RESUMEN
The No Surprises Act (NSA) was created to help protect consumers with private insurance from surprise medical bills from out-of-network health care providers. The NSA requires the Department of Health and Human Services to prepare annual reports to Congress on the effects of the NSA's provisions. This article summarizes findings of an environmental scan on consolidation trends and impacts in health care markets. It describes the evidence on price, spending, quality of care, access, and wages in health care provider and insurance markets, as well as other market trends. The authors found strong evidence that hospital horizontal consolidation is associated with higher prices paid to providers and some evidence of the same for vertical consolidation of hospitals and physician practices. Health care spending is likely to increase in tandem with these price increases. Most studies find decreased or no change in quality of care associated with consolidation; however, findings differ by quality measures examined and setting. Horizontal consolidation of commercial insurers is associated with lower prices paid to providers as insurers gain market power in negotiations with providers, but the lower prices paid to providers do not appear to be passed onto consumers, who face higher premiums following insurer consolidation. There is insufficient evidence of the effects on patient access to care and health care wages. The few evaluations of state surprise billing laws have found heterogeneous effects on prices and have not directly examined effects on spending, quality, patient access, and wages.
RESUMEN
The adoption of health care technology is central to improving productivity in this sector. To provide new evidence on how technology affects health care markets, we focus on one area where adoption has been particularly rapid: surgery for prostate cancer. Within just eight years, robotic surgery grew to become the dominant intensive prostate cancer treatment method. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that adopting a robot drives prostate cancer patients to the hospital. To test whether this result reflects market expansion or business stealing, we also consider market-level effects of adoption and find effects that are significant but smaller, suggesting that adoption expands the market while also reallocating some patients across hospitals. Marginal patients are relatively young and healthy, inconsistent with the concern that adoption broadens the criteria for intervention to patients who would gain little from it. We conclude by discussing implications for the social value of technology diffusion in health care markets.
Asunto(s)
Neoplasias de la Próstata , Procedimientos Quirúrgicos Robotizados , Masculino , Humanos , Prostatectomía , Neoplasias de la Próstata/cirugía , HospitalesRESUMEN
BACKGROUND: There is widespread interest in programs aiming to reduce spending and improve health care quality among "superutilizers," patients with very high use of health care services. The "hotspotting" program created by the Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers (hereafter, the Coalition) has received national attention as a promising superutilizer intervention and has been expanded to cities around the country. In the months after hospital discharge, a team of nurses, social workers, and community health workers visits enrolled patients to coordinate outpatient care and link them with social services. METHODS: We randomly assigned 800 hospitalized patients with medically and socially complex conditions, all with at least one additional hospitalization in the preceding 6 months, to the Coalition's care-transition program or to usual care. The primary outcome was hospital readmission within 180 days after discharge. RESULTS: The 180-day readmission rate was 62.3% in the intervention group and 61.7% in the control group. The adjusted between-group difference was not significant (0.82 percentage points; 95% confidence interval, -5.97 to 7.61). In contrast, a comparison of the intervention-group admissions during the 6 months before and after enrollment misleadingly suggested a 38-percentage-point decline in admissions related to the intervention because the comparison did not account for the similar decline in the control group. CONCLUSIONS: In this randomized, controlled trial involving patients with very high use of health care services, readmission rates were not lower among patients randomly assigned to the Coalition's program than among those who received usual care. (Funded by the National Institute on Aging and others; ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT02090426; American Economic Association registry number, AEARCTR-0000329.).