RESUMEN
The effectiveness of the human-machine interface (HMI) in a driving automation system during takeover situations is based, in part, on its design. Past research has indicated that modality, specificity, and timing of the HMI have an impact on driver behavior. The objective of this study was to examine the effectiveness of two HMIs, which vary by modality, specificity, and timing, on drivers' takeover time, performance, and eye glance behavior. Drivers' behavior was examined in a driving simulator study with different levels of automation, varying traffic conditions, and while completing a non-driving related task. Results indicated that HMI type had a statistically significant effect on velocity and off-road eye glances such that those who were exposed to an HMI that gave multimodal warnings with greater specificity exhibited better performance. There were no effects of HMI on acceleration, lane position, or other eye glance metrics (e.g., on road glance duration). Future work should disentangle HMI design further to determine exactly which aspects of design yield between safety critical behavior.
Asunto(s)
Automatización , Conducción de Automóvil , Sistemas Hombre-Máquina , Interfaz Usuario-Computador , Humanos , Conducción de Automóvil/psicología , Masculino , Adulto , Femenino , Adulto Joven , Simulación por Computador , Automóviles , Movimientos Oculares , Factores de Tiempo , Adolescente , Análisis y Desempeño de TareasRESUMEN
Modern vehicles are vulnerable to cyberattacks and the consequences can be severe. While technological efforts have attempted to address the problem, the role of human drivers is understudied. This study aims to assess the effectiveness of training and warning systems on drivers' response behavior to vehicle cyberattacks. Thirty-two participants completed a driving simulator study to assess the effectiveness of training and warning system according to their velocity, deceleration events, and count of cautionary behaviors. Participants, who held a valid United States driving license and had a mean age of 20.4 years old, were equally assigned to one of four groups: control (n = 8), training-only (n = 8), warning-only (n = 8), training and warning groups (n = 8). For each drive, mixed ANOVAs were implemented on the velocity variables and Poisson regression was conducted on the normalized time with large deceleration events and cautionary behavior variables. Overall, the results suggest that drivers' response behaviors were moderately affected by the training programs and the warning messages. Most drivers who received training or warning messages responded safely and appropriately to cyberattacks, e.g., by slowing down, pulling over, or performing cautionary behaviors, but only in specific cyberattack events. Training programs show promise in improving drivers' responses toward vehicle cyberattacks, and warning messages show rather moderate improvement but can be further refined to yield consistent behavior.