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This paper concerns the distributed intelligence or federated inference that emerges under belief-sharing among agents who share a common world-and world model. Imagine, for example, several animals keeping a lookout for predators. Their collective surveillance rests upon being able to communicate their beliefs-about what they see-among themselves. But, how is this possible? Here, we show how all the necessary components arise from minimising free energy. We use numerical studies to simulate the generation, acquisition and emergence of language in synthetic agents. Specifically, we consider inference, learning and selection as minimising the variational free energy of posterior (i.e., Bayesian) beliefs about the states, parameters and structure of generative models, respectively. The common theme-that attends these optimisation processes-is the selection of actions that minimise expected free energy, leading to active inference, learning and model selection (a.k.a., structure learning). We first illustrate the role of communication in resolving uncertainty about the latent states of a partially observed world, on which agents have complementary perspectives. We then consider the acquisition of the requisite language-entailed by a likelihood mapping from an agent's beliefs to their overt expression (e.g., speech)-showing that language can be transmitted across generations by active learning. Finally, we show that language is an emergent property of free energy minimisation, when agents operate within the same econiche. We conclude with a discussion of various perspectives on these phenomena; ranging from cultural niche construction, through federated learning, to the emergence of complexity in ensembles of self-organising systems.

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Schizophrenia is a neurodevelopmental psychiatric disorder thought to result from synaptic dysfunction that affects distributed brain connectivity, rather than any particular brain region. While symptomatology is traditionally divided into positive and negative symptoms, abnormal social cognition is now recognized a key component of schizophrenia. Nonetheless, we are still lacking a mechanistic understanding of effective brain connectivity in schizophrenia during social cognition and how it relates to clinical symptomatology. To address this question, we used fMRI and dynamic causal modelling (DCM) to test for abnormal brain connectivity in twenty-four patients with first-episode schizophrenia (FES) compared to twenty-five matched controls performing the Human Connectome Project (HCP) social cognition paradigm. Patients had not received regular therapeutic antipsychotics, but were not completely drug naïve. Whilst patients were less accurate than controls in judging social stimuli from non-social stimuli, our results revealed an increase in feedforward connectivity from motion-sensitive V5 to posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) in patients compared to matched controls. At the same time, patients with a higher degree of positive symptoms had more disinhibition within pSTS, a region computationally involved in social cognition. We interpret these findings the framework of active inference, where increased feedforward connectivity may encode aberrant prediction errors from V5 to pSTS and local disinhibition within pSTS may reflect aberrant encoding of the precision of cortical representations about social stimuli.

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Metacognition - the ability to represent, monitor and control ongoing cognitive processes - helps us perform many tasks, both when acting alone and when working with others. While metacognition is adaptive, and found in other animals, we should not assume that all human forms of metacognition are gene-based adaptations. Instead, some forms may have a social origin, including the discrimination, interpretation, and broadcasting of metacognitive representations. There is evidence that each of these abilities depends on cultural learning and therefore that cultural selection might shape human metacognition. The cultural origins hypothesis is a plausible and testable alternative that directs us towards a substantial new programme of research.

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This article offers a formal account of curiosity and insight in terms of active (Bayesian) inference. It deals with the dual problem of inferring states of the world and learning its statistical structure. In contrast to current trends in machine learning (e.g., deep learning), we focus on how people attain insight and understanding using just a handful of observations, which are solicited through curious behavior. We use simulations of abstract rule learning and approximate Bayesian inference to show that minimizing (expected) variational free energy leads to active sampling of novel contingencies. This epistemic behavior closes explanatory gaps in generative models of the world, thereby reducing uncertainty and satisfying curiosity. We then move from epistemic learning to model selection or structure learning to show how abductive processes emerge when agents test plausible hypotheses about symmetries (i.e., invariances or rules) in their generative models. The ensuing Bayesian model reduction evinces mechanisms associated with sleep and has all the hallmarks of "aha" moments. This formulation moves toward a computational account of consciousness in the pre-Cartesian sense of sharable knowledge (i.e., con: "together"; scire: "to know").

