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More than half of the world's population lives in a country where fertility is below replacement level (MYRSKYLA; KOHLER; BILLARI, 2009). In Brazil, the total fertility rate (TFR) went down from 4.26 children per women in 1980 to 1.91 in 2010. Some internal disparities exist. We use data from the DHS from 1986, 1996 and the PNDS from 2006, the most recent survey available, to decompose and analyze fertility rates using a framework proposed by Bongaarts (2001), which is especially useful to explore and compare factors behind total fertility rates. The framework includes desired family size (DFS), unwanted fertility, sex preference, replacements for child mortality, rising age at childbearing, involuntary infertility and competing preferences. By understanding fertility components across time in Brazil, this paper illuminates how these factors vary by socio-demographic characteristics (race, religion, wealth, education, and place of residence), and how these factors combined have formed TFR throughout the years and in contexts of both high and low fertility. We found that, contrarily to what happened in the past, women in recent periods are having, in aggregate, fewer children than their ideal family sizes. However, unwanted pregnancies still explain why certain social groups have more children than desired. We also find that women with higher levels of education tend to desire more children than women with lower educational levels. Competing preferences is the main explanation for this disparity.

Más de la mitad de los habitantes del mundo vive en un pais donde la fecundidad está abajo del nivel de reposición (MYRSKYLA; KOHLER; BILLARI, 2009). En Brasil, la tasa global de fecundidad (TGF) fue reducida de 4.26 hijos por mujer en 1980 para 1.91 en 2010. Existen algunas disparidades internas. Utilizamos datos del DHS de 1986, 1996 y del PNDS de 2006, el estudio más reciente disponible, para descomponer y analizar las tasas de fecundidad utilizando un método propuesto por Bongaarts (2001), el cual es especialmente útil para explorar y comparar los factores por detrás de las tasas globales de fecundidad. El método incluye el tamaño deseado de familia, fecundidad indeseada, preferencia de sexo, reposición de la mortalidad infantil, el aumento de la edad al primero hijo, infecundidad involuntaria y preferencias competitivas. Al comprender la variación de la fecundidad y sus componentes através del tiempo en Brasil, este artículo ilumina como esos factores varían de acuerdo con características socio-demograficas (raza, religión, riqueza, educación y sitio de residencia) y como esos factores combinados han formado la TFR a lo largo de los años y en el contexto de alta y baja fecundidad. Encontramos que contrariamente al pasado, mujeres en periodos más recientes tienen, al todo, menos hijos que los que compondrían su tamaño deseado de familia. Sin embargo, embarazos indeseados aún son responsables por que algunos grupos sociales tengan más hijos que los que desean. También encontramos que mujeres con niveles más altos de educación tienden a desear tener más hijos que las mujeres con niveles más bajos. Las preferencias competitivas son la explicación principal para esa incompatibilidad.

Mais da metade dos habitantes do planeta vive em um país onde a Taxa de Fecundidade Total (TFT) está abaixo do nível de reposição (MYRSKYLA; KOHLER; BILLARI, 2009). No Brasil, a TFT caiu de 4,26 filhos por mulher, em 1980, para 1,91, em 2010. Existem, no entanto, disparidades internas. No presente trabalho, são utilizados dados da DHS de 1986, 1996 e da PNDS de 2006, o estudo mais recente disponível, que permitem decompor e analisar taxas de fecundidade empregando o método proposto por Bongaarts (2001), o qual é especialmente útil para explorar e comparar os fatores que compõem a TFT. O método inclui o tamanho desejado de família, a fecundidade indesejada, a preferência por sexo, a reposição da mortalidade infantil, o aumento da idade ao primeiro filho, a infertilidade involuntária e as preferências competitivas. Ao compreender a variação da fecundidade e seus componentes ao longo do tempo no Brasil, esse artigo explora como tais fatores variam de acordo com as características sociodemográficas (raça/cor, religião, nível de riqueza, educação e local de residência) e como esses fatores combinados formaram a TFT ao longo dos anos e nos contextos de alta e baixa fecundidade. Observou-se que mulheres nos períodos mais recentes têm, em média, menos filhos do que poderiam ter segundo seu tamanho ideal de família. Ao mesmo tempo, gravidezes indesejadas ainda são responsáveis por alguns grupos sociais terem mais filhos do que desejavam. Também verificou-se que mulheres com níveis mais altos de educação tendem a desejar mais filhos do que aquelas com nível mais baixo. As preferências competitivas são a explicação principal para essa incompatibilidade.

