RESUMEN

There is evidence that religiosity and self-esteem are positively related, while self-esteem and religiosity in turn predict successful social adaptation. Moreover, self-esteem has been shown to be directly related to social adaptation in vulnerable contexts. In this registered report study, we tested the hypothesis that religiosity has a positive influence on social adaptation for people living in vulnerable contexts and that self-esteem is a mediator of this relationship. Evidence from this study indicates that neither there is any effect of religiosity on social adaptation nor on self-esteem, independent of whether people live in vulnerable contexts or not.

RESUMEN

People living in vulnerable environments face a harder set of challenges adapting to their context. Nevertheless, an important number of them adapt successfully. However, which cognitive and socio-affective variables are specifically related to these variations in social adaptation in vulnerable contexts has not been fully understood nor directly addressed. Here we evaluated socio-affective variables (anxious attachment style, internal locus of control, self-esteem and stress) and cognitive variables (fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, working memory, numeracy, probabilistic reasoning and logical reasoning) to explain variations in social adaptation in a sample of 232 adults living in vulnerable contexts (M = 42.3, SD = 14.9, equal amount of men and women). Our results show that an important amount of variance in social adaptation can be explained by socio-affective variables, principally by self-esteem, while cognitive variables also contributed significantly. As far as we know, this is one of the first steps towards understanding the role of cognitive and socio-affective features on social adaptation. In the long run, this area of research could play an important role on the assignation of resources to ease people's integration into society. Our data and R analysis scripts can be found at: https://osf.io/egxy5/.

Asunto(s)

Cognición/fisiología , Inteligencia/fisiología , Autoimagen , Ajuste Social , Adolescente , Adulto , Anciano , Anciano de 80 o más Años , Femenino , Humanos , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Solución de Problemas/fisiología

RESUMEN

Higher education (HE) faces the challenge of responding to an increasing diversity. In this context, more attention is being paid to teachers and teaching skills positively related to students learning. Beyond the knowledges identified as key components of an effective teacher, teachers also need to be capable of unraveling what their students think and believe, and how they accommodate the new information. More importantly, teachers need to be able to adapt their own teaching to their audience's needs. In learners, social cognition (SC) has been related to a better receptivity to the different teacher-student interactions. Since these interactions are bidirectional, SC could also help to explain teachers' receptiveness to the information available in feedback situations. However, little is known about how SC is related to teacher development, and therefore teaching effectiveness, in HE. In addition, executive functions (EFs), closely related to SC, could play a key role in the ability to self-regulate their own teaching to better answering their students emerging needs. Although there is wide evidence regarding the association of EFs to performance in high demanding settings, as far as we know, there are no studies exploring the relationship between teachers' EFs and teaching effectiveness in HE. Establishing a positive association between teaching effectiveness and these socio-cognitive functions could be a promising first step in designing professional development programs that promote HE academics' ability to understand and care about students thoughts and emotions, to eventually adapt their teaching to their students needs for a better learning.

RESUMEN

Most of the research on Bayesian reasoning aims to answer theoretical questions about the extent to which people are able to update their beliefs according to Bayes' Theorem, about the evolutionary nature of Bayesian inference, or about the role of cognitive abilities in Bayesian inference. Few studies aim to answer practical, mainly health-related questions, such as, "What does it mean to have a positive test in a context of cancer screening?" or "What is the best way to communicate a medical test result so a patient will understand it?". This type of research aims to translate empirical findings into effective ways of providing risk information. In addition, the applied research often adopts the paradigms and methods of the theoretically-motivated research. But sometimes it works the other way around, and the theoretical research borrows the importance of the practical question in the medical context. The study of Bayesian reasoning is relevant to risk communication in that, to be as useful as possible, applied research should employ specifically tailored methods and contexts specific to the recipients of the risk information. In this paper, we concentrate on the communication of the result of medical tests and outline the epidemiological and test parameters that affect the predictive power of a test-whether it is correct or not. Building on this, we draw up recommendations for better practice to convey the results of medical tests that could inform health policy makers (What are the drawbacks of mass screenings?), be used by health practitioners and, in turn, help patients to make better and more informed decisions.

RESUMEN

Argumentation is a crucial component of our lives. Although in the absence of rational debate our legal, political, and scientific systems would not be possible, there is still no integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation. Furthermore, classical theories of argumentation are normative (i.e., the acceptability of an argument is determined by a set of norms or logical rules), which sometimes creates a dissociation between the theories and people's behavior. We think the current challenge for psychology is to bring together the cognitive and normative accounts of argumentation. In this article, we exemplify this point by analyzing two cases of argumentative structures experimentally studied in the context of cognitive psychology. Specifically, we focus on the slippery slope argument and the ad hominem argument under the frameworks of Bayesian and pragma-dialectics approaches, respectively. We think employing more descriptive and experimental accounts of argumentation would help Psychology to bring closer the cognitive and normative accounts of argumentation with the final goal of establishing an integrated area of research on the psychology of argumentation.