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1.
IEEE Trans Neural Netw Learn Syst ; 28(11): 2466-2478, 2017 11.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-27514067

RESUMEN

In spam and malware detection, attackers exploit randomization to obfuscate malicious data and increase their chances of evading detection at test time, e.g., malware code is typically obfuscated using random strings or byte sequences to hide known exploits. Interestingly, randomization has also been proposed to improve security of learning algorithms against evasion attacks, as it results in hiding information about the classifier to the attacker. Recent work has proposed game-theoretical formulations to learn secure classifiers, by simulating different evasion attacks and modifying the classification function accordingly. However, both the classification function and the simulated data manipulations have been modeled in a deterministic manner, without accounting for any form of randomization. In this paper, we overcome this limitation by proposing a randomized prediction game, namely, a noncooperative game-theoretic formulation in which the classifier and the attacker make randomized strategy selections according to some probability distribution defined over the respective strategy set. We show that our approach allows one to improve the tradeoff between attack detection and false alarms with respect to the state-of-the-art secure classifiers, even against attacks that are different from those hypothesized during design, on application examples including handwritten digit recognition, spam, and malware detection.In spam and malware detection, attackers exploit randomization to obfuscate malicious data and increase their chances of evading detection at test time, e.g., malware code is typically obfuscated using random strings or byte sequences to hide known exploits. Interestingly, randomization has also been proposed to improve security of learning algorithms against evasion attacks, as it results in hiding information about the classifier to the attacker. Recent work has proposed game-theoretical formulations to learn secure classifiers, by simulating different evasion attacks and modifying the classification function accordingly. However, both the classification function and the simulated data manipulations have been modeled in a deterministic manner, without accounting for any form of randomization. In this paper, we overcome this limitation by proposing a randomized prediction game, namely, a noncooperative game-theoretic formulation in which the classifier and the attacker make randomized strategy selections according to some probability distribution defined over the respective strategy set. We show that our approach allows one to improve the tradeoff between attack detection and false alarms with respect to the state-of-the-art secure classifiers, even against attacks that are different from those hypothesized during design, on application examples including handwritten digit recognition, spam, and malware detection.

2.
IEEE Trans Pattern Anal Mach Intell ; 35(6): 1312-27, 2013 Jun.
Artículo en Inglés | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-23599050

RESUMEN

Hypergraph clustering refers to the process of extracting maximally coherent groups from a set of objects using high-order (rather than pairwise) similarities. Traditional approaches to this problem are based on the idea of partitioning the input data into a predetermined number of classes, thereby obtaining the clusters as a by-product of the partitioning process. In this paper, we offer a radically different view of the problem. In contrast to the classical approach, we attempt to provide a meaningful formalization of the very notion of a cluster and we show that game theory offers an attractive and unexplored perspective that serves our purpose well. To this end, we formulate the hypergraph clustering problem in terms of a noncooperative multiplayer "clustering game," and show that a natural notion of a cluster turns out to be equivalent to a classical (evolutionary) game-theoretic equilibrium concept. We prove that the problem of finding the equilibria of our clustering game is equivalent to locally optimizing a polynomial function over the standard simplex, and we provide a discrete-time high-order replicator dynamics to perform this optimization, based on the Baum-Eagon inequality. Experiments over synthetic as well as real-world data are presented which show the superiority of our approach over the state of the art.


Asunto(s)
Algoritmos , Análisis por Conglomerados , Evolución Biológica , Teoría del Juego , Humanos
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