The models take as a springboard China's one-child program. Localities with low per capita incentives attract few couples to the program, while localities with high incentives attract many couples at first, but the value of the benefits is then watered down. The models show that participation in the program may persistently oscillate or may decay to a stationary level. Which behavior occurs is determined by whether there are decreasing, constant, or increasing returns in the rates of participation in response to successive equal increments in the incentive offered, and by the extent to which prospective parents learn from experience with past oscillations in the incentives. The models raise many empirical questions about the dynamics of incentive programs.
Asunto(s)
Política de Planificación Familiar , Servicios de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Modelos Teóricos , Asia , China , Países en Desarrollo , Asia Oriental , Política Pública , InvestigaciónRESUMEN
PIP: Data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, excluding the low income Survey of Economic Opportunity, were used to test an empirical model of the relationship between US state tax exemption values and tax rates for couples and fertility. Income is held constant so that the real tax exemption value is affected by changes in tax rates, the price level, or the statutory value of the exemption. Prior research by Whittington et al. found a positive relationship between births and the federal exemption between 1979-83 for 294 households. The tax value of the exemption varies widely across states. There are 41 states with substantial personal income taxes, while seven states have no state personal income taxes. A very limited tax on personal income is collected in Tennessee, New Hampshire, and Connecticut. Pennsylvania has no dependency exemption. The range in exemption varies from $1500 in Georgia to $300 in Alabama. Tax credits in lieu of exemptions vary from $6 in Arkansas to $85 in Oregon. Tax rates also vary across states. The value of the exemption lowers the cost of a child and is not constant over time. Six models are specified. Model 1 uses combined state and federal exemptions. Models 2 and 3 use a lagged combined exemption value of one and two years. Models 4 and 6 use state exemptions separated from federal exemptions. Model 5 uses a lag of one year, and model 6 uses a lag of two years. The estimation results of the conditional logit (Chamberlain) Model 1 show a negative and significant coefficient, which suggests that exemptions are not an incentive for births. In Models 2 and 3, the coefficient is positive and significant. In Model 4, the pattern of Model 1 holds except the sign is positive. In Models 5 and 6, the federal exemption is positive and significant, and the state exemption is negative and significant. When substitution is made with the means of the predicted values for the exemption, Models 1-4 all become positive and significant. In models with income as a constant, income reduces the impact of the dependency exemption on fertility. Neither state or federal exemptions are a determinant of fertility but serve as a policy tool for motivating average family size.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Recolección de Datos , Fertilidad , Renta , Modelos Logísticos , Modelos Teóricos , Impuestos , Factores de Tiempo , Américas , Demografía , Países Desarrollados , Economía , Política de Planificación Familiar , Administración Financiera , América del Norte , Población , Dinámica Poblacional , Política Pública , Investigación , Muestreo , Factores Socioeconómicos , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
The purpose of this study is to assess the factors which have influenced the evolution of fertility in Quebec between 1960 and 1990, in order to have a better focus on short and middle term fertility's determining factors. A Whittaker-Henderson filter is applied to various variables presumably linked to the total fertility index in order to retrieve and isolate the trend, which then enables concentration on residuals' co-variations. A regression analysis then enables assessment of the factors' weights and the short term's influence (business cycle). Governmental incentives, notably between 1988 and 1990, appear as having contributed, as well as the overall economic conjuncture, to the observed total fertility index raise in the course of this period.
