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Walker and Gopnik (2017) suggest they have solved a longstanding problem in comparative and developmental psychology: How to provide an unambiguous measure of analogical reasoning in nonverbal subjects. We argue that this test, much like many others that purport to measure analogical reasoning in nonverbal subjects, does not distinguish between the two competing accounts of successful performance: the use of perceptual variance among stimuli to support higher-order concepts like "same" and "different" versus use of perceptual variance alone.

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During the past decade, considerable effort has been devoted to understanding whether chimpanzees reason about unobservable variables as explanations for observable events. With respect to physical causality, these investigations have explored chimpanzees' understanding of gravity, force, mass, shape, and so on. With respect to social causality, this research has focused on the question of whether they reason about mental states such as emotions, desires, and beliefs. In the studies reported here, we explored whether the chimpanzee's natural motivation for object exploration is modulated by a cognitive system that seeks explanations for unexpected events. We confronted both chimpanzees and young children with simple tasks which occasionally could not be made to work. We coded their reactions to determine if they appeared to be searching for an apparent cause (or explanation) of the task failure. The results of these preliminary studies point to both similarities and differences in how young children and chimpanzees react to such circumstances.

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A recent meta-analysis performed by Wellman, Cross, and Watson clears the air surrounding young children's performance on tests of false belief by showing that it is highly likely that there is some type of conceptual development between 3 and 5 years of age that supports improved task performance. The data concerning the evolutionary origin of these abilities, however, is considerably less clear. Nonetheless, there is some reason to suspect that theory of mind is unique to our species, and that its original function was to provide a more abstract level of describing ancient behavioral patterns (such as deception, reconciliation, and gaze following)-behaviors that humans share in common with many other species. Thus, the initial selective advantage of theory of mind may have been because it increased the flexibility of already-existing behaviors, not because it generated scores of radically new ones.

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The results of 6 studies (involving 304 children) suggested that 4- and 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, understand that very recent past events determine the present. In Studies 1-3, 3- and 4-year-old children were introduced to 2 empty hiding locations. With children's backs to these locations, a camera recorded an experimenter secretly hiding a puppet in one of them. Children then viewed the videotape of what had just happened, along with another tape that depicted identical events except with a different child and with the puppet hidden in the other location. Only 4-year-olds were subsequently able to locate the puppet, even though 3-year-olds remembered the contents of the tapes and understood the equivalence between the video events and the real world. In Study 4, similar effects were obtained when a verbal analog of the test was presented to 3-5-year-olds. Studies 5 and 6 showed that when children observed 2 events in which they had just participated, only 5-year-olds understood that the most recent events were relevant.

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Humans, chimpanzees, capuchins and aye-ayes all display an unusually high degree of encephalization and diverse omnivorous extractive foraging. It has been suggested that the high degree of encephalization in aye-ayes may be the result of their diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging behaviors. In combination with certain forms of tool use, omnivorous extractive foraging has been hypothesized to be linked to higher levels of sensorimotor intelligence (stages 5 or 6). Although free-ranging aye-ayes have not been observed to use tools directly in the context of their extractive foraging activities, they have recently been reported to use lianas as tools in a manner that independently suggests that they may possess stage 5 or 6 sensorimotor intelligence. Although other primate species which display diverse, omnivorous extractive foraging have been tested for sensorimotor intelligence, aye-ayes have not. We report a test of captive aye-ayes' comprehension of tool use in a situation designed to simulate natural conditions. The results support the view that aye-ayes do not achieve stage 6 comprehension of tool use, but rather may use trial-and-error learning to develop tool-use behaviors. Other theories for aye-aye encephalization are considered.

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Eighty-eight young 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds were scheduled for 2 testing sessions. On Visit 1, the children were videotaped playing a game while an experimenter covertly placed a large sticker on their head and covertly removed it after the game. One week later, the children were videotaped playing a different game. A sticker was again covertly placed on their heads. Half the children in each age group then observed the video from the previous week, whereas the other half observed the tape from 3 min earlier. Less than half of the 3-year-olds in both conditions reached up for the sticker. In contrast, the majority of 4- and 5-year-olds in the briefly delayed condition reached for the sticker, but few in the extremely delayed condition did so. By 4 years of age, children may have developed a causal understanding of the self's endurance through time.

