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The paper investigates the psychological factors associated with the unprecedented assistance that Poles have offered refugees from Ukraine since the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Building on social identity theory, and examining the current social context in Poland, we focus on three social identity dimensions, i.e., a feeling of closeness towards refugees from Ukraine, anticipatory fears (of a Russian invasion), and a community norm of helping. These three dimensions predict collective helping resulting from a sense of a common fate and a feeling of togetherness with Ukrainians. We tested this hypothesis in a study (N = 1066) conducted between 11 and 17 March 2022. Participants were asked about their helping activities during the previous week; they also responded to questions on different measures of social identity processes. The results support our expectations, revealing that closeness, anticipatory fears, and social norms are associated with two forms of help: benevolent and activist. The results of the study contribute to the discussion on social identity processes underlying offers of help to people fleeing from war-zones. Thus, they enhance our understanding of the role of citizens in terms of their contribution to helping refugees, and can be used to improve responses to other humanitarian crises.

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The paper investigates the role of political ideology and an open-minded thinking style (i.e., the tendency to reason based on rules of inference rather than intuitive heuristics) with respect to the accuracy of factual beliefs. In line with political asymmetry theory, we assumed that right-wing beliefs, in contrast to left-wing beliefs, are associated with more inaccurate factual beliefs. We also expected that the open-minded thinking style acts as a buffer against inaccurate factual beliefs among people with right-wing (but not left-wing) political affinities. To test these hypotheses, we conducted three studies (total N = 1120) in which participants holding right- and left-wing beliefs, and displaying differing degrees of the open-minded thinking style (as measured by the Active Open-minded Thinking Style questionnaire), assessed policy-relevant facts congenial to left- as well as right-wing beliefs. The results of the study confirm the hypotheses proposed. The paper's findings contribute to the ongoing discussion around the ideological underpinnings of (un)biased cognition and the controversies concerning the role of cognitive factors in ideological polarization. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09789-z.

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Research shows that people prefer self-consistent over self-discrepant feedback-the self-verification effect. It is not clear, however, whether the effect stems from striving for self-verification or from the preference for subjectively accurate information. We argue that people prefer self-verifying feedback because they find it to be more accurate than self-discrepant feedback. We thus experimentally manipulated feedback credibility by providing information on its source: a student (control condition) or an experienced psychologist (experimental condition). In line with our expectations, the results of two preregistered studies with 342 adults showed that people preferred self-verifying feedback only in the control condition. In the experimental condition, the effect disappeared (or reversed, in Study 1). Study 2 showed that individual differences in credibility (epistemic authority) ascribed to the self and to psychologists matter as well. These findings suggest that feedback credibility, rather than the desire for self-verification, often drives the self-verification effect.

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One might assume that the desire to help (here described as Want) is the essential driver of helping declarations and/or behaviors. However, even if desire to help (Want) is low, intention to help may still occur if the expectancy regarding the perceived effectiveness of helping is high. We tested these predictions in a set of three experimental studies. In all three, we measured the desire to help (Want) and the Expectancy that the aid would be impactful for the victim; in addition, we manipulated Expectancy in Study 3. In Studies 1 and 3, we measured the participants' declaration to help while in Study 2, their helping behavior was examined. In all three studies, we used variations of the same story about a victim. The results supported our hypothesis. Thus, the studies help to tease apart the determinants of helping under conditions of lowered desire to do so, an issue of great importance in public policymaking.

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Need for cognitive closure (NFC), that is, individual's aversion toward uncertainty and the desire to reduce it quickly usually manifests in effort minimizing cognitive strategies. Recent studies, however, demonstrated that it is also linked with laborious processing when the task itself induces uncertainty. Although this pattern was observed when testing behaviors and cardiovascular activity, it has never been tested on a neurocognitive level. To fill this gap, we investigate whether NFC moderates the impact of task uncertainty on engagement-related P3b component of brain activity. In the experiment, we recorded the electroencephalographic activity of the brain while participants performed a sampling task which provides uncertainty manipulation within participants. We also manipulated NFC between participants. As predicted, we did not find any differences between high and low NFC participants in the P3b component at lower levels of uncertainty. However, at the highest level of uncertainty, the P3b component decreases significantly among low but not high NFC participants. That is because gaining certainty and achieving closure is not a critical epistemic goal for low NFC and thus, exerting extra effort to gain certainty is not justified.

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Examining the relationship between brain activity and religious fundamentalism, this study explores whether fundamentalist religious beliefs increase responses to error-related words among participants intolerant to uncertainty (i.e., high in the need for closure) in comparison to those who have a high degree of toleration for uncertainty (i.e., those who are low in the need for closure). We examine a negative-going event-related brain potentials occurring 400 ms after stimulus onset (the N400) due to its well-understood association with the reactions to emotional conflict. Religious fundamentalism and tolerance of uncertainty were measured on self-report measures, and electroencephalographic neural reactivity was recorded as participants were performing an emotional Stroop task. In this task, participants read neutral words and words related to uncertainty, errors, and pondering, while being asked to name the color of the ink with which the word is written. The results confirm that among people who are intolerant of uncertainty (i.e., those high in the need for closure), religious fundamentalism is associated with an increased N400 on error-related words compared with people who tolerate uncertainty well (i.e., those low in the need for closure).

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We claim that religious orthodoxy is related to prejudice toward groups that violate important values, i.e., atheists. Moreover, we suggest that expressing prejudice may efficiently reduce the threat posed by this particular group among people who hold high levels, but not low levels, of orthodox belief. We tested these assumptions in an experimental study in which, after being exposed to atheistic worldviews (value-threat manipulation), high and low orthodox participants were allowed (experimental condition) or not (control condition) to express prejudice toward atheists. Threat was operationalized by cardiovascular reactivity, i.e., heart rate (HR); the higher the HR index, the higher the threat. The results found that people who hold high (vs. low) levels of orthodox belief responded with increased HR after the threat manipulation. However, we observed decreased HR after the expression of prejudice toward atheists among highly orthodox participants compared to the control condition. We did not find this effect among people holding low levels of orthodox belief. Thus, we conclude that expressing prejudice toward this particular group may be an efficient strategy to cope with the threat posed by this group for highly orthodox people. The results are discussed in light of previous findings on religious beliefs and the self-regulatory function of prejudice.

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Need for closure (NFC), defined as a desire for a quick and unambiguous answer to a question and an aversion to uncertainty, usually leads to a more structured, persistent, and rigid cognitive style. We suggested that this cognitive characteristic could be related to differences in a simple sensory gating control mechanism as reflected in event-related potentials (N1 component). We expected that the higher an individual's NFC, the more attention he/she would allocate to the selected stimuli or the feature of the stimuli, which is manifested in an increased N1 component. We tested this assumption in two experiments where NFC was measured by a scale and event-related potentials were recorded during the Stroop task and the Visual Distractor task. In line with the hypotheses, we found that NFC was associated with amplified processing of stimuli at an early sensory stage, which was evidenced in an increased N1 component. We suggested that this early sensory gating mechanism protects high NFC individuals against anxiety-producing uncertainty.

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