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A central question in understanding cognition and pathology-related cognitive changes is how we process time. However, time processing difficulties across several neurological and psychiatric conditions remain seldom investigated. The aim of this review is to develop a unifying taxonomy of time processing, and a neuropsychological perspective on temporal difficulties. Four main temporal judgments are discussed: duration processing, simultaneity and synchrony, passage of time, and mental time travel. We present an integrated theoretical framework of timing difficulties across psychiatric and neurological conditions based on selected patient populations. This framework provides new mechanistic insights on both (a) the processes involved in each temporal judgement, and (b) temporal difficulties across pathologies. By identifying underlying transdiagnostic time-processing mechanisms, this framework opens fruitful avenues for future research.

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The economic conceptualization of Freudian metapsychology, based on an energetics model of the psyche's workings, offers remarkable commonalities with some recent discoveries in neuroscience, notably in the field of neuroenergetics. The pattern of cerebral activity at resting state and the identification of a default mode network (DMN), a network of areas whose activity is detectable at baseline conditions by neuroimaging techniques, offers a promising field of research in the dialogue between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. In this article we study one significant clinical application of this interdisciplinary dialogue by looking at the role of the DMN in the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Anomalies in the functioning of the DMN have been observed in schizophrenia. Studies have evidenced the existence of hyperactivity in this network in schizophrenia patients, particularly among those for whom a positive symptomatology is dominant. These data are particularly interesting when considered from the perspective of the psychoanalytic understanding of the positive symptoms of psychosis, most notably the Freudian hypothesis of delusions as an "attempt at recovery." Combining the data from research in neuroimaging of schizophrenia patients with the Freudian hypothesis, we propose considering the hyperactivity of the DMN as a consequence of a process of massive reassociation of traces occurring in schizophrenia. This is a process that may constitute an attempt at minimizing the excess of free energy present in psychosis. Modern models of active inference and the free energy principle (FEP) may shed some light on these processes.

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Through research into the molecular and cellular mechanisms that occur during critical periods, recent experimental neurobiological data have brought to light the importance of early childhood. These have demonstrated that childhood and early environmental stimuli play a part not only in our subjective construction, but also in brain development; thus, confirming Freud's intuition regarding the central role of childhood and early experiences of the environment in our psychological development and our subjective outcomes. "Critical periods" of cerebral development represent temporal windows that mark favorable, but also circumscribed, moments in developmental cerebral plasticity. They also vary between different cortical areas. There are, therefore, strictly defined temporal periods for learning language, music, etc., after which this learning becomes more difficult, or even impossible, to acquire. Now, research into these critical periods can be seen as having a significant part to play in the interdisciplinary dialog between psychoanalysis and neurosciences with regard to the role of early experiences in the etiology of some psychopathological conditions. Research into the cellular and molecular mechanisms controlling the onset and end of these critical periods, notably controlled by the maturation of parvalbumin-expressing basket cells, have brought to light the presence of anomalies in the maturation of these neurons in patients with schizophrenia. Starting from these findings we propose revisiting the psychoanalytic theories on the etiology of psychosis from an interdisciplinary perspective. Our study works from the observation, common to both psychoanalysis and neurosciences, that experience leaves a trace; be it a "psychic" or a "synaptic" trace. Thus, we develop a hypothesis for an "absence of trace" in psychosis; reexamining psychosis through the prism of the biological theory of critical periods in plasticity.

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The existence of disturbances in the perception of somatic states and in the representation of the body with the presence of cœnesthetic hallucinations, of delusional hypochondriac ideas or of dysmorphophobias is a recognized fact in the psychopathology of schizophrenia. Freudian psychoanalytic theory had accorded a privileged place to the alteration of the perception of the body in schizophrenia. Freud had attributed to these phenomena a primary and prodromal role in the psychopathology of psychosis. We propose to look at this theory in a new way, starting from the perspective of recent studies about the role of the insula in the perception and representation of somatic states, since this structure has been identified as underpinning the sense of interoception. The data in the neurobiological literature about abnormalities in the insular cortex in schizophrenia has shown that insula dysfunction could constitute one of the biological substrates of disorders of body perception in schizophrenia, and could be a source of the alteration of the sense of self that is characteristic of this psychiatric pathology. Moreover, this alteration could thus be involved in the positive symptomatology of schizophrenia.

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This article aims to situate the Freudian concept of delusion in psychosis as an 'attempt at recovery', within the context of the classical psychiatric theories prevalent in the nineteenth century. Freud's theoretical thinking on the psychopathology of psychosis presents elements of continuity with, and divergence from, the psychiatric theories of his time. We will thus demonstrate the singularity of Freud's own theory. We will discuss the possible influence that the theory proposed by Griesinger, with its description of a temporal evolution in the psychotic process, may have had on Freud's thinking, and consider the theory of 'deductive logic' prevalent in nineteenth-century French psychiatry. Finally, we will discuss the vehement critique Freud made of both these theories.

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In the Freudian theory of the psychical apparatus, the introduction from the 1920s onward of the second drive dualism appears as a major turning point. The idea of a "death drive," first expressed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920), is generally considered to be a new concept, one that represents a break with Freud's previous thinking. It has often surprised the scholars because it seemed, at first sight, difficult to reconcile with the idea of the singularity of living organisms within which the psychical functions form an integral part. Our research aims to demonstrate that the theory of the death drive does not represent a complete change in direction for Freud. It is present, in essence, in his earliest work, to the extent that the "principle of inertia" described in 1895 in A Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895) can be seen as a precursor to the death drive. Based on a reading of Freud's early formulations of his ideas, we aim to bring to light how certain aporias that seem inherent to the concept of the death drive can be overcome if we consider them in the context of an epistemological model that draws on the paradigms of physics which were conveyed by the Helmholtz School. Namely, we can consider the idea of death drive in reference to the principle of entropy and the laws of thermodynamics.

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This article aims to clarify the epistemological foundations of the Freudian energetics model, starting with a historical review of the 19th century scientific context in which Freud's research lay down its roots. Beyond the physiological and anatomical references of Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a), the physiology Freud makes reference to is in reality primarily anchored in an epistemological model derived from physics. Whilst across the Rhine, the autonomy of physiology in relation to physics was far from being accomplished, as a counterpoint, in France, the revolution in physiology driven by Claude Bernard established itself autonomously from physics,. In contrast, Freud's scientific landscape is entirely dominated by the physics elevated to the rank of an ideal science. The influence of Helmholtz, who is both a medical doctor and a physicist, has a determining influence on Freud's training. The discoveries in physics at that time, in particular the formulation of the principle of 'conservation of force' - first principle of thermodynamics - will constitute the points of reference upon which Freud will elaborate his energetics model, then subsequently, the idea of economy in his metapsychology. In this way we can trace both the historic and epistemological path that led Freud from a concept based on physics, and more specifically thermodynamic energy, to an idea of nervous energy that constitutes the basis of the concept of "quantity" as it is stated as 'first fundamental idea' in Project for a Scientific Psychology (Freud, 1895a). This notion will subsequently evolve, and lead Freud to the introduction of the concept of 'psychical energy,' this time in a purely metapsychological sense.