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Chimpanzees were tested for their ability to discriminate between accidental/inadvertent and intentional actions with equivalent adverse consequences. Subjects were first trained to `point' to human trainers in order to receive food rewards. In Experiment 1, six 5-year-old subjects were alternately presented with two unfamiliar human actors. In condition 1, each actor either started to hand a cup of juice to the trainer but then pulled it back and intentionally poured it onto the floor, or accidentally spilled it while handing it to the trainer. In condition 2, the actors either accidentally spilled it as above, or aggressively threw the juice onto the floor. The subjects were then presented with both actors and were allowed to choose between them. In Experiment 2, seven 6-7-year-old chimpanzees were confronted with unfamiliar actors who either (a) intentionally withheld and consumed food intended for the subjects, (b) attempted to hand the intended food to the subjects but were victimized by a third party who consumed the food, or (c) always succeeded in delivering the food to the subjects. In general, the subjects showed little evidence of using the accidental/inadvertent versus intentional distinction in their choices between the actors, although they did display some evidence of favoring the actor involved in the most passive role in both conditions in Experiment 1.

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Cytomegalovirus (CMV) infection is ubiquitous and results in a wide spectrum of clinical manifestations ranging from asymptomatic infection to severe life threatening disease. Infection in normal children and adults usually causes no symptoms but in the immunocompromised host, CMV may result in severe opportunistic infections with high morbidity and mortality. Historically, virus detection was dependent on culture of the virus or on a centrifugation culture system referred to as a shell vial assay. The shell vial assay frequently lacked sensitivity and was unable to detect infection in its early phase. Also, as with culture assays, the results were affected by antiviral therapy. The CMV antigenemia assay was developed to provide more rapid results and has gained wide usage. This assay is limited to detection of the virus in white blood cells and is more sensitive than culture or the shell vial assay. Application of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to these problems has resulted in the development of assays for CMV which are more sensitive than previously available methods. This method employs liquid hybridization with 32P labeled probes and gel retardation analysis for detection of amplified DNA specific for each virus. A comparison of the detection of CMV by an antigenemia assay or the PCR method in the leukocytes of renal transplant patients revealed that the PCR assay detects cytomegalovirus earlier and more consistently than the antigenemia assay. Finally, the application of a fluorescent dye detection system and image analysis of the acrylamide gel with a laser scanner provides additional sensitivity to the detection of cytomegalovirus, as well as avoiding the use of radioactivity, making the assay more adaptable to the clinical laboratory.

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By 2 1/2 years of age, human infants appear to understand how others are connected to the external world through the mental state of attention and also appear to understand the specific role that the eyes play in deploying this attention. Previous research with chimpanzees suggests that, although they track the gaze of others, they may simultaneously be unaware of the underlying state of attention behind gaze. In a series of 3 experiments, the investigators systematically explored how the presence of eyes, direct eye contact, and head orientation and movement affected young chimpanzees' choice of 2 experimenters from whom to request food. The results indicate that young chimpanzees may be selectively attached to other organisms making direct eye contact with them or engaged in postures or movements that indicate attention, even though they may not appreciate the underlying mentalistic significance of these behaviors.

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BACKGROUND: Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) diagnosis of infectious diseases, especially virus diseases, offers a very sensitive and specific technique for clinical diagnosis. However, detection systems for amplified DNA requiring radioactive probe hybridization or signal development using blot transfer or nucleotide capture require overnight incubation or specially labeled probe molecules for analysis of amplified DNA. OBJECTIVES: To place this technology in the clinical laboratory, rapid and sensitive methods are needed for the detection of amplified DNA which are applicable to the assay of multiple specimens representing many different organisms and requiring a minimum of manipulation. STUDY DESIGN: Electrophoretic separation of amplified DNA fragments, stained with the fluorescent dye SYBR Green I, and laser scanning of the gels for detection of virus-specific PCR products was compared with detection of amplified DNA by liquid hybridization with radioactive probes and gel retardation analysis of labeled probe molecules. RESULTS: Fluorescent scanning methodology was applied to the detection of cytomegalovirus (CMV), herpes simplex virus (HSV) and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). This method was at least 10 times more sensitive than radioactive probe hybridization in the detection of CMV-specific PCR products. This method also required less time and avoided the use of radioactivity. CONCLUSIONS: Clinical diagnosis of virus infections can be conveniently and rapidly accomplished, while avoiding the dangers of radioactive probe handling, by fluorescence staining and laser scanning of specifically amplified gene fragments. This technology is applicable to the detection of genes from many different organisms, without specially synthesized and/or labeled oligonucleotide primer or probe sequences.

