RESUMEN

The security and privacy provided by Visible Light Communication (VLC) technologies is an area that has been slightly addressed due to the misconception that, since light does not go through solid objects like walls, VLC-based communications cannot be eavesdropped on by outside observers. As an upcoming technology, VLC is expected to be used in multiple environments were, due to radio frequency RF overuse or limitations, RF solutions cannot or should not be employed. In this work, we study the eavesdropping characteristics of a VLC-based communication. To evaluate these concerns, a two-step process was followed. First, several simulations of a standardly used scenario were run. Later on, experimental tests were performed. Following those tests, the results of the simulations and the experimental tests were analyzed. The results of these simulations and tests seemed to indicate that VLC channels can be eavesdropped on without considerable difficulties. Furthermore, the results showed that sniffing attacks could be performed from areas outside the expected coverage of the VLC infrastructure. Finally, the use of the simulation such as the one implemented in this work to recognize places from which sniffing is possible helps determine the risk for eavesdropping that our VLC-based network has.

RESUMEN

Visible Light Communications (VLC) is a cutting edge technology for data communication that is being considered to be implemented in a wide range of applications such as Inter-vehicle communication or Local Area Network (LAN) communication. As a novel technology, some aspects of the implementation of VLC have not been deeply considered or tested. Among these aspects, security and its implementation may become an obstacle for VLCs broad usage. In this article, we have used the well-known Risk Matrix methodology to determine the relative risk that several common attacks have in a VLC network. Four examples: a War Driving, a Queensland alike Denial of Service, a Preshared Key Cracking, and an Evil Twin attack, illustrate the utilization of the methodology over a VLC implementation. The used attacks also covered the different areas delimited by the attack taxonomy used in this work. By defining and determining which attacks present a greater risk, the results of this work provide a lead into which areas should be invested to increase the safety of VLC networks.

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RESUMEN

Due to the massive insertion of embedded cameras in a wide variety of devices and the generalized use of LED lamps, Optical Camera Communication (OCC) has been proposed as a practical solution for future Internet of Things (IoT) and smart cities applications. Influence of mobility, weather conditions, solar radiation interference, and external light sources over Visible Light Communication (VLC) schemes have been addressed in previous works. Some authors have studied the spatial intersymbol interference from close emitters within an OCC system; however, it has not been characterized or measured in function of the different transmitted wavelengths. In this work, this interference has been experimentally characterized and the Normalized Power Signal to Interference Ratio (NPSIR) for easily determining the interference in other implementations, independently of the selected system devices, has been also proposed. A set of experiments in a darkroom, working with RGB multi-LED transmitters and a general purpose camera, were performed in order to obtain the NPSIR values and to validate the deduced equations for 2D pixel representation of real distances. These parameters were used in the simulation of a wireless sensor network scenario in a small office, where the Bit Error Rate (BER) of the communication link was calculated. The experiments show that the interference of other close emitters in terms of the distance and the used wavelength can be easily determined with the NPSIR. Finally, the simulation validates the applicability of the deduced equations for scaling the initial results into real scenarios.