Asunto(s)
Demografía , Análisis Factorial , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Factores Socioeconómicos , Américas , Canadá , Países Desarrollados , Economía , América del Norte , Población , Dinámica Poblacional , Política Pública , Investigación , Estadística como AsuntoRESUMEN
PIP: Throughout history, boys and men have engaged in dangerous sports and survival-related activities to a greater extent than women. Evolution, therefore, favored genes of women who bore comparatively more sons. 105 males per 100 females is average at birth, with excess mortality among males continuing until the numbers of men and women virtually equilibrate by age 20. Cultural traditions and China's 1-child policy have, however, increased the demand for sons, and have exaggerated the demographic imbalance between the sexes. 107-109 12-year-old boys exist for every 100 girls. Among 3-year-old children, there are 111 boys per 100 girls. As these cohorts mature, many young men may find themselves involuntary bachelors. This shortage of wives will have major consequences on the way of life in China, ultimately rewriting much of which is presently cultural taboo. Marriage age and the ability to remarry may change. Male homosexuality will also become more tolerated. While present-day taboos may be reversed, market forces will also respond to the shortage of young females. As young males begin to search in vain for female companions, parents will place premiums on female offspring, dowries will lower, and bride prices will rise. One might also expect national-level financial rewards for bearing females.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Cultura , Divorcio , Economía , Estudios de Evaluación como Asunto , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Homosexualidad , Matrimonio , Núcleo Familiar , Sexo , Cambio Social , Tabú , Asia , Conducta , China , Países en Desarrollo , Composición Familiar , Relaciones Familiares , Asia Oriental , Psicología , Política Pública , Conducta Sexual , Valores SocialesRESUMEN
PIP: The author reviews world demographic trends, emphasizing the differences between the developed and developing countries. The focus of the paper is on the use of economic measures to influence fertility trends in both situations. The author concludes that such measures have been more effective in efforts to reduce fertility than in efforts to raise it. (SUMMARY IN ENG AND RUS)^ieng
Asunto(s)
Fertilidad , Motivación , Dinámica Poblacional , Política Pública , Factores Socioeconómicos , Demografía , Economía , Política de Planificación Familiar , PoblaciónRESUMEN
PIP: Decades of social change in West Germany and the emergence of an ideology that stresses individualism have altered dramatically procreative behavioral patterns. At present, West Germany is characterized by a low marriage rate (6.1/1000 in 1986), declining fertility (10.3 birth/1000), rising divorce rates (20.1/1000), and increases in the proportion of single-person households (34%). The relationship between family planning, family policy, and demographic policy is unclear and changing. Family planning practice is viewed as a part of comprehensive life planning and is based on factors such as partnership or marital status, sex roles, the conflict between working in the home and having a career, consumer aspirations, and housing conditions. The Government's family policy includes the following components: child benefits, tax relief on children, tax splitting arrangements for married couples, childcare allowance, parental leave, student grants, tax deductions for domiciliary professional help and nursing assistance, and the provision of daycare. Thus, West Germany's family policy is directed more at encouraging and facilitating parenthood and family life than at a setting demographic goals. There is no evidence, however, that such measures will be successful and divergent influences of other policy areas are often more compelling. Nor is there any way to quantify the fertility-costing impact of individual family policy measures. The indistinct nature of family planning policy in West Germany mirrors political differences between the current coalition government, which maintains a traditional view of the family, and the opposition Social-Democratic and Green Parties, which question whether the equality of men and women can be achieved in the context of old family structures.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Tasa de Natalidad , Divorcio , Composición Familiar , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Matrimonio , Política , Conducta Sexual , Demografía , Países Desarrollados , Europa (Continente) , Alemania Occidental , Población , Dinámica Poblacional , Política PúblicaRESUMEN
PIP: In May 1988, the provincial government of Quebec instituted a payment schedule of new birth allowances. It is explicitly a cash bonus for having children. Parents receive US $500 for the 1st and 2nd children and US $3000 for each additional child paid in 8 tax exempt installments over 2 years. In addition, there are income tax cuts and interest free home loans for parents. Quebec also pays monthly child allowances until age 6 (up to US $500/year). Quebec's 1988 population of 6.6 million is 26% of Canada's population. Quebec is overwhelmingly French, with 80% of Canada's French speakers. Rivalry between French and English speakers is believed to contribute to concern about Quebec's falling fertility. Massive social and economic changes in the 1950s, with transition from a largely agricultural economy to industrialization, led to a decline in total fertility rate from 3.7 lifetime children/woman in 1958 to 1.4 in 1988. Quebec has Canada's lowest total fertility rate and has also experienced significant out-migration due to economic problems. Experience in Czechoslovakia and Romania indicates that incentives produce a temporary upward "bump" in fertility with an eventual return to former levels.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Tasa de Natalidad , Emigración e Inmigración , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Industrias , Características de la Población , Política Pública , Investigación , Américas , Canadá , Demografía , Países Desarrollados , Países en Desarrollo , Economía , América del Norte , Población , Dinámica PoblacionalRESUMEN