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OBJECTIVES: Recent evidence has shown that young adults have poor knowledge about reproductive health and fertility, and that interventions are needed to increase fertility awareness. The aim of this study was to assess the effectiveness of a brief video in increasing knowledge about fertility and infertility in young adults. METHODS: We carried out a two-arm, parallel-group, randomised controlled trial with a pre-test/post-test design (NCT02607761, ClinicalTrials.gov). The sample was composed of 173 undergraduates who completed a self-report questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to exposure or no exposure to an educational video about reproductive health and infertility (intervention group, n = 89; control group, n = 84). RESULTS: At baseline, participants revealed poor knowledge of infertility risk factors and fertility issues, and average knowledge of the definition of infertility. Interaction effects between group and time were found for all variables targeted in the video. Participants in the intervention group significantly increased their knowledge of fertility issues, infertility risk factors and the definition of infertility. No significant differences in post-test knowledge were observed in the control group, except for the age at which there is a marked decrease in female fertility. CONCLUSIONS: A short video intervention is effective in increasing short-term knowledge about reproductive health and infertility. If future research using longer intervals corroborates our findings, video intervention could be a useful tool in public health prevention campaigns.

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El descenso de la fecundidad en América Latina y el Caribe es un fenómeno inédito y extremadamente veloz. Hoy, numerosos países de la región tienen fecundidad bajo el nivel de reemplazo, incluyendo casos emblemáticos como el de Brasil. Aquí se debate desde qué marco conceptual se pueden comprender las diferentes medidas, programas o políticas que están surgiendo y surgirán en el futuro en relación a temas de fecundidad y familia. Además, se resumen e interpretan las experiencias de aquellos países en los que se han implementado políticas familiares en contexto de fecundidad bajo el reemplazo (concretamente, las políticas implementadas en Suecia, España y Francia) discutiendo de qué manera las experiencias europeas pueden resultar útiles para la formulación de políticas en América Latina. Para concluir, se enumeran las decisiones clave a tomar para el diseño de políticas familiares en contexto de baja fecundidad.

A queda da fecundidade nos países da América Latina e do Caribe é um fenômeno inédito e veloz. Numerosos países estão abaixo do nível da taxa de reposição, incluindo casos emblemáticos como o do Brasil. É necessário compreender a partir de que marco conceitual podem-se harmonizar as diferentes medidas de política pública que estão surgindo e irão surgir no futuro, tendo como referência as questões de família e fecundidade baixa. Além disso, cabe resumir as experiências daqueles países nos quais se implantaram políticas familiares em contexto de fecundidade abaixo da reposição. O artigo resume e analisa as políticas aplicadas na Suécia, Espanha e França e discute em que medida estas podem ser úteis para a formulação de políticas na América Latina. Também sugere que um conjunto de decisões-chave deve ser tomado no momento de se desenharem políticas familiares em tal contexto novo para nossa região.

In recent years fertility in Latin America and the Caribbean has fallen at a very rapid pace. In many countries it fell to below-replacement levels, including emblematic cases such as Brazil. In this context, it is important to analyze the conceptual backgrounds that can give coherence to different policy measures. It is also essential to understand and analyze family policies in other countries having below-replacement fertility levels. In this paper we consider the cases of Sweden, Spain and France and discuss to what extent those policies can serve as inspirations for policy makers in Latin America and the Caribbean. We also suggest a list of key decisions needed to carry forward the design of family policy measures in this low-fertility context, which is unprecedented in our region.

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Diante do declínio da fecundidade, o Brasil aproxima-se das condições demográficas que determinam o crescimento zero ou negativo, no longo prazo, de uma população. Entretanto, não há razões suficientes para se afirmar que a fecundidade estabilizar-se-á no nível de reposição ou pouco abaixo dele. Há indicações de que ela deve atingir patamares bastante baixos a esse nível nas próximas décadas. Teoricamente, uma população estável e fechada com taxas de fecundidade abaixo do nível de reposição pode retomar o crescimento zero se submetida a uma mudança do número anual constante de entradas derivadas do retorno da fecundidade ao nível de reposição. Isto também pode ocorrer devido a saldos líquidos migratórios positivos, constantes e com estrutura etária fixa. Portanto, para um determinado conjunto de taxas de saída existe um número infinito de populações estacionárias equivalentes. Pressupondo um regime de fecundidade abaixo da reposição, este trabalho utiliza o modelo teórico de Schmertmann (1992) para simular e examinar, comparativamente, a estrutura etária da população do Estado de São Paulo, resultante de um aumento da fecundidade até o nível de reposição, e as estruturas etárias desta mesma população tornada estacionária via migração, assumindo diferentes cenários de fecundidade e estrutura etária das imigrantes.