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Hermeneutics refers to interpretation and translation of text (typically ancient scriptures) but also applies to verbal and non-verbal communication. In a psychological setting it nicely frames the problem of inferring the intended content of a communication. In this paper, we offer a solution to the problem of neural hermeneutics based upon active inference. In active inference, action fulfils predictions about how we will behave (e.g., predicting we will speak). Crucially, these predictions can be used to predict both self and others--during speaking and listening respectively. Active inference mandates the suppression of prediction errors by updating an internal model that generates predictions--both at fast timescales (through perceptual inference) and slower timescales (through perceptual learning). If two agents adopt the same model, then--in principle--they can predict each other and minimise their mutual prediction errors. Heuristically, this ensures they are singing from the same hymn sheet. This paper builds upon recent work on active inference and communication to illustrate perceptual learning using simulated birdsongs. Our focus here is the neural hermeneutics implicit in learning, where communication facilitates long-term changes in generative models that are trying to predict each other. In other words, communication induces perceptual learning and enables others to (literally) change our minds and vice versa.

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Much decision-making requires balancing benefits to the self with benefits to the group. There are marked individual differences in this balance such that individualists tend to favor themselves whereas prosocials tend to favor the group. Understanding the mechanisms underlying this difference has important implications for society and its institutions. Using behavioral and fMRI data collected during the performance of the ultimatum game, we show that individual differences in social preferences for resource allocation, so-called "social value orientation," is linked with activity in the nucleus accumbens and amygdala elicited by inequity, rather than activity in insula, ACC, and dorsolateral pFC. Importantly, the presence of cognitive load made prosocials behave more prosocially and individualists more individualistically, suggesting that social value orientation is driven more by intuition than reflection. In parallel, activity in the nucleus accumbens and amygdala, in response to inequity, tracked this behavioral pattern of prosocials and individualists. In addition, we conducted an impunity game experiment with different participants where they could not punish unfair behavior and found that the inequity-correlated activity seen in prosocials during the ultimatum game disappeared. This result suggests that the accumbens and amygdala activity of prosocials encodes "outcome-oriented emotion" designed to change situations (i.e., achieve equity or punish). Together, our results suggest a pivotal contribution of the nucleus accumbens and amygdala to individual differences in sociality.

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This paper considers psychotic symptoms in terms of false inferences or beliefs. It is based on the notion that the brain is an inference machine that actively constructs hypotheses to explain or predict its sensations. This perspective provides a normative (Bayes-optimal) account of action and perception that emphasizes probabilistic representations; in particular, the confidence or precision of beliefs about the world. We will consider hallucinosis, abnormal eye movements, sensory attenuation deficits, catatonia, and delusions as various expressions of the same core pathology: namely, an aberrant encoding of precision. From a cognitive perspective, this represents a pernicious failure of metacognition (beliefs about beliefs) that can confound perceptual inference. In the embodied setting of active (Bayesian) inference, it can lead to behaviors that are paradoxically more accurate than Bayes-optimal behavior. Crucially, this normative account is accompanied by a neuronally plausible process theory based upon hierarchical predictive coding. In predictive coding, precision is thought to be encoded by the post-synaptic gain of neurons reporting prediction error. This suggests that both pervasive trait abnormalities and florid failures of inference in the psychotic state can be linked to factors controlling post-synaptic gain - such as NMDA receptor function and (dopaminergic) neuromodulation. We illustrate these points using biologically plausible simulations of perceptual synthesis, smooth pursuit eye movements and attribution of agency - that all use the same predictive coding scheme and pathology: namely, a reduction in the precision of prior beliefs, relative to sensory evidence.

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Does the brain activity underlying the production of deception differ depending on whether or not one believes their deception can be detected? To address this question, we had participants commit a mock theft in a laboratory setting, and then interrogated them while they underwent functional MRI (fMRI) scanning. Crucially, during some parts of the interrogation participants believed a lie-detector was activated, whereas in other parts they were told it was switched-off. We were thus able to examine the neural activity associated with the contrast between producing true vs. false claims, as well as the independent contrast between believing that deception could and could not be detected. We found increased activation in the right amygdala and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), as well as the left posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), during the production of false (compared to true) claims. Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the effects of deception and belief in the left temporal pole and right hippocampus/parahippocampal gyrus, where activity increased during the production of deception when participants believed their false claims could be detected, but not when they believed the lie-detector was switched-off. As these regions are associated with binding socially complex perceptual input and memory retrieval, we conclude that producing deceptive behavior in a context in which one believes this deception can be detected is associated with a cognitively taxing effort to reconcile contradictions between one's actions and recollections.

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The effects of other people's opinions on conscious perceptual judgments are pervasive and well studied. Although existing research is suggestive, less is known about how others' opinions affect nonconscious sensorimotor behavior. In the experiment, participants were shown figures containing a visual illusion, along with judgments made by experimental confederates, which conflicted with participants' previous perceptual reports. In this context, participants were asked to perform a simple motor behavior, for which the same illusion provided the target. We found that participants' precision while performing this behavior was affected by the group decision, even though conscious perceptual reports and movement efficiency were not. We discuss the consequences of these findings for cooperative behavior and for personal autonomy.

