RESUMEN
In Property Rights: A Re-Examination, James Penner returns to and develops a project that he has been engaged in for nearly three decades: to replace the influential 'bundle of rights' picture of property, which he regards as irredeemably flawed, with an alternative account-one that regards property as a unified entitlement. In this review article, I expound and analyse the central features of Penner's theory. I defend the view that, in its original iteration, Penner's account was trebly monistic: it regarded property as a single entitlement justified by a single human interest and protected by a single duty of non-interference. I go on to critically examine one of Penner's central ideas-that to understand property it is necessary to understand its justification. Along the way, I trace how Penner's account has evolved and explain how certain alterations have put some problems to bed while generating others.
RESUMEN
This paper is concerned with the English Court of Appeal's decision in Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust that six men had, for the purposes of their claims against the trust, ownership of the sperm they had produced. The case has been discussed by many commentators and most, if not all, of those who have discussed the case have claimed or assumed that the court held that the claimants had property rights in the sperm they had produced. In this paper, I advance an interpretation of the case that does not regard the court as deciding that the men had property rights (in the narrow sense of that term) in the sperm they had produced. On this view, the 'ownership' that the Court of Appeal purported to vest in each of the men was not a right in rem, a right 'binding the world'. If this is so, it is perhaps unsurprising that some scholars, evaluating the success of the court's reasoning as a justification for vesting the claimants with property rights, have found it to be unsatisfactory.