RESUMEN
Contact tracing is an important tool for allowing countries to ease lock-down policies introduced to combat SARS-CoV-2. For contact tracing to be effective, those with symptoms must self-report themselves while their contacts must self-isolate when asked. However, policies such as legal enforcement of self-isolation can create trade-offs by dissuading individuals from self-reporting. We use an existing branching process model to examine which aspects of contact tracing adherence should be prioritised. We consider an inverse relationship between self-isolation adherence and self-reporting engagement, assuming that increasingly strict self-isolation policies will result in fewer individuals self-reporting to the programme. We find that policies that increase the average duration of self-isolation, or that increase the probability that people self-isolate at all, at the expense of reduced self-reporting rate, will not decrease the risk of a large outbreak and may increase the risk, depending on the strength of the trade-off. These results suggest that policies to increase self-isolation adherence should be implemented carefully. Policies that increase self-isolation adherence at the cost of self-reporting rates should be avoided.
RESUMEN
The dynamics of immunity are crucial to understanding the long-term patterns of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Several cases of reinfection with SARS-CoV-2 have been documented 48-142 days after the initial infection and immunity to seasonal circulating coronaviruses is estimated to be shorter than one year. Using an age-structured, deterministic model, we explore potential immunity dynamics using contact data from the UK population. In the scenario where immunity to SARS-CoV-2 lasts an average of three months for non-hospitalised individuals, a year for hospitalised individuals, and the effective reproduction number after lockdown ends is 1.2 (our worst case scenario), we find that the secondary peak occurs in winter 2020 with a daily maximum of 387,000 infectious individuals and 125,000 daily new cases; three-fold greater than in a scenario with permanent immunity. Our models suggests that longitudinal serological surveys to determine if immunity in the population is waning will be most informative when sampling takes place from the end of the lockdown in June until autumn 2020. After this period, the proportion of the population with antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 is expected to increase due to the secondary wave. Overall, our analysis presents considerations for policy makers on the longer term dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 in the UK and suggests that strategies designed to achieve herd immunity may lead to repeated waves of infection as immunity to reinfection is not permanent.
RESUMEN
As the COVID-19 pandemic continues to threaten various regions around the world, obtaining accurate and reliable COVID-19 data is crucial for governments and local communities aiming at rigorously assessing the extent and magnitude of the virus spread and deploying efficient interventions. Using data reported between January and February 2020 in China, we compared counts of COVID-19 from near-real time spatially disaggregated data (city-level) with fine-spatial scale predictions from a Bayesian downscaling regression model applied to a reference province-level dataset. The results highlight discrepancies in the counts of coronavirus-infected cases at district level and identify districts that may require further investigation.
RESUMEN
Emerging evidence suggests that contact tracing has had limited success in the UK in reducing the R number across the COVID-19 pandemic. We investigate potential pitfalls and areas for improvement by extending an existing branching process contact tracing model, adding diagnostic testing and refining parameter estimates. Our results demonstrate that reporting and adherence are the most important predictors of programme impact but tracing coverage and speed plus diagnostic sensitivity also play an important role. We conclude that well-implemented contact tracing could bring small but potentially important benefits to controlling and preventing outbreaks, providing up to a 15% reduction in R, and reaffirm that contact tracing is not currently appropriate as the sole control measure.