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The ability of young children to recognize themselves in delayed videotapes and recent photographs was investigated using a delayed analog of the mirror mark test, as well as verbal reports. In Experiment 1, 42 2-4-year-old children were videotaped while playing an unusual game. During the game an experimenter covertly placed a large sticker on the child's head. The videotape was played back 3 min later to the children. Older, but not younger, children reached up to remove the sticker when the tape revealed it being placed on their heads. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used with 60 3- and 4-year-olds where Polaroid photographs were taken during and after the act of the sticker being placed on the child's head. When allowed to look at the photographs, young 3-year-olds did not reach up to search for the sticker, whereas older 3- and 4-year-olds did. Almost all of the children who did not appear to realize that there was a sticker on their head from the information provided by the photographs did provide a correct verbal label for the image, and reached up to remove the sticker when presented with a mirror. Experiment 3 compared the reaction of 48 2 1/2-3 1/2-year-olds to live versus delayed video feedback and indicated an effect of the temporal aspect of the stimulus. The results are discussed in the context of the different forms of self-conception that may underwrite the 2 manifestations of self-recognition.

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To evaluate Heyes's (1994) claim that chimpanzees are incapable of using mirrored information to obtain otherwise unavailable information about the self, we exposed two different age groups of chimpanzees (3-year-olds and 7- to 10-year-olds) to mirrors and video images of conspecifics. Their reactions to these stimuli were videotaped and were later scored for behavioral indices of self-recognition by a trained observer who was blind to the purpose and conditions of the study. Some types of behavior (contingent facial and body movements) were clearly influenced by the type of stimulus that the chimpanzees were viewing but not by age; however, other behaviors (self-exploration) were affected by age in conjunction with the type of stimulus the animals were viewing. The results suggest that, unlike self-exploratory behavior, contingent facial and body movements may not, by themselves, be reliable indicators of self-recognition.

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Previous experimental research has suggested that chimpanzees may understand some of the epistemological aspects of visual perception, such as how the perceptual act of seeing can have internal mental consequences for an individual's state of knowledge. Other research suggests that chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates may understand visual perception at a simpler level; that is, they may at least understand seeing as a mental event that subjectively anchors organisms to the external world. However, these results are ambiguous and are open to several interpretations. In this Monograph, we report the results of 15 studies that we conducted with chimpanzees and preschool children to explore their knowledge about visual perception. The central goal of these studies was to determine whether young chimpanzees appreciate that visual perception subjectively links organisms to the external world. In order to achieve this goal, our research incorporated three methodological objectives. First, we sought to overcome limitations of previous comparative theory of mind research by using a fairly large sample of well-trained chimpanzees (six to seven animals in all studies) who were all within 8 months of age of each other. In contrast, previous research has typically relied on the results of one to four animals ranging widely in age. Second, we designed our studies in order to allow for a very sensitive diagnosis of whether the animals possessed immediate dispositions to act in a fashion predicted by a theory of mind view of their psychology or whether their successful performances could be better explained by learning theory. Finally, using fairly well-established transitions in preschool children's understanding of visual perception, we sought to establish the validity of our nonverbal methods by testing predictions about how children of various ages ought to perform. Collectively, our findings provide little evidence that young chimpanzees understand seeing as a mental event. Although our results establish that young chimpanzees both (a) develop algorithms for tracking the visual gaze of other organisms and (b) quickly learn rules about the configurations of faces and eyes, on the one hand, and subsequent events, on the other, they provide no clear evidence that these algorithms and rules are grounded in a matrix of intentionality. Particularly striking, our results demonstrate that, even though young chimpanzee subjects spontaneously attend to and follow the visual gaze of others, they simultaneously appear oblivious to the attentional significance of that gaze. Thus, young chimpanzees possess and learn rules about visual perception, but these rules do not necessarily incorporate the notion that seeing is "about" something. The general pattern of our results is consistent with three different possibilities. First, the potential existence of a general developmental delay in psychological development in chimpanzees (or, more likely, an acceleration in humans) leaves open the possibility that older chimpanzees may display evidence of a mentalistic appreciation of seeing. Second, chimpanzees may possess a different (but nonetheless mentalistic) theory of attention in which organisms are subjectively connected to the world not through any particular sensory modality such as vision but rather through other (as-of-yet unspecified) behavioral indicators. Finally, a subjective understanding of visual perception (and perhaps behavior in general) may be a uniquely evolved feature of the human lineage.

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A fundamentally new psychology related to the ability to conceive of limited aspects of the self may have evolved in the ancestor of the great ape/human clade. Existing models of the evolution of primate intelligence do not provide an adequate explanation of the apparent restriction of this phenomenon. We propose that the capacity for self-conception evolved as a psychological mechanism enabling large-bodied, highly arboreal apes to cope with problems posed by the need to negotiate their way through a habitat that was fragile due to their body size. First, we briefly outline the case for believing that a new psychology related to self-conception evolved during the Miocene in the ancestor of the great ape/human clade. Next, we examine the existing models of the evolution of primate intelligence and assess their ability to account for the evolution of self-conception. Finally, we offer details of our alternative model, along with a series of predictions that can be derived from it.