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As social agents, humans continually interact with the people around them. Here, motor cooperation was investigated using a paradigm in which pairs of participants, one being scanned with fMRI, jointly controlled a visually presented object with joystick movements. The object oscillated dynamically along two dimensions, color and width of gratings, corresponding to the two cardinal directions of joystick movements. While the overall control of each participant on the object was kept constant, the amount of cooperation along the two dimensions varied along four levels, from no (each participant controlled one dimension exclusively) to full (each participant controlled half of each dimension) cooperation. Increasing cooperation correlated with BOLD signal in the left parietal operculum and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), while decreasing cooperation correlated with activity in the right inferior frontal and superior temporal gyri, the intraparietal sulci and inferior temporal gyri bilaterally, and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. As joint performance improved with the level of cooperation, we assessed the brain responses correlating with behavior, and found that activity in most of the areas associated with levels of cooperation also correlated with the joint performance. The only brain area found exclusively in the negative correlation with cooperation was in the dorso medial frontal cortex, involved in monitoring action outcome. Given the cluster location and condition-related signal change, we propose that this region monitored actions to extract the level of cooperation in order to optimize the joint response. Our results, therefore, indicate that, in the current experimental paradigm involving joint control of a visually presented object with joystick movements, the level of cooperation affected brain networks involved in action control, but not mentalizing.

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Deception is an essentially social act, yet little is known about how social consequences affect the decision to deceive. In this study, participants played a computerized game of deception without constraints on whether or when to attempt to deceive their opponent. Participants were questioned by an opponent outside the scanner about their knowledge of the content of a display. Importantly, questions were posed so that, in some conditions, it was possible to be deceptive, while in other conditions it was not. To simulate a realistic interaction, participants could be confronted about their claims by the opponent. This design, therefore, creates a context in which a deceptive participant runs the risk of being punished if their deception is detected. Our results show that participants were slower to give honest than to give deceptive responses when they knew more about the display and could use this knowledge for their own benefit. The condition in which confrontation was not possible was associated with increased activity in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex. The processing of a question which allows a deceptive response was associated with activation in right caudate and inferior frontal gyrus. Our findings suggest the decision to deceive is affected by the potential risk of social confrontation rather than the claim itself.

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Many complex systems maintain a self-referential check and balance. In animals, such reflective monitoring and control processes have been grouped under the rubric of metacognition. In this introductory article to a Theme Issue on metacognition, we review recent and rapidly progressing developments from neuroscience, cognitive psychology, computer science and philosophy of mind. While each of these areas is represented in detail by individual contributions to the volume, we take this opportunity to draw links between disciplines, and highlight areas where further integration is needed. Specifically, we cover the definition, measurement, neurobiology and possible functions of metacognition, and assess the relationship between metacognition and consciousness. We propose a framework in which level of representation, order of behaviour and access consciousness are orthogonal dimensions of the conceptual landscape.

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Collaboration can provide benefits to the individual and the group across a variety of contexts. Even in simple perceptual tasks, the aggregation of individuals' personal information can enable enhanced group decision-making. However, in certain circumstances such collaboration can worsen performance, or even expose an individual to exploitation in economic tasks, and therefore a balance needs to be struck between a collaborative and a more egocentric disposition. Neurohumoral agents such as oxytocin are known to promote collaborative behaviours in economic tasks, but whether there are opponent agents, and whether these might even affect information aggregation without an economic component, is unknown. Here, we show that an androgen hormone, testosterone, acts as such an agent. Testosterone causally disrupted collaborative decision-making in a perceptual decision task, markedly reducing performance benefit individuals accrued from collaboration while leaving individual decision-making ability unaffected. This effect emerged because testosterone engendered more egocentric choices, manifest in an overweighting of one's own relative to others' judgements during joint decision-making. Our findings show that the biological control of social behaviour is dynamically regulated not only by modulators promoting, but also by those diminishing a propensity to collaborate.