PIP: This paper gives examples of pronatalist and migration policies adopted by several European countries, and evaluates their effectiveness: migration is the only practical means of preventing population stagnation. The pronatalist policies of France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Romania range from a system of family support so complicated that a special bureau has been set up to interpret it in France, through increasing benefits such as paid maternity leave in GDR, to an inconsistent support system in Hungary to coercive measures in Romania. In 1966 Romania severely restricted abortion and divorce, and even screened working women for pregnancy to prevent abortion. It has been estimated that the effect of these policies has been marginal and temporary: 0.2-0.3 children per woman in France, 0.1 in GDR, and 0.2 in Romania. Childbearing fell to former levels rapidly in Romania, probably a result of illegal abortion. Probably other social policies, such as housing infrastructure and child-care facilities, affect childbearing as much or more so than pronatalist measures. The migration policies of the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland are described. Most have varied over the years, entailing several rationales, such as humanitarianism, recruitment of workers, providing asylum to refugees, as well as maintaining population levels. Success of policies depends on economic conditions, social tensions regarding integration of foreigners and naturalization policies. Pronatalist policies in general are not very effective unless extremely costly and continuous, but they do provide social justice for parents. The solution to prevent harsh changes in population age structure is ultimately to allow migration from less developed countries. To make either of these policies effective, emancipation of (especially male) parents, and education of people about other cultures will be required.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Ayuda a Familias con Hijos Dependientes , Demografía , Emigración e Inmigración , Estudios de Evaluación como Asunto , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Derechos Humanos , Legislación como Asunto , Política , Densidad de Población , Dinámica Poblacional , Población , Política Pública , Aborto Inducido , Países Desarrollados , Europa (Continente) , Servicios de Planificación Familiar , Ciencias SocialesRESUMEN
PIP: The Dutch government determined that a pronatalist policy will be necessary to reverse the downward fertility trend if their current population is to be maintained. The political feasibility, acceptability and effectiveness of such a policy is examined, beginning with a short history of Dutch population and policy since 1945. The antinatalist policy since 1975 has been markedly effective in eliminating high order births. 1st, the government surveyed the Dutch people and found that they prefer the same or smaller population size than current numbers. Regarding specific pronatalist measures, some, particularly the less educated, prefer direct payments, while other favor maternity leave. No one wants to pay higher taxes, however, to support such tactics. Nor do people desire that family planning subsidies be eliminated. Surveys within political parties failed to reveal any consensus regarding specific antinatalist measures to apply. From the literature, it seems that pronatalist programs in other nations, unless they pay a substantial portion of child expenses, have been ineffective in raising overall fertility: they may exert temporary effects on birth spacing. Finally, a theory, presented by the US delegates to the World Population Conference in Mexico, assuming that populations have a self-regulation mechanism and that governments do not need to implement population policies, is discussed. There is as yet no evidence for mechanisms within populations that affect mortality, fertility, nuptiality and migration. Rather, people seem to act in their own interests, even if they are aware of population goals. The paper recommended that the Dutch government educate the public about advantages and disadvantages of population growth.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Ayuda a Familias con Hijos Dependientes , Recolección de Datos , Educación , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Servicios de Información , Motivación , Características de la Población , Densidad de Población , Dinámica Poblacional , Población , Política Pública , Investigación , Educación Sexual , Factores Socioeconómicos , Demografía , Países Desarrollados , Economía , Europa (Continente) , Planificación en Salud , Países Bajos , Organización y Administración , MuestreoRESUMEN
