RESUMEN
Exposure to parasites in conservation translocations increases the risks to recipient and translocated populations from disease, and therefore there has been interest in implementing biosecurity methods. Using four case examples we described how biosecurity was applied in practical translocation scenarios prior to and during a translocation and also post-release. We implemented biosecurity, including quarantine barriers, at specific points in the translocation pathway where hazards, identified by the disease risk analysis, had the potential to induce disease. Evidence that biosecurity protected translocated and recipient populations, included an absence of mortality associated with high-risk non-native parasites, a reduction in mortality associated with endemic parasites, the absence of high-risk pathogenic parasites, or associated diseases, at the destination; and the apparent absence of diseases in closely related species at the destination site. The biosecurity protocols did not alter the level or duration of translocated species confinement and therefore probably did not act as a stressor. There is a monetary cost involved in biosecurity but the epidemiological evidence suggests that conservation translocation managers should carefully consider its use. Breakdowns in quarantine have occurred in human hospitals despite considerable investment and training for health professionals, and we therefore judge that there is a need for training in the objectives and maintenance of quarantine barriers in conservation translocations. Biosecurity protocols for conservation translocations should be continually updated in response to findings from disease risk analysis and post-release disease surveillance and we recommend further studies to evaluate their effectiveness.
Asunto(s)
Anuros , Abejas , Conservación de los Recursos Naturales , Mariposas Nocturnas , Passeriformes , Animales , Humanos , Ranidae , Medición de RiesgoRESUMEN
There are risks from disease in undertaking wild animal reintroduction programmes. Methods of disease risk analysis have been advocated to assess and mitigate these risks, and post-release health and disease surveillance can be used to assess the effectiveness of the disease risk analysis, but results for a reintroduction programme have not to date been recorded. We carried out a disease risk analysis for the reintroduction of pool frogs (Pelophylax lessonae) to England, using information gained from the literature and from diagnostic testing of Swedish pool frogs and native amphibians. Ranavirus and Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis were considered high-risk disease threats for pool frogs at the destination site. Quarantine was used to manage risks from disease due to these two agents at the reintroduction site: the quarantine barrier surrounded the reintroduced pool frogs. Post-release health surveillance was carried out through regular health examinations of amphibians in the field at the reintroduction site and collection and examination of dead amphibians. No significant health or disease problems were detected, but the detection rate of dead amphibians was very low. Methods to detect a higher proportion of dead reintroduced animals and closely related species are required to better assess the effects of reintroduction on health and disease.