Ante el declive de la fecundidad, Brasil se aproxima a las condiciones demográficas que determinan el crecimiento cero o negativo, en el largo plazo, de una población. Entretanto, no hay razones suficientes para afirmar que la fecundidad se estabilizará en el nivel de reposición o un poco por debajo de él. Hay indicaciones de que ésta debe alcanzar cifras bastante bajas a ese nivel en las próximas décadas. Teóricamente, una población estable y cerrada con tasas de fecundidad por debajo del nivel de reposición puede retomar el crecimiento cero si es sometida a un cambio del número anual constante de entradas derivadas del retorno de la fecundidad al nivel de reposición. Esto también puede ocurrir debido a saldos netos migratorios positivos, constantes y con estructura etaria fija. Por lo tanto, para un determinado conjunto de tasas de salida existe un número infinito de poblaciones estacionarias equivalentes. Presuponiendo un régimen de fecundidad por debajo de la reposición, este trabajo utiliza el modelo teórico de Schmertmann (1992) para simular y examinar, comparativamente, la estructura etaria de la población del Estado de San Pablo, resultante de un aumento de la fecundidad hasta el nivel de reposición, y las estructuras etarias de esta misma población tornada estacionaria vía migración, asumiendo diferentes escenarios de fecundidad y estructura etaria de las inmigrantes.

Due to its declining fertility rate, Brazil is closer to the demographic conditions that determine population zero or negative growth, on the long run. However, there are no reasonable grounds to assert that the fertility rate will stabilize at replacement level or just below it. There are indications that it will be likely to descend to very low levels in coming decades. Theoretically, a stable and closed population with fertility rates below replacement level can return to zero growth if the population is subjected to changes in the constant annual number of entries derived from the return of fertility to replacement level. This may also occur due to constant positive net migration with constant and fixed age structure. Therefore, for a given set of rates of exits, there are an infinite number of equivalent stationary populations. Given fertility below replacement level, the present study uses Schmertmann's theoretical model (1992) to simulate and examine, by comparison, (1) the age structure of the population of the State of São Paulo, Brazil, that has resulted from a rise in fertility to replacement level and (2) the age structures of this population, as made stationary through migration, assuming different scenarios of fertility and the age structure of immigrants.

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PIP: Fertility levels are currently very low in western Europe, accelerating the process of demographic aging. This aging process cannot be offset by any realistic degree of immigration. Most European couples are not limiting family size because they want to be childless or because they prefer 1-child families. Rather, most would prefer to have 2 children, but are hampered in achieving their reproductive goals by economic uncertainties and the difficulties women face combining paid work with the duties of motherhood. Western European efforts to increase fertility, if possible, to replacement level are described dating back to the 1930s. Policies in Sweden have reduced the levels of economic insecurity for families and made it easier for women to both participate in the labor force and have children. These policies have increased fertility in Sweden. In contrast, however, Italy has taken no such action, and average family size in that country has fallen to 1.2 children. Fertility in Australia is also noted.^ieng

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PIP: This is a general review of the trend toward below-replacement fertility in developed countries and of the policy initiatives that have been developed in response to such trends.^ieng