PIP: Current levels of fertility in developed countries may represent a temporary pause on a continuing downward trendline, the bottom of a long decline, or some sort of equilibrium level of fertility in a postindustrial society. Concerns about population decline are entangled in major political and social questions and tend to focus on perceived shortages of particular groups of humans (eg regional or subnational groups defined culturally). If indeed Western nations determine that the trend toward declining fertility is a major concern, 4 policy responses are possible: 1) limit access to fertility control methods, 2) encourage higher fertility through economic incentives, 3) increase immigration, or 4) adapt to declining and aging populations through measures such as modifying the terms of social security provision or converting age-related facilities to other social purposes. Although the threats of sustained low fertility should not be minimized, there is a danger that politicians and ideologues from both the Left and the Right will resort to the same exaggerated rhetoric used by population explosion alarmists in the 1960s and 1970s.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Demografía , Países Desarrollados , Emigración e Inmigración , Estudios de Evaluación como Asunto , Política de Planificación Familiar , Servicios de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Política , Dinámica Poblacional , Población , Política PúblicaRESUMEN
PIP: Below replacement fertility has become the norm in 21 of Europe's 27 countries. Their average total fertility rate is 1.69. This trend has raised concerns about insufficient numbers in the economically active population and prospective personnel shortages in the military. In the Federal Republic of Germany, fertility has been below replacement for the past 17 years and its 1985 total fertility rate of 1.28 is a record low. Only a few European countries (Bulgaria, France, and Romania) have explicitly pronatalist policies. Other nations (Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, and the German Democratic Republic) have instituted a progressive system of child allowances, increasing payments with each additional birth. Ironically, policies that seek to promote social opportunities for women, such as participation in the labor force, are likely to reduce fertility even farther. Without increased services such as reasonably priced housing, child care centers, and economic incentives to compensate women for lost opportunity costs in the labor market, policies that seek to increase fertility will not succeed. Policy options that were once available to increase fertility (for example, prohibiting abortion) are no longer socially acceptable. New policies will have to be developed through research on the determinants of fertility behavior in postindustrial societies.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Demografía , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Política , Dinámica Poblacional , Crecimiento Demográfico , Población , Política Pública , Cambio Social , Derechos de la Mujer , Países Desarrollados , Economía , Europa (Continente) , Factores SocioeconómicosRESUMEN
PIP: An overview of demographic and labor force problems in the German Democratic Republic is presented. Topics mentioned include population decrease resulting from losses during World War II and labor force emigration prior to 1961, the low rate of natural increase, manpower resources and the dependency burden, and pro-natalist population policy measures. Selected demographic and labor force figures for 1984 are provided.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Demografía , Dependencia Psicológica , Economía , Empleo , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Fuerza Laboral en Salud , Dinámica Poblacional , Crecimiento Demográfico , Política Pública , Países Desarrollados , Emigración e Inmigración , Europa (Continente) , Europa Oriental , Alemania Oriental , Mortalidad , Política , Población , GuerraRESUMEN
PIP: Some 40 countries use some form of incentives and disincentives in support of population policies, about half with the aim of reducing fertility and half with the aim of increasing it. These schemes range from limitations on tax and family allowances or maternity benefits after a given family size has been reached to payments to acceptors of fertility control methods. Some schemes aim to eliminate or reduce the cost and inconvenience people may face in achieving their fertility preferences, whereas others contain an element of deterrence. It is difficult to isolate and measure the impact of incentives on fertility from the effects of other factors such as family planning service availability or modernization. Studies in pronatalist countries suggest that incentive schemes produce short-term fertility increases without a change in average family size. Monetary incentives must be constantly increased to keep pace with inflation, placing a heavy burden on government budgets. Administrative capacity to operate the scheme is critical in terms of both manpower and efficient systems for record keeping, monitoring, and close supervision to prevent abuse. There is also considerable debate on the moral and ethical implications of incentives and disincentives as policy tools. Incentives offered for the acceptance of a particular fertility control method potentially contravene the principle of voluntary and informed consent. In addition, the relative value of the reward is greater for those in the lower income groups. The discriminatory nature of certain types of incentives and disincentives is illustrated by measures introduced in Singapore that give highest priority in school enrollment to the children of highly educated mothers with 2-3 children. This ruling is expected to further intensify the controversy surrounding incentive and disincentive schemes.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Motivación , Política , Política PúblicaRESUMEN
PIP: A study of fertility in Czechoslovakia is presented based on data for 3,029 married women aged 18-39, with particular reference to fertility differentials by socioeconomic and cultural characteristics. Attitudes toward family size and fertility are also examined, as well as attitudes toward fertility incentives such as extended maternity leave and maternity and child allowances. (summary in ENG, RUS)^ieng
Asunto(s)
