RESUMEN
When faced with ambiguous visual input, observers may experience various perceptual interpretations of the same input. Indeed, such input can cause perception to unpredictably switch between interpretations over time. Theories of such so-called multistable perception broadly fall into two categories: top-down theories that emphasize dependence on higher-level cognitive factors such as knowledge, and bottom-up theories that suggest more vital involvement of aspects of lower-order information processing such as adaptation in the visual system. Most present-day accounts hold that both factors play a role, so that perceptual reversals arise inevitably due to factors like adaptation, yet can be delayed or hastened by higher-level cognitive influences. We revisited a body of work that shows the occurrence of perceptual reversals to depend dramatically on the observer's knowledge that the input is, indeed, ambiguous: without such knowledge many observers in that work did not experience any reversals, in apparent conflict with the idea that reversals are inevitable. We used an ambiguous animation that allowed subjects to report perceptual reversals without realizing the ambiguity. We found that subjects who were aware of the animation's ambiguity reported slightly more perceptual reversals than uninformed subjects, but that this between-group difference was small, and was overshadowed by inter-observer variability within each group. These findings suggest that knowledge of ambiguity can influence perception of ambiguous stimuli, but only mildly, in keeping with most present-day accounts. We discuss potential explanations for the discrepancy with the earlier work.
Asunto(s)
Percepción de Movimiento , Percepción Visual , Humanos , Conocimiento , Estimulación LuminosaRESUMEN
Competing rivalrous neural representations can be resolved at several levels of the visual system. Sustained percepts during interocular-switch rivalry (ISR), in which rivalrous left- and right-eye stimuli swap between eyes several times a second, often are attributed to competing binocularly driven neural representations of each rivalrous stimulus. An alternative view posits monocular neural competition together with a switch in eye dominance at the moment of each stimulus swap between eyes. Here, a range of experimental conditions was tested that would change the colors seen if mediated by eye dominance but not if by competition between binocularly driven responses. Observers viewed multiple chromatically rivalrous discs in various temporal and spatial patterns, and reported when all discs in view appeared the same color. Unlike typical ISR paradigms that swap the complete stimulus in each eye, some of the rivalrous discs were swapped at a different time, or faster frequency, than other discs. Monocular dominance of one eye at a time implies that all discs will rarely be seen as identical in color when some discs swap at a different frequency than others. On the other hand, competing binocularly driven neural responses are not affected by asynchronous swap timing among the individual discs. Results for every observer are in accord with competing responses at the level of binocularly driven, chromatically tuned neurons. Although an account based on eye dominance can be constructed using many small retinotopic zones that have independent timing for the moment of switching the dominant eye, competing binocularly driven responses are a more parsimonious explanation.