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PIP: Population Council demographer John Bongaarts and his colleague Griffith Feeney argue that recent concern about a lack of births overlooks the fact that many women in developed countries are simply choosing to bear children later than women used to. So-called birth dearths are often caused by temporary delays in childbearing. The two demographers have designed a new way for demographers to account for the timing, or tempo, of childbearing in estimates of fertility. Their tempo-adjusted total fertility rate (TFR) allows demographers to correct skewed fertility trends, such as those leading to projections of birth dearths. The new measure provides a better indication of women's true propensity to bear children. Standard measures of fertility are distorted by changes in tempo. Such changes occur when large numbers of couples delay or accelerate their initiation of family building. The authors used historical data and theoretical arguments to validate the tempo-adjusted TFR, which improves upon the two common measures of fertility. Flaws in the TFR and the completed fertility rate (CFR) are corrected by Bongaarts and Feeney's new measure. To demonstrate their new tool, they examined the below-replacement fertility seen in recent decades in the US. By the mid-1990s, the TFR in almost every developed country had fallen below the replacement level of 2.1 births/woman, and in Italy, Spain, and Germany it fell below 1.5. If such fertility persists, declining population size, extreme population aging, and financial pressure upon social security systems may result. However, if fertility preferences hold at current levels, the very low fertility rates observed in the developed world will approach 2 children/couple.^ieng

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PIP: At present, at least 51 countries--representing 44% of the world's population--are showing below-replacement fertility rates. In some of these countries, where the number of new births is not adequate to replace aging populations, this trend is problematic. In other countries, most notably China, declining fertility has conferred significant benefits. At an Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) Population Commission meeting held in New York in 1997, staff from China's State Statistical Bureau reported the country has a current total fertility rate of 1.8. The birth rate remains high, however, because of the large numbers of Chinese women in the 15-49 year reproductive age group (336 million in 1997). Also buffering the impact of a low fertility rate is a large labor surplus (130 million excess workers in rural China). To keep fertility below the replacement level, China plans to improve the quality of its family planning service, enhance poverty alleviation programs, and increase incentives for small families in rural areas. China's low fertility rate has provided an important impetus for economic development.^ieng

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PIP: This news article summarizes information on current fertility, contraceptive use, and population growth in Japan. Data are obtained from the 1996 KAP survey conducted by the Population Problems Research Council of the Mainichi Shimbun and a recent report by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Survey findings reveal that 63.1% of women in 1996 considered high education costs the most important obstacle to child rearing in Japan. The second most frequently cited reason was the physical and psychological burden of raising children (55.9% of women). The total fertility rate in 1995 declined to 1.43 children/woman. The birth rate was 9.5/1000 population. Births in 1995 numbered 1,187,067. Births continued to be delayed. The average age of a woman at the time of her first birth was 27.5 years. Age at first marriage also increased to an average of 28.5 years for men and 26.3 years for women. Divorces increased to 1.60/1000 population. 45.2% of women desired 2 children, and 40.6% desired 3 children. 65.2% of women believed that childbirth was an individual's and not a government's choice. 32.3% agreed that government should encourage greater fertility. 56.6% reported current use of a contraceptive method, and 21.2% reported use of family planning. Among current contraceptive users, 23.4% began use before marriage. 10% initiated use after marriage, and 17.8% began use after their first birth. 31.9% began use after their second child. 70.3% reported talking with husbands about contraceptives. 73.6% of wives made the decision about contraceptive use. 77.2% of married women relied on the condom. Almost 33% of women relied on abortion at least once for terminating a pregnancy. 54.3% of unmarried women desired two children, and 9.3% did not want children. 52.6% of unmarried women did not want to marry in the near future. 3.8% never wanted to marry. 46.5% of unmarried women had experience with sexual intercourse.^ieng

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PIP: This brief news article discusses the severe imbalance between births and deaths in Russia since 1990. In the first 6 months of 1996 there were twice as many deaths as births. In Moscow, between January and July 1996, there were 34,356 births and 66,586 deaths. The imbalance began in 1990, when the birth rate was 10.5/1000 and the death rate was 12.8/1000. By 1992 the gap widened to 7.7 births/1000 and 13.7 deaths/1000. The decline in population replacement is likely to affect care of and support for the elderly. Russia's elected council took action by changing the labor code to prohibit women from working in industries that are considered harmful to women's reproductive capability and health: heavy manual labor as builders, crane operators, and tunnel workers. A sociologist at Moscow State University posits that when people live with uncertainty and in poor conditions they stop having babies. Social science research affirms that post-communist instability and uncertainty about the future are deterrents to young couples having children. Russia is following Europe's demographic patterns, but has the singular combination of a very low birth rate and a very high death rate.^ieng