Actitud , Cultura , Composición Familiar , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Factores Socioeconómicos , Conducta , Checoslovaquia , Demografía , Países Desarrollados , Economía , Europa (Continente) , Europa Oriental , Población , Características de la Población , Dinámica Poblacional , Psicología , Política PúblicaRESUMEN
PIP: Report on the 1981 International Population Conference concerned with low fertility, its causes and its consequences. Low fertility in developed countries is associated with the changing role of women which increasingly allows them greater education, employment, and social opportunities. The direction of the relationship, however, is debated. Some argue that women have fewer children because they work, while others assert that they work because of fewer children. Whatever the cause, many developed Western countries have made efforts to correct the problem. Most developed countries aim for replacement level birthrates of 2.1 children per woman, and many have instituted pronatalist policies aimed at achieving this level of fertility. Population policy in Western Europe has tended to concentrate on economic incentives. Eastern European countries, on the other hand, aim at enhancing the value of children while discouraging materialism; countries strong in democratic and civil liberatarian traditions do not follow this pattern. Factors which might potentially affect this trend towards low fertility have not generally been given consideration. These include increased unemployment and an increase in the degree to which women are able to exercise control over their reproductive lives.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Fertilidad , Crecimiento Demográfico , Tasa de Natalidad , Europa (Continente) , Europa Oriental , Composición Familiar , Humanos , MortalidadRESUMEN
PIP: In this article, population policies, specifically fertility policies, in the developed countries were reviewed, and drawing on this review, several theoretical issues facing governments implementing policies aimed at encouraging fertility were discussed. Policies affecting fertility are classified broadly into 2 groups: those affecting the family's demand for children and those affecting the supply of children. The former comprises economic policies such as birth payment, payment of childbearing cost, family allowance, and tax cut, and the latter includes policies regulating the availability of the means of fertility control; i.e., the legal regulation of modern contraceptive methods and induced abortion. Although recent fertility is considerably below the replacement level in most of the Western European countries, there are very few who adopt policies explicitly aimed at raising their fertility level. Policies affecting the demand for children have long been institutionalized as welfare policies rather than as fertility policies in these countries, and the trend toward liberalization of the legal regulation of modern contraceptive methods and induced abortion is clear except where strongly influenced by Catholicism. On the other hand, governments in most Eastern European countries have tried to encourage fertility when faced with a decline below replacement level during the 1960s. They have adopted all possible policy measures for encouraging fertility, notable among them being the rise in family allowance and the limitation of legalized induced abortion to only those who have a certain amount of children. Governments which encourage fertility must solve at least 4 issues before implementing their fertility policies: 1) legitimizing the intervention into inalienable human rights; i.e., marriage and human reproduction; 2) adjusting the new goal of fertility encouragement with other established goals which every government must pursue, especially with regard to budget allocation, 3) the acceptability of specific policy measures, and 4) the effectiveness of policy measures for fertility reduction. In contrast with Eastern European countries where governments manipulate the mass media and force the national goal upon families, it is difficult to legitimatize the national goal of fertility to individual families, to deprive funds for fertility policies of the regular budget, to adopt policy measures which regulate the availability of modern contraceptive methods, and the accessibility to legal induced abortion in Western European democratic countries. Thus, it does not seem to be an easy task for democratic governments to effectively affect childbearing decisions of individual families by policy measures. (author's)^ieng
Asunto(s)
Ayuda a Familias con Hijos Dependientes , Tasa de Natalidad , Países Desarrollados , Estudios de Evaluación como Asunto , Política de Planificación Familiar , Fertilidad , Financiación Gubernamental , Motivación , Política Pública , Conducta , Demografía , Economía , Europa (Continente) , Europa Oriental , Administración Financiera , Población , Dinámica Poblacional , PsicologíaRESUMEN
PIP: The family planning program in Fu-swei-jing, an urban district in west Beijing, has emphasized China's new issue--1 child per couple. A study showed that more intellectuals, officials, and women with higher educational level have obtained single child certificates than blue collar workers and less educated women. Among those obtaining single child certificates, 60% definitely wanted only 1 child, 30% would have 1 child until the government policy changes, and 10% obtained the certificate reluctantly. Among the reasons for not obtaining the certificate: 14.5% agreed to have 1 child, but hope the policy will change; 42.7% favored 2 children per family; a desire for at least 1 boy in the family; and postponing the decision until the child is older. For future family programs we suggest: 1) educate people about the significance of the issue, 2) give social and economic preferences to single-child families, 3) increase the quality of contraceptive materials and continue birth control education, 4) strengthen pediatric, prenatal, and postnatal maternal care, and 5) plan for 2nd children in special cases. .85% of the Fu-swei-Jing population are mentally or physically handicapped. Most handicaps are hereditary, and a few resulted from marriage of close relatives. We should educate the public about genetics and eugenics, correlate population quantity and quality controls, establish sheltered workshops for the retarded, and establish policies on marriage and childbirth for people with hereditary diseases.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Composición Familiar , Planificación en Salud , Educación Sexual , Asia , China , Países en Desarrollo , Educación , Servicios de Planificación Familiar , Asia Oriental , Fertilidad , GenéticaRESUMEN