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Recent research shows that visual processing influences the speed/accuracy trade-off people use when performing goal-directed movement. This raises the question of how this influence is produced in visual cognition. Visual influences on speed/accuracy trade-off could be produced in conscious visual perception, in non-conscious visuomotor transformation, or by some interaction of conscious perceptual and non-conscious visuomotor processes. There is independent evidence showing that both perceptual and visuomotor processes are involved in trading off speed and accuracy; however, the interaction between these processes has yet to be investigated. We present an experiment in which we show that a change in visual consciousness induced by a perceptual illusion affects the speed and accuracy of goal-directed movements, suggesting that perceptual and visuomotor processes do interact in speed/accuracy trade-off. We discuss the consequences of these results for theories of visual function more generally.

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Although much is known about decision making under uncertainty when only a single step is required in the decision process, less is known about sequential decision making. We carried out a stochastic sequence learning task in which subjects had to use noisy feedback to learn sequences of button presses. We compared flat and hierarchical behavioral models and found that although both models predicted the choices of the group of subjects equally well, only the hierarchical model correlated significantly with learning-related changes in the magneto-encephalographic response. The significant modulations in the magneto-encephalographic signal occurred 83 msec before button press and 67 msec after button press. We also localized the sources of these effects and found that the early effect localized to the insula, whereas the late effect localized to the premotor cortex.

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This experiment tests how people produce and detect deception while playing a computerized version of the dice game, Meyer. Deception is an integral part of this game, and the participants played it as in real life, without constraints on whether or when to attempt to deceive their opponent, and whether or when to accuse them of deception. We stress that deception is a complex act that cannot be exclusively associated with telling a falsehood, and that it is facilitated by hierarchical decision-making and risk evaluation. In comparison with a non-competitive control condition, both claiming truthfully and claiming falsely were associated with activity in fronto-polar cortex (BA10). However, relative to true claims, false claims were associated with greater activity in the premotor and parietal cortices. We speculate that the activity in BA10 is associated with the development of high-level executive strategies involved in both types of claim, while the premotor and parietal activity is associated with the need to select which particular claim to make.

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Behavioural and neuroimaging studies suggest that spontaneous and task-related thought processes share common cognitive mechanisms and neural bases. Lateral rostral prefrontal cortex (RPFC) is a brain region that has been implicated both in spontaneous thought and in high-level cognitive control processes, such as goal/subgoal integration and the manipulation of self-generated thoughts. We therefore propose that the recruitment of lateral RPFC may follow a U-shaped function of cognitive demand: relatively high in low-demand situations conducive to the emergence of spontaneous thought, and in high-demand situations depending on processes supported by this brain region. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate brain activity while healthy participants performed two tasks, each with three levels of cognitive demands, in a block design. The frequency of task-unrelated thoughts, measured by questionnaire, was highest in the low cognitive demand condition. Low and high cognitive demand conditions were each compared to the intermediate level. Lateral RPFC and superior parietal cortex were recruited in both comparisons, with additional activations specific to each contrast. These results suggest that RPFC is involved both when (a) task demands are low, and the mind wanders, and (b) the task requires goal/subgoal integration and manipulation of self-generated thoughts.

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'Social value orientation' characterizes individual differences in anchoring attitudes toward the division of resources. Here, by contrasting people with prosocial and individualistic orientations using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we demonstrate that degree of inequity aversion in prosocials is predictable from amygdala activity and unaffected by cognitive load. This result suggests that automatic emotional processing in the amygdala lies at the core of prosocial value orientation.

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Postencounter and circa-strike defensive contexts represent two adaptive responses to potential and imminent danger. In the context of a predator, the postencounter reflects the initial detection of the potential threat, whereas the circa-strike is associated with direct predatory attack. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate the neural organization of anticipation and avoidance of artificial predators with high or low probability of capturing the subject across analogous postencounter and circa-strike contexts of threat. Consistent with defense systems models, postencounter threat elicited activity in forebrain areas, including subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (sgACC), hippocampus, and amygdala. Conversely, active avoidance during circa-strike threat increased activity in mid-dorsal ACC and midbrain areas. During the circa-strike condition, subjects showed increased coupling between the midbrain and mid-dorsal ACC and decreased coupling with the sgACC, amygdala, and hippocampus. Greater activity was observed in the right pregenual ACC for high compared with low probability of capture during circa-strike threat. This region showed decreased coupling with the amygdala, insula, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Finally, we found that locomotor errors correlated with subjective reports of panic for the high compared with low probability of capture during the circa-strike threat, and these panic-related locomotor errors were correlated with midbrain activity. These findings support models suggesting that higher forebrain areas are involved in early-threat responses, including the assignment and control of fear, whereas imminent danger results in fast, likely "hard-wired," defensive reactions mediated by the midbrain.

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