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PIP: This news brief describes government activities in Shanghai to manage the emerging problems of population aging and of improving the quality of life. Shanghai achieved negative population growth in 1991. Total population in 1994 was 13.56 million. The birth rate by the end of 1994 was 5.89/1000, and the death rate was 7.0/1000. The negative rate of growth was -1.2/1000. Negative population growth is attributed to rapid socioeconomic development and an effective family planning program. The government intends to offer a series of education programs for women. The programming would include health education about women's life stages ranging from puberty through menopause. A special television show on the family and reproductive health was aired in September 1995. The family planning program will be intensified in order to reach the floating population. The municipality of Shanghai is attracting new floating migrants with its market economy and the construction of the Pudong New Development Zone.^ieng

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South Korea and Cuba are dissimilar in religion, economy, culture and attitudes toward premarital sexual relations. In 1960, Korea instituted a national family planning programme to combat rapid population growth. Cuba explicitly rejected Malthusian policies, but made family planning universally available in 1974 in response to health needs. Both countries have undergone rapid fertility declines and today have less than replacement level fertility. Both countries have also used a similar mixture of methods, including a high prevalence of female sterilisation. Abortion has played a major role in the fertility decline of both countries, rising in the first half of the fertility transition and then falling, although remaining a significant variable in the second half. It is concluded that access to contraception, voluntary sterilisation, and safe abortion has a direct impact on fertility and has been associated with a rapid fall in family size in two very different countries.

PIP: It is argued that access to contraception, voluntary sterilization, and safe abortion had a direct impact on fertility decline in two countries (Cuba and Korea) that differed in religion, economic conditions, culture, and attitudes. Both countries achieved below replacement fertility through high rates of contraceptive prevalence and ready access to legal abortion. Family planning services were provided in both countries through the public sector and in Korea through a subsidized private sector. Fertility decline in both countries occurred at the same time as the initiation of family planning programs. Family planning was introduced in Korea in order to reduce population growth and in Cuba in order to reduce the incidence of induced abortion and not for demographic reasons. Both Korea and Cuba had successful family planning programs over the past ten years that combined awareness, accessibility, and perceived quality. Korea adopted legal abortion as a means of reducing high maternal mortality rates and fertility. Cuba adopted legal abortion, during a period when the government lacked hard currency and consumer items such as birth control pills. Even antibiotics were difficult to obtain, particularly for teenagers. Both countries worked to improve services for teenagers. The experiences with family planning in both countries provide support for the theory that socioeconomic forces are not needed to push fertility lower. It is suggested that access to reversible and permanent contraception and safe abortion increases the speed of the transition and permits lower fertility than would otherwise be achieved without formal family planning programs. Fertility decline occurred in Korea under rising incomes and Cuba experienced declines during a period of economic declines. Both countries need to expand options for reducing exposure to pre-union adolescent pregnancies.

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PIP: This paper presents a detailed discussion of the impact of World War II on subsequent fertility behavior a generation later in Italy. The changes in fertility were delayed and induced by a transgenerational process precipitated by war. War anomie and anomie in the rules of family formation are "symptoms" and not effects of the broad structural changes and historical upheavals during the 30 years of war. Fertility behavior is not construed to be an inevitable outcome of causal processes, but as alternative responses to life situations. The author bases this explanatory model of macrodemographic processes on a variant of Brown and Harris' etiological model that explains the occurrence of depression. It is argued that demographic models of European fertility are needed that acknowledge "a radical form of war that acts on reciprocity systems susceptible to change" and "intervenes to modify the subsequent transgenerational (family) relations." A research design is not now available that relies on the tools of history and anthropology. Thus, the demography of fertility may be reduced to a "mere bookkeeping of vital statistical data or simple economics of resources." The author's new pattern of family formation in Italy considers the "regional family culture and structure to be symptom-formation factors relating to the war and transformations in systems of family relations and exchange." These family changes are linked to war anomie and "changes in the logic of transition strategies from suppression to disconfirmation." War anomie is linked with a generational impact that intervenes in the relationship between changes in the logic of transition strategies and the decline in births. The decline in births is the response to background factors, precipitating events, and symptom-formation or structural factors. The author states that the second demographic transition does not represent a break with prior urban lifestyles and does not modify general trends continuing from the first demographic transition.^ieng

