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AimWe aimed to estimate the risk of COVID-19 outbreaks in a case study COVID-free destination country, associated with shore leave for merchant ship crews. MethodsA stochastic version of the SEIR model CovidSIM v1.1, designed specifically for COVID-19 was utilised. It was populated with parameters for SARS-CoV-2 transmission, shipping characteristics, and plausible control measures. ResultsWhen no control interventions were in place, an outbreak of COVID-19 in our case study destination country (New Zealand; NZ) was estimated to occur after a median time of 23 days (assuming a global average for source country incidence of 2.66 new infections per 1000 population per week, a crew of 20, a voyage length of 10 days, 1 day of shore leave both in NZ and abroad, and 108 port visits by international merchant ships per week). For this example the uncertainty around when outbreaks occur is wide (an outbreak occurs with 95% probability between 1 and 124 days). The combined use of a PCR test on arrival, self-reporting of symptoms with contact tracing, and mask use during shore leave, increased this median time to 1.0 year (14 days to 5.4 years). Scenario analyses found that onboard infection chains could persist for well over 4 weeks even with crews of only 5 members. ConclusionIntroduction of SARS-CoV-2 through shore leave from international shipping crews is likely, even after long voyages. The risk can be substantially mitigated by control measures such as PCR testing and mask use.
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There is large uncertainty around the case fatality risk (CFR) for COVID-19 in China. Therefore, we considered symptomatic cases outside of China (countries/settings with 20+ cases) and the proportion who are in intensive care units (4.0%, 14/349 on 13 February 2020). Given what is known about CFRs for ICU patients with severe respiratory conditions from a meta-analysis, we estimated a CFR of 1.37% (95%CI: 0.57% to 3.22%) for COVID- 19 cases outside of China.
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Recent experience with pandemic influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 highlighted the importance of global surveillance for severe respiratory disease to support pandemic preparedness and seasonal influenza control. Improved surveillance in the southern hemisphere is needed to provide critical data on influenza epidemiology, disease burden, circulating strains and effectiveness of influenza prevention and control measures. Hospital-based surveillance for severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) cases was established in New Zealand on 30 April 2012. The aims were to measure incidence, prevalence, risk factors, clinical spectrum and outcomes for SARI and associated influenza and other respiratory pathogen cases as well as to understand influenza contribution to patients not meeting SARI case definition.All inpatients with suspected respiratory infections who were admitted overnight to the study hospitals were screened daily. If a patient met the World Health Organization’s SARI case definition, a respiratory specimen was tested for influenza and other respiratory pathogens. A case report form captured demographics, history of presenting illness, co-morbidities, disease course and outcome and risk factors. These data were supplemented from electronic clinical records and other linked data sources.Hospital-based SARI surveillance has been implemented and is fully functioning in New Zealand. Active, prospective, continuous, hospital-based SARI surveillance is useful in supporting pandemic preparedness for emerging influenza A(H7N9) virus infections and seasonal influenza prevention and control.