RESUMEN
Enterprise innovation remains a cornerstone of economic development, with the direct influence of financialization on enterprise innovation standing as a critical factor. In contrast with the existing research, this study constructs an evolutionary game model by utilizing the Cournot model to analyze the innovation behavior of enterprises, and analyzes the influence of financialization on enterprise innovation by incorporating investment returns, market competition, and demand scale into the research framework. In addition, this study selects the sample of the Chinese non-financial listed enterprises and using panel data for the period 2009 to 2021. Based on the findings from the empirical analysis, this study reveals that excessive financialization hinders innovation in Chinese enterprises. Additionally, an intermediary pathway involving 'financialization - investment returns - enterprise innovation' is identified as a transmission mechanism. The demand scale generated by innovation inversely correlates with the inhibitory effects of financialization on enterprise innovation behavior. Meanwhile, heightened market competition amplifies the inhibitory influence of financialization on innovation. This study provided valuable empirical evidence, facilitating the enhancement of enterprise innovation efficiency.
RESUMEN
Payoff, emotion, and historical memory directly determine investment decision-making for incomplete rational men in a public goods game (PGG). How these factors affect investment and cooperation behavior has not been investigated yet. Thus, we proposed a new investment model involving theses three factors to examine its coupling effect on cooperation in PGG. An emotional increment was employed to describe the emotional change in every round by supposing an investor' pleasure to a cooperator but regret to a defector. Furthermore, an emotional index was formed by accumulating these historical changes with a memory decline effect. Then an investment formula was proposed by considering this emotional index and a historical payoff. Moreover, the cooperation level affected by these factors was investigated. Results show a mutually reinforcing relationship between emotional and payoff investments. A poor memory capacity coefficient allows defectors to change their behaviors but produces some opportunists. A large memory length results in a high cooperator fraction but is not suggested to be too large.