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PIP: The author first notes that in France, as in most other countries that have completed the demographic transition, fertility has stabilized at a level below that necessary to replace the population. A consequence of this is a continuing process of demographic aging, leading to increasing allocations of the nation's resources to meet the needs of the elderly at the expense of the young, which in turn leads to even lower levels of fertility. The author argues for policies to redistribute wealth toward families with children, pointing out that the longer the initiation of such policies is delayed, the more unpopular they are likely to prove politically. He concludes that unless such policies are adopted, the population will not only age, but will begin an inexorable process of decline in total size.^ieng

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PIP: The author first notes that, though the population of Germany has increased significantly in size since the Second World War, fertility has been below replacement levels for some time. Furthermore, this strong rate of growth has been accompanied by major variations from one generation to the next, although these trends have received very little attention from German scholars. It is noted that, since the rate of natural increase has been negative since 1972, this growth must have been caused exclusively by immigration. The seriousness of the demographic situation in the former East German states is noted. Current projections indicate a decline in total population size of about 13 million over the next 50 years. Policy options faced by the German authorities are discussed. This article was previously published in the April 15, 1995 issue of Chroniques Economiques.^ieng

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PIP: This article uses data from a 1990 survey on abortion which was carried out in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, and which involved 400 women. With particular reference to the implications for population policy, the author examines aspects of knowledge, attitude, and behavior concerning family planning. The results indicate that although most women were aware of the serious problems facing the Serb community with regard to the low level of fertility, and although three was perceived as the ideal number of children, only about half of the women with one child planned to have more children. Factors affecting the low use of effective contraception are also analyzed.^ieng

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PIP: Sri Lanka is now at the stage of fertility transition where it is approaching below replacement level fertility. The total fertility rate for 1988-93 was 2.3 children per woman. Fertility was low, even though only 66% of currently married women were practicing contraception. The low fertility despite a contraceptive use rate lower than the 71% needed for replacement level fertility may have been achieved in part due to reliance on induced abortion in large numbers. During 1960-90 Sri Lanka has experienced the highest rate of fertility decline compared with other South Asian countries. Demographic transition occurred according to the pattern of initial declines in the death rate since 1947. Births did not begin to decline until 1960 (from 37 per 1000 in 1960 to 20 per 1000 in 1970). Family planning efforts were expanded during 1968-77 and integrated into maternal and child health programs. The 1972-76 Five Year Plan recognized the importance of family planning in the context of low standards of living and malnutrition, which could decrease health standards and increase infant mortality. Around 1980 cash incentives were given for sterilization acceptors. The government was repeatedly aware of the link between available resources and the demands of an increasing population. The Ministry of Health targeted zero population growth by the year 2050 and a two child family average by the year 2000. Stabilization of population in 2050 at 25 million would be an increase from 18.6 million in 1993. One of the signs of permanent fertility decline was the large declines in fertility during 1975-87 in the older reproductive age groups. By 1987-93 large declines were apparent in older and younger age groups. Family limitation was begun at relatively early ages. The inference from fertility declines during the 1980s recorded in the Demographic and Health Surveys in 1987 and 1993 is that the total fertility rate for 1991-93 was 2.06, which is lower than replacement level fertility of 2.1.^ieng

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PIP: China's population policies should take into account that further population declines between 1992 and the year 2000 will result in reducing the proportion of young people and increasing by two times the number of elderly over the age of 65 years. The aged population which was 1.2 billion in 1994 is expected to increase to 12.9% of total population. The expected increases in the elderly would make China the only country in the world, beside Japan with an expected elderly population comprising 20% of total population by 2025, ever to have such a high proportion of aged. China must decide whether it is more important to reduce population growth or secure a favorable ratio of working age persons to elderly dependents. With a high proportion of elderly in a population, there would be a need for social support from children for the elderly and increased expenditures for pensions, public health services, social welfare, and social relief. Griffith Feeney and Yuan Jianhua of the Beijing Institute of Information and Control in 1994 examined data from a 1992 national survey and found that fertility declined from 2.04 children per woman in 1990 to 1.65 children per woman in 1991, which is replacement level fertility. The reliability of the survey results has been questioned by Chinese demographers because of the change in national birth planning policy to the responsibility system among local, regional, and national political and administrative heads for family planning use. The study researchers conclude that, even with underreporting of 10% to 20%, the survey results indicate attainment of Chinese replacement level fertility. If policy continues to press for fertility decline, there would be unprecedented number of elderly and a tremendous population imbalance. Demographically, this form of age structure imbalance has never been experienced historically. The 1992 State Family Planning Commission survey results were substantiated by surveys conducted between 1982 and 1990 as showing "very low, but generally declining levels of fertility." Both the international and the national community of scholars have recognized the high quality of these surveys.^ieng

