RESUMEN
Adaptive behaviours depend on dynamically updating internal representations of the world based on the ever-changing environmental contingencies. People with a substance use disorder (pSUD) show maladaptive behaviours with high persistence in drug-taking, despite severe negative consequences. We recently proposed a salience misattribution model for addiction (SMMA; Kalhan et al., 2021), arguing that pSUD have aberrations in their updating processes where drug cues are misattributed as strong predictors of positive outcomes, but weaker predictors of negative outcomes. We also argued that conversely, non-drug cues are misattributed as weak predictors of positive outcomes, but stronger predictors of negative outcomes. We tested these hypotheses using a multi-cue reversal learning task, with reversals in whether drug or non-drug cues are relevant in predicting the outcome (monetary win or loss). We show that people with a tobacco use disorder (pTUD), do form misaligned internal representations. We found that pTUD updated less towards learning the drug cue's relevance in predicting a loss. Further, when neither drug nor non-drug cue predicted a win, pTUD updated more towards the drug cue being relevant predictors of that win. Our Bayesian belief updating model revealed that pTUD had a low estimated likelihood of non-drug cues being predictors of wins, compared to drug cues, which drove the misaligned updating. Overall, several hypotheses of the SMMA were supported, but not all. Our results implicate that strengthening the non-drug cue association with positive outcomes may help restore the misaligned internal representation in pTUD, and offers a quantifiable, computational account of these updating processes.
Asunto(s)
Tabaquismo , Humanos , Señales (Psicología) , Teorema de Bayes , Aprendizaje , Adaptación PsicológicaRESUMEN
Bayesian inference suggests that perception is inferred from a weighted integration of prior contextual beliefs with current sensory evidence (likelihood) about the world around us. The perceived precision or uncertainty associated with prior and likelihood information is used to guide perceptual decision-making, such that more weight is placed on the source of information with greater precision. This provides a framework for understanding a spectrum of clinical transdiagnostic symptoms associated with aberrant perception, as well as individual differences in the general population. While behavioral paradigms are commonly used to characterize individual differences in perception as a stable characteristic, measurement reliability in these behavioral tasks is rarely assessed. To remedy this gap, we empirically evaluate the reliability of a perceptual decision-making task that quantifies individual differences in Bayesian belief updating in terms of the relative precision weighting afforded to prior and likelihood information (i.e., sensory weight). We analyzed data from participants (n = 37) who performed this task twice. We found that the precision afforded to prior and likelihood information showed high internal consistency and good test-retest reliability (ICC = 0.73, 95% CI [0.53, 0.85]) when averaged across participants, as well as at the individual level using hierarchical modeling. Our results provide support for the assumption that Bayesian belief updating operates as a stable characteristic in perceptual decision-making. We discuss the utility and applicability of reliable perceptual decision-making paradigms as a measure of individual differences in the general population, as well as a diagnostic tool in psychiatric research.
Asunto(s)
Teorema de Bayes , Toma de Decisiones , Humanos , Toma de Decisiones/fisiología , Femenino , Masculino , Adulto , Adulto Joven , Reproducibilidad de los Resultados , Percepción/fisiología , Individualidad , IncertidumbreRESUMEN
This paper asks whether integrating multimodal EEG and fMRI data offers a better characterisation of functional brain architectures than either modality alone. This evaluation rests upon a dynamic causal model that generates both EEG and fMRI data from the same neuronal dynamics. We introduce the use of Bayesian fusion to provide informative (empirical) neuronal priors - derived from dynamic causal modelling (DCM) of EEG data - for subsequent DCM of fMRI data. To illustrate this procedure, we generated synthetic EEG and fMRI timeseries for a mismatch negativity (or auditory oddball) paradigm, using biologically plausible model parameters (i.e., posterior expectations from a DCM of empirical, open access, EEG data). Using model inversion, we found that Bayesian fusion provided a substantial improvement in marginal likelihood or model evidence, indicating a more efficient estimation of model parameters, in relation to inverting fMRI data alone. We quantified the benefits of multimodal fusion with the information gain pertaining to neuronal and haemodynamic parameters - as measured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence between their prior and posterior densities. Remarkably, this analysis suggested that EEG data can improve estimates of haemodynamic parameters; thereby furnishing proof-of-principle that Bayesian fusion of EEG and fMRI is necessary to resolve conditional dependencies between neuronal and haemodynamic estimators. These results suggest that Bayesian fusion may offer a useful approach that exploits the complementary temporal (EEG) and spatial (fMRI) precision of different data modalities. We envisage the procedure could be applied to any multimodal dataset that can be explained by a DCM with a common neuronal parameterisation.
