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Infrastructure development is a major driver of biodiversity loss globally. With upward of US$2.5 trillion in annual investments in infrastructure, the financial sector indirectly drives this biodiversity loss. At the same time, biodiversity safeguards (project-level biodiversity impact mitigation requirements) of infrastructure financiers can help limit this damage. The coverage and harmonization of biodiversity safeguards are important factors in their effectiveness and therefore warrant scrutiny. It is equally important to examine the extent to which these safeguards align with best-practice principles for biodiversity impact mitigation outlined in international policies, such as that of the International Union for Conservation of Nature. We assessed the biodiversity safeguards of public development banks and development finance institutions for coverage, harmonization, and alignment with best practice. We used Institute of New Structural Economics and Agence Française de Développement's global database to identify development banks that invest in high-biodiversity-footprint infrastructure and have over US$500 million in assets. Of the 155 banks, 42% (n = 65) had biodiversity safeguards. Of the existing safeguards, 86% (56 of 65) were harmonized with International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standard 6 (PS6). The IFC PS6 (and by extension the 56 safeguard policies harmonized with it) had high alignment with international best practice in biodiversity impact mitigation, whereas the remaining 8 exhibited partial alignment, incorporating few principles that clarify the conditions for effective biodiversity offsetting. Given their dual role in setting benchmarks and leveraging private finance, infrastructure financiers in development finance need to adopt best-practice biodiversity safeguards if the tide of global biodiversity loss is to be stemmed. The IFC PS6, if strengthened, can act as a useful template for other financier safeguards. The high degree of harmonization among safeguards is promising, pointing to a potential for diffusion of practices.

Evaluación mundial de las salvaguardas para la biodiversidad de los bancos del desarrollo que financian la infraestructura Resumen El desarrollo infraestructural es una de las causas principales de la pérdida mundial de biodiversidad. Con más de US$2.5 billones de inversión anual en la infraestructura, el sector financiero impulsa de forma indirecta esta pérdida. Al mismo tiempo, las salvaguardas para la biodiversidad (los requerimientos para la mitigación del impacto sobre la biodiversidad a nivel proyecto) de los financiadores de la infraestructura pueden ayudar a limitar este daño. La cobertura y armonización de estas salvaguardas son factores importantes en su efectividad y por lo tanto requieren de escrutinio. Es igual de importante examinar en qué medida se ajustan estas salvaguardas con los principios de mejores prácticas para mitigar el impacto sobre la biodiversidad esbozados en las políticas internacionales, como las de la UICN. Analizamos las salvaguardas para la biodiversidad de los bancos del desarrollo público y las instituciones de financiamiento para el desarrollo en cuanto a cobertura, armonización y ajuste con las mejores prácticas. Usamos las bases de datos mundiales del Institute of New Structural Economics y de la Agence Française de Développement para identificar los bancos del desarrollo que invierten en infraestructuras con una gran huella de biodiversidad y que tienen más de US$500 millones en activos. De los 155 bancos, el 42% % (n = 65) tenía salvaguardas para la biodiversidad. De éstas, el 86% (56 de 65) armonizaba con el Estándar de Desempeño 6 (PS6) de la Corporación Financiera Internacional (IFC). El PS6 de la IFC (y por extensión, las 56 salvaguardas que armonizan con él) tuvo un gran ajuste con las mejores prácticas internacionales para la mitigación del impacto sobre la biodiversidad, mientras que las ocho faltantes exhibieron un ajuste parcial, pues incorporaban pocos principios que clarificaban las condiciones de una compensación efectiva de biodiversidad. Ya que los financiadores de la infraestructura tienen un papel doble estableciendo referencias e impulsando el financiamiento privado, también necesitan adoptar las mejores prácticas para salvaguardar la biodiversidad si se desea detener la pérdida de biodiversidad mundial. El PS6 de la IFC, si se fortalece, puede fungir como una plantilla útil para los demás financiadores de las salvaguardas. La gran armonización entre las salvaguardas es prometedora y apunta hacia un potencial de difusión de las prácticas.

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The Belt and Road Initiative is perhaps the largest infrastructure development project in history and has aspirations to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals. In this Voices, we ask experts from various disciplinary backgrounds for their perspectives on the opportunities and challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative in achieving this vision.

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Biodiversity offsetting aims to compensate for development-induced biodiversity loss through commensurate conservation gains and is gaining traction among governments and businesses. However, cost shifting (i.e., diversion of offset funds to other conservation programs) and other perverse incentives can undermine the effectiveness of biodiversity offsetting. Additionality-the requirement that biodiversity offsets result in conservation outcomes that would not have been achieved otherwise-is fundamental to biodiversity offsetting. Cost shifting and violation of additionality can go hand in hand. India's national offsetting program is a case in point. Recent legislation allows the diversion of offset funds to meet the country's preexisting commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). With such diversions, no additional conservation takes place and development impacts remain uncompensated. Temporary additionality cannot be conceded in light of paucity of funds for preexisting commitments unless there is open acknowledgement that fulfillment of such commitments is contingent on offset funds. Two other examples of perverse incentives related to offsetting in India are the touting of inherently neutral offsetting outcomes as conservation gains, a tactic that breeds false complacency and results in reduced incentive for additional conservation efforts, and the clearing of native vegetation for commercial plantations in the name of compensatory afforestation, a practice that leads to biodiversity decline. The risks accompanying cost shifting and other perverse incentives, if not preempted and addressed, will result in net loss of forest cover in India. We recommend accurate baselines, transparent accounting, and open reporting of offset outcomes to ensure biodiversity offsetting achieves adequate and additional compensation for impacts of development.

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