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What is the likelihood that each of the 37 developing countries with populations of 15 million or more in 1990 will reach replacement fertility by the year 2015? These countries have a combined population of 3.9 billion, 91 percent of the population of all developing countries. For this article, a composite index was used as the basis for predicting future levels of total fertility. The index was constructed from socioeconomic variables (life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rates, percent adult literacy, ratio of children enrolled in primary or secondary school, percent of the labor force in nonagricultural occupations, gross national product per capita, and percent of the population living in urban areas), total fertility rates for the years 1985-90, total fertility rate decline from 1960-65 to 1985-90, family planning program effort scores in 1989, and the level of contraceptive prevalence in 1990. Eight countries are classified as certain to reach replacement fertility by 2015, and an additional thirteen probably will also. Five countries are classified as possibly reaching replacement fertility, and eleven as unlikely to do so.

PIP: What is the likelihood of 37 countries with population of 15 million or greater reaching replacement fertility by 2015? The 37 countries had in 1990 a combined population of 3.9 billion, 91% of total developing country population. Bernard Berelson in 1978 assessed the likelihood of reaching a crude birth rate (CBR) of 20 births per year per 1000 population by the year 2000 for 4 groups of countries: 1) The Certain: Taiwan, South Korea, and Chile; 2) The Probable: China, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Malaysia; 3) The Possible: India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Peru; and 4) The Unlikely: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iran, Zaire, Afghanistan, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya, and Nepal. Those countries which by 1994 have already or almost reached replacement level include: Taiwan, South Korea, China, Thailand, Chile, and Sri Lanka. What accounts for the miscalculation is the slow growth between 1965-85 in gross national product, the smaller decline in total fertility rate [TFR], the smaller decrease in infant mortality and life expectancy, insufficient increases in literacy, and larger increase in males in nonagricultural labor. Contraceptive prevalence has increased and family planning efforts have improved. World TFRs declined by 33% between the 1960s and 1980s. Socioeconomic improvements are needed worldwide. Likelihood projections were based on socioeconomic setting, total fertility rate, total fertility rate decline, contraceptive prevalence, program effort score, and composite index. The certain group now includes China, both Koreas, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. The probable group includes India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, and South Africa. The possible group includes Bangladesh, Myanmar, Algeria, Iran, and Kenya. The unlikely group is comprised of Afghanistan, Nepal, Pakistan, Iraq, Sudan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. When proximate determinants (marriage, contraceptive use, induced abortion, and breast feeding) are considered, the groups of countries change. TFR projections extrapolating from past trends compared to UN projections showed all the certain countries the same, 4 of the probable countries reaching a TFR of 2.3, and none of the possible or unlikely countries reaching replacement fertility.

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PIP: In the United States, the total fertility rate is about 1.9 births per woman, down from a peak of 3.2 a generation ago and below the replacement level of 2.1 children. The proportion of women who will never have children has risen from 8% a generation ago to approximately 18% in 1993. The increase in the proportion of women in the labor force, a proximate explanation of the recent decline in intended fertility, is expected to continue. The demographic consequence is declining population with an older age structure. A pronatalist policy to alleviate this outcome, through monetary transfers from taxpayers to potential parents, is not only unlikely to succeed, it is politically unfeasible. An alternative solution, immediately effective but politically unpalatable, would be a generous immigration policy. Even with replacement level fertility, the population is destined to become much older. This inevitable aging of the population should be countered by appropriate institutional transformations: 1) with lower fertility, a larger proportion of women will be available to participate in the labor force to generate taxes needed to support a larger number of pensioners; 2) the institutional practice of ascribing a dependent status to anyone above a particular age can be changed; 3) concerns that an older labor force will have an obsolete education (and fewer years of it) can be countered by changing access to education. Yet, the most serious question is not merely the net reproduction rate, but producing adequate numbers of new adult citizens with responsibility and technical training in the modern world. The fundamental process of socializing children may be jeopardized by replacing the full-time parent with the hired care-giver, the peer group, and the television set. The attenuation of the bonds between parent and child may devalue the worth of childbearing itself. These portentous consequences deserve consideration.^ieng

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