RESUMEN
The paper reviews the course of the controversy surrounding Jung's theory of archetypes beginning in the mid 1990s and continuing to the present. Much of this controversy was concerned with the debate between the essentialism of the evolutionary position of Anthony Stevens as found in his 1983 book Archetypes: A Natural History of the Self, and the emergence model of the archetypes proposed in various publications by Hogenson, Knox and Merchant, among others. The paper then moves on to a consideration of more recent developments in theory, particularly as derived from an examination of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze, who introduces Bergson's somnambulistic unconscious into the discussion of Jung's theories. It is suggested that this largely unexamined influence on Jung may provide answers to some of the unanswered questions surrounding his theorizing. The paper concludes by suggesting that the notion of the somnambulistic unconscious may resemble Atmanspacher's argument for a dual-aspect monism interpretation of Jung.
L'article passe en revue le cours suivi par la controverse autour de la théorie de Jung sur les archétypes, commençant au milieu des années 1990 et jusqu'à aujourd'hui. Une partie importante de la controverse s'attachait au débat entre l'essentialisme de la position évolutionniste d'Anthony Stevens, telle qu'on la trouve dans son livre de 1984 Archétype : Une histoire naturelle du Soi, et le modèle de l'émergence des archétypes proposé sous des formes diverses par Hogenson, Knox et Merchant, entre autres. Cet article s'intéresse ensuite à des avancées plus récentes dans la théorie, particulièrement ce qui provient de l'examen du philosophe Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze introduit l'inconscient somnambulique de Bergson dans le débat sur les théories de Jung. Il est suggéré que cette influence sur Jung - à ce jour quasiment pas étudiée - pourrait fournir des réponses à certaines des questions ouvertes entourant ses théories. L'article conclut en suggérant que la notion d'inconscient somnambulique peut s'apparenter à l'argumentation d'Atmanspacher soutenant une interprétation de Jung selon le modèle d'un monisme à double aspect.
El trabajo presenta una revisión del curso de la controversia alrededor de la teoría de arquetipos de Jung que comenzó a mediados de 1990 y continúa hasta el presente. Mucho de dicha controversia consideraba el debate entre el esencialismo de la posición evolutiva de Anthony Stevens tal como es encontrada en su libro de 1984 Arquetipo: Una historia natural del self, y el modelo de emergencia propuesto por Hogenson, Knox y Merchant, entre otros. El trabajo luego considera un desarrollo más reciente en la teoría, que deriva particularmente de la examinación del filósofo Gilles Deleuze, quien introduce el inconsciente sonambulístico de Bergson en la discusión de las teorías de Jung. Se sugiere que esta influencia en Jung, largamente ignorada, puede ofrecer respuestas a algunas de las preguntas no respondidas de su teoría. El trabajo concluye sugiriendo que la noción de inconsciente sonambulístico puede parecerse al argumento de Atmanspacher sobre una interpretación de Jung, monista de aspecto dual.
Asunto(s)
Teoría Junguiana , Inconsciente en Psicología , HumanosRESUMEN
The discovery of mirror neurons by researchers at the University of Parma promises to radically alter our understanding of fundamental cognitive and affective states. This paper explores the relationship of mirror neurons to Jung's theory of archetypes and proposes that archetypes may be viewed as elementary action patterns. The paper begins with a review of a proposed interpretation of the fainting spells of S. Freud in his relationship with Jung as an example of an action pattern that also defines an archetypal image. The challenge that mirror neurons present to traditional views in analytical psychology and psychoanalysis, however, is that they operate without recourse to a cognitive processing element. This is a position that is gaining increasing acceptance in other fields as well. The paper therefore reviews the most recent claims made by the Boston Process of Change Study Group as well as conclusions drawn from dynamic systems views of development and theoretical robotics to underline the conclusion that unconscious agency is not a requirement for coherent action. It concludes with the suggestion that this entire body of research may lead to the conclusion that the dynamic unconscious is an unnecessary hypothesis in psychoanalysis and analytical psychology.
Asunto(s)
Teoría Freudiana , Teoría Junguiana , Neuronas/fisiología , Inconsciente en Psicología , Adulto , Inteligencia Artificial , Niño , Cognición , Humanos , Instinto , Modelos Psicológicos , Apego a Objetos , Psicoanálisis/métodos , Interpretación Psicoanalítica , Teoría Psicoanalítica , Religión y Psicología , Robótica , Teoría de SistemasRESUMEN
The paper considers the role of synchronicity in the establishment of meaning in analysis, and links it to the notion of moments of meeting proposed by the Boston Process of Change Study Group. In so doing, the paper proposed to view synchronicity as an element in developmental processes, wherein attributions of meaningfulness are made in relation to patterns of action that do not have intrinsic meaning, but which have evolved in an environment of meaning, thereby bootstrapping the infant into the world of meaning. Jung's paradigmatic example of synchronicity--the scarab beetle event--is examined in this context and the argument is made that the event was primarily meaningful for Jung and carried with it important countertransference implications that Jung did not consider. The paper concludes with some suggestions for further investigation into the relationship between synchronicity and clinical practice.
Asunto(s)
Teoría Junguiana , Contratransferencia , HumanosRESUMEN
Jung's theory of synchronicity is seen as a step in the development of a complete theory of the symbol. In so doing, a number of proposals are made for modelling the symbolic process along lines already in use for modelling a variety of other phenomena, ranging from language to the behaviour of earthquakes. These modelling techniques involve processes of self-organization, and raise issues of scaling in systems including symbolic systems. The proposal is made that symbolic systems obey the same rules of scaling that these other systems obey, and that symbolic systems can therefore be understood as exhibiting the characteristics of a power law distribution-a concept that is explained and developed in the paper. It is finally proposed that synchronicity is an aspect of the symbolic that can be characterized as exhibiting a high degree of 'symbolic density'.
Asunto(s)
Ego , Simbolismo , Interfaz Usuario-Computador , Humanos , Psicología/métodos , Factores de TiempoRESUMEN
This paper addresses the question of how symbols should be understood in analytical psychology and psychoanalysis. The point of view examined focuses on the recent turn to more cognitive and developmental models in both disciplines and briefly reviews and critiques the evolutionary and cognitive arguments. The paper then presents an argument based on dynamic systems theory in which no pre-existing template or structure for either mind or behaviour is assumed. Within the dynamic systems model the Self is viewed as an emergent phenomenon deriving from the dynamic patterns existing in a complex system that includes the physiological characteristics of the infant, the intentional attributions of the caregiver and the cultural or symbolic resources that constitute the environment. The symbol can then be seen as a discrete, and in important ways an autonomous, element in the dynamic system. Conclusions are drawn for further research into the nature of the symbol with implications for both theory and practice in analytical psychology and psychoanalysis.