RESUMEN
We use data from Social Security administrative records to examine the lifetime patterns of initial entitlement to retired-worker and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits across cohorts born in different years. Breaking out age-at-entitlement patterns for different birth-year cohorts reveals close adherence in entitlement ages to changes in program rules, such as increasing the full retirement age. The proportion of a cohort that becomes newly entitled to DI benefits rises noticeably during recessions and at ages 50 and 55, and cumulative entitlement rate patterns show that more recent cohorts rely increasingly on DI benefits in their late 30s and 40s.
Asunto(s)
Seguro por Discapacidad/estadística & datos numéricos , Seguridad Social/estadística & datos numéricos , Distribución por Edad , Anciano , Estudios de Cohortes , Interpretación Estadística de Datos , Femenino , Humanos , Seguro por Discapacidad/tendencias , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Jubilación/estadística & datos numéricos , Jubilación/tendencias , Seguridad Social/tendencias , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
Fewer Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries have their earnings suspended or terminated because of work than those who are actually working, partly because beneficiaries "park" earnings at a level below substantial gainful activity (SGA) to retain benefits. We assess the extent of parking by exploiting the 1999 change in the SGA earnings level from $500 to $700 monthly for nonblind beneficiaries using a difference-indifference analysis that compares two annual cohorts of beneficiaries who completed their trial work period, one that was affected by the SGA change and one that was not. Our impact estimates, along with results from other sources, suggest that from 0.2 to 0.4 percent of all DI beneficiaries were parked below the SGA level in the typical month from 2002 through 2006. The SGA change did not yield any difference in mean earnings, although it did result in a small reduction in months spent off of the rolls because of work.
Asunto(s)
Personas con Discapacidad/estadística & datos numéricos , Empleo/economía , Renta/estadística & datos numéricos , Seguro por Discapacidad/economía , Seguridad Social/economía , Adulto , Empleo/estadística & datos numéricos , Femenino , Humanos , Renta/tendencias , Seguro por Discapacidad/estadística & datos numéricos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Salarios y Beneficios/estadística & datos numéricos , Seguridad Social/estadística & datos numéricos , Seguridad Social/tendencias , Estados UnidosRESUMEN
This article describes responses to removing the retirement earnings test in 2000 for persons at the full retirement age or older. We examine annual earnings and retirement benefit claims from Social Security administrative data that cover the 4 years before and after the change. Three findings emerge from the study. First, the effect on earnings of removing the earnings test is uneven across people with different earnings levels. We find little effect on earnings at lower levels, but the effect on earnings in the mid to upper levels (50th to 80th percentiles) is large and significant. Such a finding indicates that the removal most affects people with earnings levels above the earnings test threshold. The largest increases in earnings are found at the 70th percentile for persons who have attained ages 65-69 and at the 60th percentile for those turning 65. Second, there is no clear evidence of the effect of the test's removal on the overall rate of labor force participation. A small rise in work participation among individuals aged 65-69 may be at least partially attributable to the trend already under way. Increases in work participation that do occur are mostly attributable to retaining older workers rather than inducing older workers back into the workforce. The effect appears to increase over time, suggesting that the removal has long-lasting effects on work participation. Third, the removal of the earnings test accelerated applications for benefits by 2 to 5 percentage points among individuals aged 65-69 and by 3 to 7 percentage points among those reaching age 65.
Asunto(s)
Determinación de la Elegibilidad , Renta/estadística & datos numéricos , Pensiones/estadística & datos numéricos , Jubilación/economía , Seguridad Social/economía , Análisis Actuarial , Anciano , Anciano de 80 o más Años , Femenino , Humanos , Renta/tendencias , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Modelos Econométricos , Proyectos Piloto , Estados Unidos , United States Social Security AdministrationRESUMEN
Under the retirement earnings test, Social Security benefits are reduced if earnings exceed specified amounts, although the benefit reduction is partly offset by future benefit increases. By imposing a tax on the earnings of beneficiaries, the earnings test provided a disincentive for them to supplement retirement income by working. The Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 eliminated the earnings test for Social Security beneficiaries who have reached the full retirement age. This article presents the first study of labor force activity (earnings and employment) among individuals aged 65-69 before and immediately after this sudden rule change. Drawing on Social Security administrative data, the author examines three widely expected reactions: increased return to work, increased hours worked, and accelerated applications for old-age benefits. The analysis finds that removing the retirement earnings test: Encouraged some workers to increase their earnings. The increases in earnings are large and significant among higher earners but are not statistically significant among lower earners. Had little effect on employment. Removing the earnings test appears to have had no immediate, significant effect on the employment rate of older workers. Employment of older people may be affected in the longer run, however. Slightly increased the pace of applications for benefits. Applications rose about 2 percent in the 65-69 age group in 2000. The overall acceleration will probably be small, however, because most individuals in this age group apply for benefits before reaching the full retirement age. Although the current analysis captures the effects of retaining older workers in the labor force, these initial results may not capture all the effects of eliminating the retirement earnings test, however, for two reasons. First, the analysis covers only a single year--the year the earnings test was eliminated. Since eliminating the earnings test may have had little effect on people who had already retired, its full effect may not be apparent for several years. Second, the analysis applies only to workers aged 65-69. Eliminating the earnings test for people above the full retirement age may also encourage younger workers to delay retirement and therefore increase their labor supply. Further analysis will therefore be required to determine the longer-run impact of eliminating the retirement earnings test.