Asunto(s)
Encéfalo/diagnóstico por imagen , Encéfalo/fisiología , Electroencefalografía/métodos , Neuroimagen Funcional/métodos , Imagen por Resonancia Magnética/métodos , Modelos Teóricos , Imagen Multimodal/métodos , Acoplamiento Neurovascular/fisiología , Teorema de Bayes , Simulación por Computador , Electroencefalografía/normas , Neuroimagen Funcional/normas , Humanos , Imagen por Resonancia Magnética/normas , Imagen Multimodal/normas , Prueba de Estudio ConceptualRESUMEN
Received academic wisdom holds that human judgment is characterized by unrealistic optimism, the tendency to underestimate the likelihood of negative events and overestimate the likelihood of positive events. With recent questions being raised over the degree to which the majority of this research genuinely demonstrates optimism, attention to possible mechanisms generating such a bias becomes ever more important. New studies have now claimed that unrealistic optimism emerges as a result of biased belief updating with distinctive neural correlates in the brain. On a behavioral level, these studies suggest that, for negative events, desirable information is incorporated into personal risk estimates to a greater degree than undesirable information (resulting in a more optimistic outlook). However, using task analyses, simulations, and experiments we demonstrate that this pattern of results is a statistical artifact. In contrast with previous work, we examined participants' use of new information with reference to the normative, Bayesian standard. Simulations reveal the fundamental difficulties that would need to be overcome by any robust test of optimistic updating. No such test presently exists, so that the best one can presently do is perform analyses with a number of techniques, all of which have important weaknesses. Applying these analyses to five experiments shows no evidence of optimistic updating. These results clarify the difficulties involved in studying human 'bias' and cast additional doubt over the status of optimism as a fundamental characteristic of healthy cognition.
Asunto(s)
Juicio , Optimismo , Pesimismo , Adulto , Teorema de Bayes , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Modelos Psicológicos , Riesgo , Adulto JovenRESUMEN
Seizure activity in EEG recordings can persist for hours with seizure dynamics changing rapidly over time and space. To characterise the spatiotemporal evolution of seizure activity, large data sets often need to be analysed. Dynamic causal modelling (DCM) can be used to estimate the synaptic drivers of cortical dynamics during a seizure; however, the requisite (Bayesian) inversion procedure is computationally expensive. In this note, we describe a straightforward procedure, within the DCM framework, that provides efficient inversion of seizure activity measured with non-invasive and invasive physiological recordings; namely, EEG/ECoG. We describe the theoretical background behind a Bayesian belief updating scheme for DCM. The scheme is tested on simulated and empirical seizure activity (recorded both invasively and non-invasively) and compared with standard Bayesian inversion. We show that the Bayesian belief updating scheme provides similar estimates of time-varying synaptic parameters, compared to standard schemes, indicating no significant qualitative change in accuracy. The difference in variance explained was small (less than 5%). The updating method was substantially more efficient, taking approximately 5-10min compared to approximately 1-2h. Moreover, the setup of the model under the updating scheme allows for a clear specification of how neuronal variables fluctuate over separable timescales. This method now allows us to investigate the effect of fast (neuronal) activity on slow fluctuations in (synaptic) parameters, paving a way forward to understand how seizure activity is generated.