PIP: The birth rate in Belgium decreased between 1964 and 1975, after which the birth rate again began to increase. This increase was not enough, however, to justify classifying Belgium's population as expansive. The decrease in fertility was due mainly to a decrease in the fertility of women in the highest fertility age groups. This development began to spread into lower age groups but was reversed by trends toward more traditional family patterns. After 1961, couples showed a preference for remaining childless for the first several years following their marriage, for the 2 child family, and for longer birth intervals. The decrease in fertility was greater among those with larger families, among the inhabitants of Flanders, among Catholics, among women who didn't work outside the home, and among those in higher income groups. Belgium has a relatively high infant mortality rate. 80% of the infant deaths in Belgium are perinatal in nature, due mainly to sociocultural and socio-hygienic factors. Trends in fertility and mortality have led to an increase in the average age of the Belgian population, which could lead to future socioeconomic problems. Social and economic incentives for having children should be instituted in order to secure the stability of the Belgian population, without infringing on the freedom of women to choose to work and have children. This would include aid for families in which both parents work, and economic aid so that those families in which the woman remains at home can afford to have more children. It is recommended that 30-35% of Belgian families should have 3 children instead of 2, if socioeconomic stability is to be achieved.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Dinámica Poblacional , Crecimiento Demográfico , Adulto , Bélgica , Tasa de Natalidad , Femenino , Fertilidad , Humanos , Recién Nacido , Edad Materna , Mortalidad , Embarazo , Cambio SocialRESUMEN
PIP: Education alone cannot effectively control population growth. Benefit to the individual must be coordinated with the benefit to the community and the country. It is absolutely necessary and possible to control population by economic means. The economic policy in Tienjing includes: 1) give preference to single child families in child care, health benefits, education, and employment, and financially punish families with more than two children; 2) establish a better rationing policy, one not based on a per capita ration, and give preference to single child families; 3) establish retirement benefits and guarantee higher living standards for retirees who have either no children or only 1 or 2 children, and give paid sick leave to people experiencing complications following sterilization operations; 4) establish equal inheritance rights for both male and female offspring; and 5) give bonuses to units with excellent family planning results and to medical personnel with fewer complications during sterilization operations, and financially punish groups with poor family planning results. In order to effectively implement the economic means, coordinate bonuses with punishment, and coordinate local policies with those of the entire society. The key is strong leadership, but the voluntary and active involvement of the public insures success.^ieng
Asunto(s)
Regulación de la Población , Política Pública , Factores Socioeconómicos , Asia , China , Países en Desarrollo , Economía , Composición Familiar , Asia Oriental , Fertilidad , Asistencia a los AncianosRESUMEN
PIP: After liberation in Romania the high birth rate, high mortality rate, and high population growth rate pattern changed to a low birth rate, low mortality rate, and low growth rate pattern. Higher standard of living and educational level, the increasing involvement of women in social and economic activities, the rapid development of cities, and the lower infant mortality rate are the 4 main factors responsible for this development. Consequently, Romania is facing a problem of increasing labor shortages. People who would otherwise be in the labor force are in school to allow the rapid development in science and technology. The increasing proportion of older retirees in the population also decreases the labor supply. Agricultural mechanization has provided labor to support industrialization in the past. Future increases will emphasize irrigation and soil improvement rather than mechanization. The Romanian government has established 6 new laws to stimulate population growth. First, award bonuses to families with more children and tax childless couples. Second, eliminate factors destabilizing families, preference to young couples, and restrict abortion and divorce. Third, protect women's societal rights through bonuses to mothers and paid maternity leave to pregnant women. Fourth, reduce mortality rate and improve people's health and life span. Fifth, better utilize the labor force and redistribute the population by economic methods. Six, use longterm procedures to achieve the best population structure and to have a younger population.^ieng