RESUMEN
Following a radiological or nuclear emergency, workers, responders and the public may be internally contaminated with radionuclides. Screening, monitoring and assessing any internal contamination and providing necessary medical treatment, especially when a large number of individuals are involved, is challenging. Experience gained and lessons learned from the management of previous incidents would help to identify gaps in knowledge and capabilities on preparedness for and response to radiation emergencies. In this paper, eight large-scale and five workplace radiological and nuclear incidents are reviewed cross 14 technical areas, under the broader topics of emergency preparedness, emergency response and recovery processes. The review findings suggest that 1) new strategies, algorithms and technologies are explored for rapid screening of large populations; 2) exposure assessment and dose estimation in emergency response and dose reconstruction in recovery process are supported by complementary sources of information, including 'citizen science'; 3) surge capacity for monitoring and dose assessment is coordinated through national and international laboratory networks; 4) evidence-based guidelines for medical management and follow-up of internal contamination are urgently needed; 5) mechanisms for international and regional access to medical countermeasures are investigated and implemented; 6) long-term health and medical follow up programs are designed and justified; and 7) capabilities and capacity developed for emergency response are sustained through adequate resource allocation, routine non-emergency use of technical skills in regular exercises, training, and continuous improvement.
Asunto(s)
Planificación en Desastres , Salud Pública , HumanosRESUMEN
Past radiological and nuclear accidents have demonstrated that monitoring a large number of children following a radiological and nuclear emergency can be challenging, in accommodating their needs as well as adapting monitoring protocols and applying age-specific biokinetics to account for various ages and body sizes. This paper presents the derived calibration factors for thyroid monitoring of children of all ages recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection using four selected detectors at given times following a short-term (acute) intake of I by inhalation. These calibration factors were derived by Monte Carlo simulations using the models of various detectors and pediatric voxel phantoms. A collection of lookup tables is presented in this paper which may be directly used as a quick reference by emergency response personnel or technical experts performing thyroid monitoring and assessment without doing time-consuming calculations.
Asunto(s)
Simulación por Computador , Método de Montecarlo , Fantasmas de Imagen , Traumatismos por Radiación/prevención & control , Monitoreo de Radiación/métodos , Protección Radiológica/métodos , Glándula Tiroides/efectos de la radiación , Adolescente , Calibración , Niño , Preescolar , Urgencias Médicas , Femenino , Humanos , Lactante , Masculino , Modelos Biológicos , Dosis de Radiación , Recuento Corporal TotalRESUMEN
Mr Litvinenko died on 23 November 2006 after having been poisoned with polonium-210 on 1 November. Measurements of the polonium-210 content of post-mortem tissue samples and samples of urine and blood showed the presence of large amounts of 210Po. Autoradiography of hair samples showed two regions of 210Po activity, providing evidence of an earlier poisoning attempt during October 2006, resulting in absorption to blood of about one-hundredth of that estimated for 1 November. Intake by ingestion on 1 November was estimated to be around 4 GBq, assuming 10% absorption to blood, and the resulting organ doses reached estimated values that were generally in a range from about 20 Gy to over 100 Gy. Comparison with estimates of protracted alpha particle doses required to cause irreversible organ damage supported the conclusion that death was the inevitable consequence of multiple organ failure, with destruction of the haemopoietic bone marrow, as well as damage to kidneys and liver, being important contributors. If the earlier poisoning during October 2006 had not been followed by a second major intake on 1 November, it is possible that the earlier intake of around 40 MBq, with absorption of 4 MBq to blood, might have caused irreversible kidney damage over a prolonged period of months or years, with doses of approaching 3 Gy.