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Traditional analyses of the evolution of intelligence have emphasized commonality and continuity among species. However, recent research suggests that humans might have specialized in a particular kind of intelligence that is related to understanding mental states such as desires, intentions and beliefs. Data indicate that the ability to reflect on one's own mental states, as well as those of others, might be the result of evolutionary changes in the prefrontal cortex. Behavioral studies in children and chimpanzees reveal both similarities and striking differences in the developmental pathways that lead to theory-of-mind capacities. Humans and great apes share many ancient patterns of social behavior, but it is too early to be certain if they interpret them in the same manner. Humans might have evolved a cognitive specialization in theory of mind, forever altering their view of the social universe.

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Pointing with the index finger is a universal human (Homo sapiens) behavior found in cultures around the world. The emergence of pointing in infancy has traditionally been linked with the early development of cognitive capacities such as perspective-taking, intersubjectivity, and empathy. In contrast to humans, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) do not develop a pointing gesture with the index finger and rarely point by gesturing with hands or arms. However, recent experimental data suggest that chimpanzees may develop cognitive skills related to perspective-taking and empathy. In this article we report the existence of a difference in the resting morphology of the index finger in humans and chimpanzees. We speculate on how this species difference may be related to species differences in pointing with the index finger.

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Mirror self-recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) is typically delayed until 4 1/2-8 years of age. Also, species capable of mirror self-recognition may be capable of some forms of mental state attribution related to intentions and knowledge. Previous investigations of knowledge attribution by chimpanzees used adolescents and adults but did not explicitly test for self-recognition. We report an investigation of knowledge attribution in 6 young chimpanzees previously tested for self-recognition. Subjects were required to discriminate between a person who had seen where food was hidden and another person who had not. The results are consistent with the proposition that most chimpanzees younger than 4 1/2 years of age show neither mirror self-recognition nor knowledge attribution. The results are also consistent with the idea that, just as in humans, development of self-recognition in chimpanzees may precede development of knowledge attribution.

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Investigations of mirror self-recognition (SR) in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) have had small samples and divergent methods. In Experiment 1, 105 chimpanzees (10 months to 40 years of age) were observed for signs of SR across 5 days of continuous mirror exposure. In Experiments 2 and 3, negative SR adult and adolescent chimpanzees were saturated with mirror exposure in efforts to facilitate SR and a longitudinal study was conducted with a number of young subjects. In Experiment 4, mark tests were administered to groups of positive SR, negative SR, and ambiguous SR subjects. In Experiment 5, we explored whether previous positive SR reports in young chimpanzees were artifacts of increased arousal during mirror exposure. Results suggest that SR typically emerges at 4.5-8 years of age, at the population level the capacity declines in adulthood, and in group settings SR typically occurs within minutes of a subject's exposure to a mirror.

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Since Darwin, the idea of intellectual continuity has gripped comparative psychology. Psychological evolution has been viewed as the accumulation of gradual changes over time, resulting in an unbroken chain of mental capacities throughout the diversity of life. Some researchers have even maintained that no fundamental psychological differences exist among species. An alternative model argues that a rather profound new psychology related to mental state attribution may have evolved recently in the primate order. The author explores recent experimental research from chimpanzees, rhesus monkeys, and children that is consistent with this second model of psychological evolution. Drawing on the fields of developmental, comparative, and social psychology, as well as evolutionary and developmental biology, the author outlines a research agenda aimed at reconstructing the evolution of metacognition.

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Three- and 4-year-old children (Homo sapiens) were tested for comprehension of knowledge formation. In Experiment 1, 34 subjects watched as a surprise was hidden under 1 of 4 obscured cups. The experimenter then pointed to the cup. All children searched under the correct cup, but no 3-year-olds (in contrast to most 4-year-olds) could explain how they knew where to look. Subjects then discriminated between simultaneous pointing by 2 adults, one who had hidden a surprise and one who had left the room before the surprise was hidden. Most 4-year-olds (but no 3-year-olds) showed clear discrimination between the adults. In Experiment 2, 16 subjects were tested with procedures designed to make the source of their own knowledge more obvious, but this had no effect on performance. We conclude that studies using very similar procedures with chimpanzees and rhesus macaques were measuring an ability (or inability) to understand how knowledge states form.

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